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Abstract
This thesis contains three core chapters that assess the performance of alter-
native monetary policy frameworks and instruments in stabilizing 10 selected
African economies. Literature and practice show that Advanced Economies
(AEs) and Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) are mostly adopting the in-
ation targeting (IT) framework. This framework relies on active use of the
interest rate as a policy instrument for macroeconomic stabilisation. Di¤er-
ent from AEs and EMEs, the majority of African countries are characterized
by low nancial market development, frequent supply shocks and volatile
terms of trade. These features impede the e¢ ciency of the IT framework
and the interest rate instrument. Supply shocks imply that ination is not
only demand driven. Volatile terms of trade translate into excessive exchange
rate uctuations.
Due to these factors, policy practice in Africa remains largely divergent
from the global trend. Authorities still rely on monetary aggregate tar-
geting (MAT) with de facto managed exchange rates. However, the MAT
framework is also failing to stabilize economies. This follows instability of
the key factors, such as the money demand, upon which the framework is
anchored. Furthermore, controlling exchange rate movements is a challenge
due to weak balance of payments positions. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the majority of African economies still remain in the grip of macroeco-
nomic instability. Ination and GDP targets are rarely met and they also
remain volatile. The perverse macroeconomic features and the perceived fail-
ure of the MAT regime have necessitated the search for alternative monetary
frameworks and instruments.
In this study, we join the search by specically focussing on three questions.
First, given the macroeconomic landscape in Africa, what is the relative
performance of the interest rate vis-à-vis the monetary aggregate as instru-
iv
ments for macroeconomic stabilization? Secondly, how do these instruments
perform when apart from ination and output stabilization, monetary pol-
icy also engages in smoothing exchange rate uctuations? Thirdly, what is
the relative performance of ination targeting vis-à-vis nominal GDP target-
ing as alternative monetary policy regimes for macroeconomic stabilization
in African economies? Although the success of monetary policy largely re-
lies on appropriate conguration of monetary policy frameworks and instru-
ments, answers to these questions remain controversial and scanty for African
economies.
In order to address these questions, we formulate a New Keynesian Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model. In this model, money is
non-separable from consumption in the utility function. We estimate the
model using the Maximum Likelihood method with quarterly data mostly
from 1990 to 2014. The data is obtained from the International Financial
Statistics (IFS). The thesis has ve chapters. Chapter 1 is the general back-
ground to the research problem. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are distinct but related
core chapters addressing three specic research questions. Chapter 5 is the
conclusion.
In Chapter 2, we compare the performance of the monetary aggregate and
the interest rate as alternative instruments for stabilizing ination and out-
put in 10 selected countries. Results show that the monetary aggregate is
superior in stabilizing 5 economies. In the other 5 countries, it is the interest
rate instrument which performs better. In the former group of countries, the
monetary aggregate plays a relatively large role in macroeconomic dynamics
while in the latter the interest rate is more signicant. These results partly
reect di¤erences in nancial market development between the two groups of
countries. Overall, we nd a weak role of the interest rate compared to the
monetary aggregate in driving aggregate demand dynamics. The exchange
rate is also found to be a key driver of macroeconomic dynamics. Our re-
v
sults suggest three things: First, authorities in Africa need to be cautious
of a blanket adoption of the interest rate as a sole monetary policy instru-
ment. Second, authorities will nd it di¢ cult to stabilize economies using
the interest rate based frameworks. Third, exchange rate stability is key to
macroeconomic stability in Africa.
In Chapter 3, we extend the authoritiesobjective function. In addition to
minimizing ination and output volatility, authorities also use the interest
rate or money supply rules to smooth exchange rate uctuations. The re-
sults show that macroeconomic performance is enhanced when authorities
smooth exchange rate uctuations in 4 of the 10 countries. The gains from
exchange rate smoothing mostly arise from a reduction in ination and ex-
change rate volatility but not from output. In the other 6 countries, exchange
rate smoothing worsens macroeconomic performance. These results reect
the fact that the exchange rate exerts a relatively large inuence in macro-
economic dynamics in the rst group of countries compared to the latter.
Exchange rate smoothing therefore minimizes the pass-through of the ex-
change uctuations to ination and output leading to better performance.
Overall, the ndings suggest that exchange rate smoothing is harmful in
Africa. Where exchange rate smoothing delivers gains, appropriate thresh-
olds of smoothing need to be observed to avoid policy induced macroeconomic
instability. Authorities should also smooth temporal rather that structural
shifts in the exchange rate level.
In Chapter 4, we compare the performance of ination targeting (IT) vis-à-
vis nominal GDP targeting (NGDPT) as alternative monetary policy frame-
works for macroeconomic stabilization. We examine the strict and exible
versions of these policy regimes. We also include a hybrid regime which
combines elements of IT and NGDPT. Results show that the hybrid regime
performs better in 5 countries. In the other 4 countries, it is the strict
ination targeting that performs better. In 1 country, exible ination tar-
vi
geting is optimal. The results also reveal that demand shocks dominate
but are closely trailed by supply and exchange rate shocks in explaining
macroeconomic uctuations. The multiplicity of signicant shocks is key
in explaining the dominance of the hybrid regime. The hybrid regime suc-
cessfully handles shocks that can neither be optimally handled by the IT
regime nor the NGDPT regime alone. These results have several implica-
tions. First, demand management alone is insu¢ cient to stabilize African
economies. Second, identifying dominant shocks is critical for choosing ro-
bust monetary policy regimes. Third, the multiplicity of signicant shocks
implies that choosing monetary policy frameworks and hence macroeconomic
management process is more complex for African policy makers.
Overall, the results have several policy implications which are outlined in
Chapter 5. First, they suggest a cautious approach towards generalized
adoption of the interest rate over the monetary aggregate as a monetary
policy instrument in African economies. This contradicts the current wave
of monetary policy changes sweeping across African countries. Secondly, the
signicance of the exchange rate renders credence to exchange rate smoothing
in Africa. The ndings, however, suggest that exchange rate smoothing can
either enhance or worsen macroeconomic performance. Where it enhances
macroeconomic performance, authorities must carefully consider the thresh-
olds of smoothing to avoid creating macroeconomic instability. Authorities
need not ght structural shifts in exchange rates levels through smoothing.
This would help to preserve the shock absorbing role of the exchange rate.
Finally, the prevalence of demand, supply as well as exchange rate shocks
makes the hybrid monetary policy regime which combines elements of IT
regime as well as NGDPT regime to perform relatively better in stabilizing
the majority of the economies. Given the multiplicity of shocks, authorities
in Africa need to complement demand management with policies that address
supply side and exchange rate bottlenecks to ensure sustainable macroeco-
vii
nomic stability. Overall, the ndings suggest that there is scope to improve
monetary policy performance in Africa by adopting suitable frameworks and
instruments. The results also highlight the problem of tackling monetary
policy issues with a "one size ts all" approach.
viii
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background to the study
Persistent shocks a¤ect macroeconomic performance in several African coun-
tries. These shocks exert negative impact on macroeconomic stability and
social welfare. In order to preserve and improve macroeconomic performance,
authorities are increasingly searching for monetary policy frameworks and in-
struments that are robust to the prevailing shocks. As dened by Mishkin
(1999), monetary policy frameworks are institutional arrangements which
guide the conduct of monetary policy. Monetary policy instruments are de-
ned as tools that central banks use to inuence money market and credit
conditions in order to meet monetary policy objectives.
Literature on monetary policy frameworks can be located in the Mundell-
Flemming theory. In this theory, an economy is typically deemed to be
unable to simultaneously pursue three objectives. These objectives are: a
xed exchange rate system, an open capital account and an independent
monetary policy. This theory is also known as the Impossible Trinity or the
Trilemma. It is a hypothesis based on two factors. First, is the Uncovered
Interest rate Parity condition (UIP). Second, is the nding from empirical
studies where countries that have tried to simultaneously pursue all three ob-
jectives have failed. There are various monetary policy regimes. The popular
ones are: i) Exchange Rate Targeting (ERT) which is mostly implemented
when a country has chosen to lose monetary policy independence. In this
study, we assume that authorities have chosen independent monetary policy.
Therefore, they can implement monetary policy using any of the following
regimes: (ii) Monetary Aggregate Targeting (MAT), (iii) Ination Targeting
(IT) and (iv) Nominal GDP Targeting (NGDPT). The choice of any of these
frameworks together with the instruments used to achieve policy objectives
ideally depends on a countrys macroeconomic conditions.
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According to Mishkin (1999), ERT involves xing the value of a domestic
currency to a low ination currency. In this framework, authorities rely on
information conveyed by the exchange rate. The ERT is quite successful
in anchoring ination expectations in small open economies (Frankel 2014).
However, by denition, the exchange rate target does not allow the exchange
rate to move in line with changes in macroeconomic fundamentals. For ex-
ample, a demand shock arising from increased demand for domestic exports
should result in an appreciation of the domestic currency. However, the ex-
change rate will not be allowed to appreciate in order to absorb the shock.
Instead, authorities will buy foreign exchange on the market to defend it. In
Africa, poor terms of trade, weak balance of payments positions and weak
central bank balance sheets make defending the exchange rate an extremely
di¢ cult task. Furthermore, the shocks that hit the anchor country are di-
rectly transferrable to the domestic economy under the ERT. Under these
circumstances, the ERT poses particular challenges since African countries
may lack the capacity to withstand imported shocks. Therefore, the ERT
regime may not be a feasible option in many African countries.
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system around 1971, several coun-
tries opted for the MAT. The MAT is based on the quantity theory of money.
It basically involves estimating potential output growth and velocity trends.
Then through a quantity-equation framework, the target growth rate of the
monetary aggregate is backed out. Authorities then withdraw or inject liq-
uidity to ensure that the actual growth in the monetary aggregate is consis-
tent with the backed out target. The MAT involves reliance on information
conveyed by a monetary aggregate. Berg et al. (2010) argue that one key
advantage of this framework is that under imperfect information, monetary
aggregates may contain information about aggregate demand and interest
rates that can not be conveyed by interest rates or the exchange rate and
can also not be readily observed in real time. In addition, interest rates may
not be market clearing in shallow nancial markets such as in the majority
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of African economies. In which case, it becomes di¢ cult to infer the true
opportunity cost of future consumption based on prevailing interest rates.
Furthermore, the use of MAT also results from the authoritiesunprepared-
ness to implement forward looking regimes. This may be due to lack of
operational and scal independence. Under these constraints, strict mon-
etary targeting provides a bulwark against scal dominance. However, as
observed by Mishkin (1999), the e¤ectiveness of the MAT relies on the sta-
bility of velocity and money multiplier. Some studies, such as Sichei and
Kamau (2010) nd that the velocity and the money multiplier are unstable
in Africa. Under a demand shock, authorities nd it increasingly di¢ cult to
determine the exact amount of liquidity to withdraw from the economy in
order to remain consistent with the policy targets. Countries which pursue
the MAT also su¤er a number of other drawbacks. These include poor liq-
uidity management and absence of well-articulated frameworks for assessing
how monetary policy should respond to shocks (Mishra et al. 2012). These
challenges are rendering the MAT framework ine¤ective and have generated
a quest for alternative regimes. One of the alternatives to the MAT is the
IT framework.
A key feature of the IT regime is the announcement of a numerical target
for ination. The announcement comes with an institutional commitment by
the monetary authority to achieve the target. Monetary policy decisions are
guided by the deviation of forecasts of future ination from the announced
target and deviation of actual output from trend. Taylor (1993) provides
useful empirical insight to this. He states that actual monetary policy de-
cisions could be usefully approximated by a simple interest-rate rule that
is increasing in the expected ination-rate gap and output gap. According
to Frankel (2014), the IT framework is gaining more popularity in AEs and
EMEs. This follows its robustness to aggregate demand shocks. Demand
shocks are dominant in these economies. Under IT, central banks typically
3
treat the nominal interest rate as their policy instrument.
The characterization of monetary policy conduct under IT shows that when
ination is rooted in demand factors, the IT regime together with the interest
rate instrument do not generate policy trade-o¤s. When there is a demand
shock, contractionary monetary policy closes both the output gap as well as
the ination gap. The challenge occurs when an economy is faced with a
negative shock to output due for example, to droughts or collapse in terms of
trade. In such cases, monetary policy conduct is not straight forward. Strict
adherence to IT which calls for a rise in interest rates may worsen output
gap and exacerbate inationary pressures. In Africa, several studies, such
as Heintz and Ndikumana (2011) show that ination is driven by supply or
trade shocks. IMF (2011) also shows that the probability of terms of trade
and disaster shocks are higher in Africa compared to AEs and EMEs. Fur-
thermore, scal dominance and nancial stability concerns compel African
authorities not to strictly adhere to interest rates rules.
Frankel (2014) shows that when supply shocks dominate, NGDP targeting
performs better in reducing macroeconomic volatility than the IT. A supply
shock will reduce real GDP and raise ination. This implies that the ina-
tion gap as well as the output gap will rise. The di¤erence occurs in the
way authorities under the IT and the NGDP regimes respond to this shock.
Under NGDPT, monetary policy response ensures that the supply shock is
apportioned between prices and the real GDP. Authorities will allow ina-
tion to rise to compensate for a fall in real GDP thereby maintaining the
NGDP target. Allowing the ination to rise implies that monetary policy
response will relatively be less hawkish under the NGDPT compared to the
IT. Under the IT, a supply shock is borne by prices alone. Authorities will
tighten monetary policy which deals with ination threats but doing so tends
to worsen the performance of GDP.
The ine¢ ciency of the IT regime and the interest rate instruments in Africa
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can also be analyzed via the transmission process of the interest rate sig-
nals. Under the interest rate instrument, authorities typically conduct mon-
etary policy by buying and selling short-term government securities in a
well-functioning nancial market. In doing so, the objective is to control
the value of some nancial market variable, such as the interbank interest
rate (IBR). The IBR is assumed to inuence long-term retail rates and hence
output and ination (Mishra et al. 2012). This process is buttressed by the
exchange rate channel. Under oating exchange rates and perfect capital
mobility, arbitrage between domestic and foreign short-term government se-
curities causes incipient capital ows which change the equilibrium value of
the exchange rate. However, the e¤ectiveness of the exchange rate channel
depends on several factors. These include the authoritieswillingness to allow
the exchange rate to move, the degree of capital mobility and the strength
of expenditure switching e¤ects.
As shown by Mishra et al. (2012), the conventional description of inter-
est rate and exchange rate transmission relies on e¤ective arbitrage along
several margins. These include arbitrage between di¤erent short-term secu-
rities, short-term and long-term securities, long-term securities and equities,
domestic and foreign securities and nancial and real assets. This transmis-
sion process is thus intended for economies with developed and competitive
nancial systems, independent central banks, high degree of international
capital mobility and oating exchange rate systems. African economies do
not compete favorably in most of these features. For example, Fig. 5 shows
that nancial market development has largely stagnated in Africa. To the
extent that the features that characterize African countries di¤er from those
of the developed economies, it would be expected that the standard policy
transmission process will also di¤er. Under these circumstances, monetary
policy conduct using the IT and the interest rate instruments may fail to
successfully stabilize economies.
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Frankel et al. (2008), also shows that the appeal of the interest rate rules
over money-targeting rules as a means of delivering lower ination and output
volatility only holds when demand shocks dominate. When supply shocks
dominate, interest rates continue to deliver lower ination volatility but at the
cost of higher output volatility. Under these circumstances, a conventional
money-based rule will result in lower output volatility and the unambiguous
welfare-based argument in favour of the IT and interest rates disappears.
Figs. 2 and 3 capture the contribution of food to ination while Fig. 4 shows
the contribution of agriculture to GDP in Africa. These gures reveal that
supply side factors can not be dispelled in Africa. As observed by IMF (2015)
and Berg et al. (2010), these factors also explain why the MAT regimes and
money supply rules remain a common practice in Africa.
This notwithstanding, the global direction in monetary policy conduct to-
wards ination targeting and interest rate rules is exerting signicant inu-
ence on policy direction in Africa. Although the success of monetary policy
largely relies on the appropriate conguration of monetary policy frameworks
and instruments, abundant research on the subject is only available for AEs
and some EMEs, but little on Africa. Besides, the available literature is
also not synchronized. This lack of synchrony compounded by the paucity
of literature is putting speed bumps on the monetary policy modernization
process in Africa.
1.2 Stylized facts
1.2.1 Volatile macroeconomic performance
African countries still remain in the grip of macroeconomic instability. Country-
specic analysis reveals that the majority of African countries struggle to
meet their ination objectives using the prevailing monetary policy frame-
works and instruments. For example, Ghana adopted an ination target of
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Table 1: Ination developments
Mean Standard Deviation
90-95 96-99 00-05 06-10 11-14 90-95 -99 -05 -10 -14
Egy. 13.9 4.7 4.7 11.7 9.2 5.2 1.7 3.3 4.5 1.9
Gha. 27.3 25.9 21.3 13.6 11.2 18.2 16.3 9.2 3.9 3.0
Ken. 25.3 8.2 8.3 12.7 9.1 17.5 3.6 4.5 8.2 4.8
Mal. 35.4 31.3 17.3 9.3 20.3 26.8 20.2 7.4 2.8 9.4
Mor. 6.0 1.8 1.5 2.2 1.1 1.6 1.2 1.1 1.4 0.8
Nig. 48.9 13.9 14.3 10.1 9.9 22.6 11.5 6.4 3.6 1.9
S.Afr. 11.3 7.0 5.2 6.9 5.6 3.11 2.2 3.3 2.8 0.8
Tanz. 31.1 14.5 5.3 8.6 10.7 11.0 5.4 1.2 2.6 4.9
Ugan. 6.14 5.3 4.3 8.5 10.8 4.8 4.2 4.3 4.1 8.5
Zam. 39.2 29.9 21.3 10.8 6.9 12.8 9.4 3.8 2.5 0.6
Ave. 24.5 14.3 10.4 9.4 9.5 12.4 7.6 4.5 3.6 3.6
Source: International Financial Statistics
8.5 percent (2) in 2007 with active use of the interest rate instrument. In
2008, the country was faced with severe oil and food price shocks which per-
sistently led to ination deviating from the target. Even prior to 2007 when
Ghana was using the monetary aggregate targeting framework, her ination
remained fairly high (see Table 1).
Table 1 also reveals that there has been some decline in aggregate ination
over time with more stability registered in the past decade. Similarly, real
GDP has been on the rise with substantial growth registered in the past
decade (see Table 2). According to OConnell (2011) this macroeconomic
progress places many African countries on the right path to use interest rate
instruments and ination targeting frameworks. However, risks to sustained
macroeconomic stability remain elevated. Nguyen et al. (2017) identify high
vulnerability to natural disasters, oil price shocks and terms of trade shocks
as some key risks. It is not surprising, therefore that Tables 1 and 2 also show
that ination rates have mostly been above targets while real GDP growth
rates are mostly below the conventional 6 percent mark.
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Table 2: Real GDP growth
Mean Standard Deviation
90-95 96-00 00-05 06-10 11-14 90-95 -99 -05 -10 -14
Egy. 3.8 5.9 3.7 6.2 2.3 1.6 1.0 0.6 1.2 1.0
Gha. 4.1 4.3 5.1 7.9 6.3 0.8 0.2 0.6 3.7 2.2
Ken. 2.0 2.0 3.8 4.7 4.5 2.1 1.7 2.1 2.4 0.9
Mal. 3.1 1.9 2.5 7.4 3.3 10.6 6.4 4.0 1.8 1.4
Mor. 1.7 4.0 4.9 5.0 3.8 6.9 5.6 1.8 1.7 1.5
Nig. 3.7 3.2 4.0 7.4 4.6 2.6 0.6 0.2 0.6 1.9
S.Afr. 0.7 2.8 3.8 3.2 2.4 2.2 1.5 1.1 3.0 0.5
Tanz. 4.1 4.3 5.2 8.3 5.3 0.6 0.2 0.5 3.5 2.0
Ugan. 13.6 18.2 6.7 8.2 5.2 24.7 6.4 1.1 1.8 1.8
Zam. -0.3 2.8 4.8 6.4 6.7 3.7 3.2 0.9 0.7 2.7
Ave. 3.7 4.9 4.5 6.5 4.4 5.6 2.7 1.3 2.0 1.6
Source: International Financial Statistics
1.2.2 Weak interest rate transmission
According to IMF (2015), while the majority of African countries still use
the MAT regime some have introduced policy rates for signaling the stance of
monetary policy. However, these countries often do not have the operational
support required to align market rates with the policy rate. For example, Fig.
1 shows that Kenya and Uganda have largely succeeded in aligning central
bank rates (CBR) with the interbank rate. However, there still remains
a divergence between the interbank rate and the retail rates (lending and
savings rates). This implies that the de facto and de jure policy stance
are di¤erent. This leaves questions regarding the e¤ectiveness of interest
rate instruments in fragmented markets. Other countries, such as Malawi,
Zambia and Tanzania which use the MAT system also have a disjoint between
the operating targets and the retail rates.
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Uganda Kenya
Figure 1: Policy rates and market interest rates (Kenya and Uganda)
1.2.3 Dominant agriculture/food sectors
Figs. 2 and 3 show that food prices signicantly contribute to overall Con-
sumer Price Index (CPI) in all countries. According to the International
Financial Statistics (IFS), the 2016 weights of food and beverages in the
overall CPI are recorded as follows (from highest to lowest): Zambia (53.5%),
Nigeria (51.8%), Malawi (50.2%), Tanzania (47.8%), Egypt (44.4%), Ghana
(43.9%), Morocco (39.3%), Kenya (36%), Uganda (28.5%) and South Africa
(17.2%). This data shows that in Zambia, Nigeria, Malawi and Tanzania
food prices contribute nearly half to the overall price dynamics. In the other
countries, food ination still contributes more to overall ination but com-
paratively less than in the rst ve countries. Even though South Africa has
the smallest weight on food compared to the rest of the countries, it is still
higher than many AEs. These weights suggest that supply factors can not
be ignored in the ght against ination. This data is consistent with Nguyen
et al. (2017) who show that 45 percent of ination variations in Africa arise
from general supply shocks. Of the 45 percent, two thirds is attributed to
domestic supply and commodity price shocks.
According to the 2011 World Bank Development Indicators, expenditures on
food in AEs are estimated as follows: Japan (14.7%), Germany (11.5%), Aus-
tralia (10.8%), Canada (9.3%), United Kingdom (8.8%) and United States
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(5.7%). These gures show that uctuations in food prices may have neg-
ligible impact on overall ination. This suggests that ination is largely
demand driven in these countries. These statistics do not compare favorably
with those from African economies where food expenditures are relatively
large. Large food sectors imply that non-monetary GDP is relatively large.
Monetary policy implemented using the IT framework and the interest rate
instrument is likely to succeed in countries with smaller expenditures on food
than in the majority of African economies. Durevall et al. (2012) argue that
traditional interest rate channels make less sense in countries that predom-
inantly dependent on agricultural sector with huge informal sector. Given
these observations, identifying monetary policy frameworks and instruments
which are consistent with the ination dynamics in African economies re-
mains an empirical issue.
Similarly, Table 3 reveals that as a single item, agriculture commands a huge
share of output in African economies1. It literally surpasses the contribution
of industry in Malawi, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The relatively large
share of agriculture implies that output and ination uctuations are not
entirely under the control of monetary policy. Considering that the agricul-
tural sector is largely small scale and rain driven makes overall GDP and
ination susceptible to weather shocks. This raises a critical question of
whether standard monetary policy frameworks and instruments which are
e¤ective in handling aggregate demand shocks in AEs and EMEs can equally
perform well in these circumstances.
1The classication is based on the United Nations Industry Classication System called
the International Standard Industrial Classication (ISIC) of Economic Activities.
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Source: International Financial Statistics
Figure 2: Contribution to overall ination (percent)
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Source: International Financial Statistics
Figure 3: Contribution to overall ination (percent)
12
Table 3: Sectoral contribution to GDP (percent)
Zam. S.Af Mor. Mal Egy. Gha. Kenya Tanz. Nig. Uga.
Serv. 56.5 68.1 57.7 49.7 49.9 49.9 50.4 43.5 55.5 50.8
Industry 33.8 29.5 29.3 17.0 39.0 27.7 19.4 25.0 24.3 22.0
Agric. 9.64 2.5 12.9 33.3 11.1 22.4 30.3 31.5 20.2 27.2
Source: 2011Word Bank Development Indicators
1.2.4 Frequent terms of trade (ToT) shocks
The top part of Fig. 4 shows uctuations in ToTs while the bottom part
shows uctuations in exchange rates. ToTs are dened as the ratio of an
index of the countrys exports to the index of the countrys imports. The
ToTs are mostly driven by uctuations in prices and demand for commodity
exports. The higher the ratio, the better the ToTs as this entails that a
country generates enough export proceeds to sustain its import bills. This
is a necessary condition for exchange rate stability. Declining ToTs signal
pressure on the exchange rate. In addition to volatility, Fig. 4 also shows
that the ToTs for Nigeria, Zambia, Malawi, Kenya, South Africa, Egypt and
Tanzania have been declining after the 2009 nancial crisis.
The majority of African countries are commodity exporters and the plunge in
global commodity prices had considerable negative e¤ects on ToTs in Africa.
Thus, a key feature of Fig. 4 is that the majority of African countries su¤er
volatile and declining ToTs. Volatile and declining ToTs result into frequent
exchange rate uctuations and depreciations. The bottom part of Fig. 4
shows that the exchange rates in the selected countries exhibit signicant
uctuations. These uctuations as argued by Sanchez (2008) have negative
implications for macroeconomic performance. This raises another critical
question for policy makers in Africa: should monetary policy respond to
exchange rate uctuations to mitigate the impact of terms of trade shocks?
Again, literature on this question is mostly available on AEs and EMEs but
not Africa.
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Figure 4: Terms of trade and exchange rate developments
1.2.5 Low nancial market development
We use an index of nancial development (FDI) developed by Svirydzenka
(2016) to compare the status of nancial development in the selected African
countries. We compare these indices with that of Norway, representing AEs.
We also include the FDI for Newzealand which was the rst country to prac-
tice IT. The FDI combines two indices, namely nancial institutions index
(FII) and nancial markets index (FMI). The FII further combines nancial
institutions access index and nancial institutions e¢ ciency index (FIEF).
The FMI combines nancial market development, nancial market access and
nancial market e¢ ciency. The resulting aggregate index, namely the FDI
is therefore more representative than the traditionally used measures, such
as the ratio of private sector credit to GDP and the ratio of stock market to
GDP. The higher the index the better the nancial market development2.
2See Svirydzenka (2016) for detailed derivations.
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Figure 5: Financial market development
Fig. 5, reveals that nancial market development has largely stagnated in
Malawi, Zambia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ghana and Nigeria. However,
South Africa, Morocco and Egypt display some upward trend in nancial
development. South Africa compares favorably with some AEs. Morocco and
Egypt appear to be below South Africa and above the rest of the countries in
our sample. According to Mishra et al. (2012), nancial market development
is key in transmitting interest rate signals under interest rate frameworks.
The status of Africas nancial market development, therefore, raises critical
questions on whether interest rate instruments would be e¤ective in dealing
with output and ination uctuations.
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1.2.6 Attempts to migrate to ination targeting
Within the described unique macroeconomic landscape that characterize
African countries, there are still signicant attempts to migrate to ination
targeting and interest rate instruments. A summary of the current mone-
tary policy frameworks and instruments in the selected African economies is
presented in Table 4. The Table is based on the 2016 International Mone-
tary Fund Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions (IMF AREAER-2016). The classication used is based on each
countrys actual or de-facto arrangement. This implies that the o¢ cially an-
nounced or de jure arrangement may di¤er from the de facto policy conduct.
For example, Kenya is denoted as an IT country by authorities as well as by
IMF (2015). However, based on the IMF AREAER (2016) Kenyas status
has changed from pursuing MAT as categorized in IMF AREAER (2014) to
pursuing "Other" monetary policy framework. Authorities in Kenya have
only taken preliminary steps toward ination targeting.
A part frommonetary policy regimes, IMFAREAER (2016) also classies the
exchange rate systems. The classication is primarily based on the degree
to which the exchange rate is determined by the market rather than by
o¢ cial action-the market-determined rates being on the whole more exible.
The presentation of exchange rate arrangements alongside monetary policy
frameworks in Table 4 highlights that similar exchange rate regimes can be
consistent with di¤erent monetary policy frameworks.
Table 4 further shows that 3 countries, namely South Africa, Ghana and
Uganda are pursuing the IT regime. The other 3 countries, namely Egypt,
Kenya and Zambia are characterized as pursuing "Other" monetary regimes.
"Other" regimes imply that these countries have no stated nominal anchor.
In practice, this has been a transitory stage from MAT to IT. The other 3
countries, namely Tanzania, Malawi and Nigeria are using the MAT regime
16
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while Morocco is implementing the ERT. The diversity in monetary pol-
icy frameworks is a reection of diverse challenges that these economies are
facing. Contrary to AEs, which recently have been using the interest rate
instrument only, Table 4 shows that several African countries tend to use
the interest rate alongside the monetary aggregate instruments to deal with
macroeconomic uctuations (see also Davoodi et al. 2013 and IMF 2015).
Recently, there has been greater use of the interest rate as an operating target
while weight is placed on both the interest rate and the monetary aggregates
in setting the monetary policy stance. Dornbusch and Fischer (1992) argue
that central banks may not achieve their objectives if they actively deploy
money and interest rate instruments, simultaneously.
The correlation coe¢ cients between the policy instruments, ination and
output are presented in Table 27. These coe¢ cients suggest that there is a
negative relationship between output and interest rate in all the countries.
The magnitude is estimated at a relatively high value of -0.25 for the IT
countries, followed by those pursuing other regimes at -0.14. The correlation
between output and interest rate in countries that pursue MAT is estimated
at -0.07. In Morocco which pursues conventional peg, it is estimated at -
0.01. These correlations suggest that authorities raise interest rates when
faced with aggregate demand pressures. The correlation between money
and ination is negative. At -0.55, the correlation is strongest in countries
that pursue other regimes. This is followed by those that pursue IT regimes
whose correlation is estimated at -0.35. The correlation in MAT countries
is estimated at -0.26 whilst for Morocco which pursues conventional peg it
is estimated at -0.15. These correlations suggest that authorities contract
money supply when faced with ination threats. Except in the MAT coun-
tries, in all the other countries, authorities inject money supply to support
growth. This is suggested by the positive correlations between money and
output.
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1.2.7 Multiple monetary policy objectives
According to IMF (2015) Low Income Countries including those from Africa
place price stability as a prime objective of monetary policy. However, in
practice they pursue additional objectives, such as exchange rate stability
(see also Table 4 ). At times, concerns over the exchange rate supersede
price stability concerns. As a result, monetary policy in many African coun-
tries can go through periods of excessive accommodation or tightening and
contribute to ination and output volatility. The pursuit of multiple pol-
icy objectives which are more than available policy instruments (violation of
the Timbergen principle) complicates policy design and is often a recipe for
policy ine¤ectiveness. Although these challenges are present for all central
banks, they are more pronounced in Africa, given the absence of clear frame-
works. According to Zhang (2009), these features may also reect imperfect
monetary policy transmission mechanism.
1.3 Motivation of the study
This study is motivated by three key issues pertaining to monetary policy
instruments and frameworks in Africa. First is the contradiction in the global
trend in monetary policy research and conduct vis-à-vis the practice in Africa.
Conventional new Keynesian literature on AEs, such as Ireland (2004) and
Woodford (2003) and literature on emerging economies, like Frömmel et al.
(2011) and Mohanty and Klau (2004), largely assume that central banks use
the interest rate policy instrument. Recent studies, such as Araujo (2015)
and Castelnouvo (2012), nd that the monetary aggregate plays an important
role in driving macroeconomic dynamics. These ndings gesture the need
to re-look at the monetary aggregate as a policy instrument. The need is
stronger for Africa.
As demonstrated by Kasekende and Brownbridge (2011), Africa has weak
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nancial markets which can impair interest rate transmission (see also Figs. 1
and 5). Furthermore, Africa is characterized by the dominance of agriculture
and hence large supply shocks (see Figs. 2, 3 and Table 4). According
to Bhattacharya and Sigh (2008) when real shocks dominate, authorities
can improve welfare by using the monetary aggregate instead of interest
rate instruments. Despite the divergence in views, there is no literature in
Africa which compares the performance of the monetary aggregate and the
interest rate rules to aid monetary policy decisions. This question is tackled
in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 is motivated by the controversy surrounding the conguration of
the monetary policy instruments, particularly, whether engaging in exchange
smoothing using monetary policy rules is consistent with the goals of macro-
economic stabilization. This question is critical for African economies due
to frequent ToTs Shocks (see Fig. 4) and also volatility in commodity prices
which together with the "Fear of Floating" make policy makers in Africa
to be sensitive to exchange rate movements. Some studies, e.g. Mohanty
and Klau (2004) and Hufner (2004), estimate simple policy rules and nd
that the exchange rate is signicant. This class of studies only addresses the
question of whether monetary authorities react to the exchange rate and not
the impact of this reaction on macroeconomic stability.
The studies that examine the e¤ect of exchange rate smoothing on macro-
economic stability also produce conicting results. For example, Batini et
al. (2000) argue in favour of exchange rate smoothing while Garcia et al.
(2011) argue against it. Apart from this dichotomy in literature, the major-
ity of these studies are either on developed or emerging market economies.
Alpanda et al. (2009) examines this question for South Africa. They nd no
evidence that the South African Reserve Bank reacts to the exchange rate.
However, Gupta and Jooste (2014) provide this evidence. Four limitations
appear in the literature on Africa: First, the studies are few. Second, the
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few available studies are only on South Africa. Third, these studies nd di-
vergent results. Finally, these studies do not examine whether exchange rate
smoothing has implications for macroeconomic performance.
Lastly, research and practice on monetary policy regimes is concentrated on
the IT. Despite en masse adoption of the IT regime, recent studies such as
Summers (2015), Woodford (2014) and Frankel (2014), have raised concerns
on its success. For example, Frankel (2014) argues that the performance
of IT regime is subdued when shocks relating to supply or terms of trade
dominate. In Africa, several studies, such as Heintz and Ndikumana (2011)
and Loening et al. (2009) show that ination is mostly driven by supply
shocks. The ndings from these studies are corroborated by the ination
decomposition presented in Figs. 2 and 3. In the many African countries,
food ination which largely depends on supply factors is a major contributor
to overall ination.
IMF (2011) further argues that the probability of terms of trade and disaster
shocks are higher in Africa than in AEs and EMEs. This again is supported
by Fig. 4 which shows signicant uctuations in ToTs. Despite this evi-
dence, there is paucity of literature in Africa on alternative frameworks like
the NGDP targeting. According to Jensen (2002), the NGDP targeting is
superior to the IT regime in handling supply shocks. The global direction
of research and practice is thus at odds with the prevailing macroeconomic
landscape and policy practice in many African economies. Therefore, Chap-
ter 4 is motivated by the lopsidedness in literature and the practice in favour
of the IT regimes and AEs.
1.4 Objectives of the study
The broad objective of this study is to compare the performance of alterna-
tive monetary policy instruments and frameworks in macroeconomic stabi-
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lization in 10 selected African economies.3 Specically, the study seeks to:
i) Compare the performance of the monetary aggregate and the interest rate
as alternative instruments for macroeconomic stabilization in the selected
African economies.
ii) Assess the implications of exchange rate smoothing by central banks on
macroeconomic performance in the selected African economies.
iii) Compare the performance of Ination Targeting and Nominal GDP Tar-
geting as alternative monetary policy frameworks for macroeconomic stabi-
lization in the selected African economies.
1.5 Research questions
The study addresses the following specic research questions:
i) Which of the monetary policy instruments, between the monetary aggre-
gate and the interest rate, performs better in macroeconomic stabilization of
the selected African economies?
ii) Does including exchange rate smoothing as an objective of monetary policy
a¤ect macroeconomic performance in the selected economies?
iii) How does macroeconomic performance under the IT regime compare with
the performance under the NGDP targeting regime in the selected countries?
1.6 Contribution of the study
This thesis contributes to the current state of knowledge on monetary policy
frameworks and instruments in Africa. Theoretically, unlike vast literature
in Africa which uses vector autoregressive models, our study uses a New
Keynesian DSGE model. The model is formulated on the assumption that
3The 10 selected countries are: Egypt, Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa, Zambia, Uganda,
Tanzania, Malawi, Morocco and Kenya
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money and consumption are non-separable in the utility function. Therefore,
the model explicitly introduces the role of real balances as one of the critical
variables driving macroeconomic dynamics in Africa.
Furthermore, most standard new Keynesian DSGE studies e.g. Gali et al.
(2001) give prominence only to inertial behavior in both ination and out-
put. Others, such as Benchimol and FourÇans (2012), de-emphasize iner-
tial behavior in order to assess the role of the monetary aggregates. We
build on these studies and combine inertial behavior and the monetary ag-
gregates in order to examine the possible role of both, the interest rate and
the monetary aggregates in Africa. Also di¤erent from standard literature
in AEs and EMEs, our model features the exchange rate, foreign ination
and foreign input prices. These variables are considered critical in driving
macroeconomic dynamics in Africa. In addition, unlike the majority of the
studies, e.g. Baldini et al. (2015), all our policy rules are derived from the
central banks optimization behavior. The study thus advances a potential
theoretical framework for monetary policy analysis in African countries.
Specically, in Chapter 2, we build on other studies like Baldini et al. (2015),
Muhanji and Ojah (2011), Peiris and Saxegaard (2010) and Berg et al.
(2010). These studies use one policy rule. This chapter extends this lit-
erature by empirically examining the performance of two alternative policy
rules, the interest rate and the monetary aggregate. In Chapter 3, we build
on similar studies like Wollmershäuser (2006) who examine macroeconomic
performance under the interest rate rule. We also build on studies, such as
Alpanda et al. (2010) who examine the signicance of the exchange rate
in the policy rule. We extend this literature by responding to a question
raised by Taylor (2001) on how the monetary aggregate can respond to the
exchange rate. We thus extend literature by including a comparison of the
performance of the interest rate and money supply rules when exchange rate
smoothing features as a central bank objective. In Chapter 4, we recognize
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the paucity of studies on monetary policy frameworks. Therefore, we empir-
ically contribute to literature by comparing two potential monetary policy
regimes for Africa, namely the IT and the NGDP targeting regimes.
1.7 Signicance of the study
The signicance of the study is threefold. Firstly, it will assist authorities
to minimize macroeconomic instability that results from suboptimal mone-
tary and exchange rate policy choices in Africa. According to Baldini et al.
(2015), inappropriate policy choices can worsen macroeconomic performance.
Secondly, the study will assist authorities to improve the credibility of mon-
etary policy in Africa. When authorities use appropriate monetary policy
instruments and frameworks, monetary policy credibility is enhanced. With
credible policies, the chances of achieving policy objectives rise. Thirdly,
the study proposes a theoretical model which can prove useful to African
authorities as they seek assistance from international partners to improve
the performance of monetary policy. This is particularly important at this
point in time when several African countries are seeking assistance to their
modernize monetary policy conduct.
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2 Assessing alternative monetary policy in-
struments in selected African economies
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we compare the performance of the monetary aggregate and
the interest rate as policy instruments for macroeconomic stabilization in
10 selected African economies. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
(2014) notes that there has been a 25 percent global drop in the use of
money based instruments towards interest rates between 2003 and 2011. This
drop follows evidence from several studies, such as Svensson (2002) and Ire-
land (2004), which show the declining signicance of monetary aggregates in
driving macroeconomic dynamics.
As observed by Berg et al. (2010), this tilt in global policy conduct contra-
dicts the practice in Africa where policymakers have to contend with perverse
macroeconomic factors. Some studies, therefore, such as IMF (2008) argue
that the continued use of monetary aggregates as policy instruments is con-
sistent with macroeconomic stabilization in Africa. Others, such as Peiris
and Saxegaard (2010) suggest the adoption of interest rates as instruments
for monetary policy. In this vein, a number of countries, such as Kenya,
Uganda and Ghana have recently started to implement regimes that increase
the role of the interest rate in monetary policy conduct.
However, IMF (2015) observes that these countries still lack the operational
support necessary to align market rates with the policy rate. While some
countries, such as, Uganda have succeeded in aligning short-term rates with
the policy stance, ultimately it is the transmission from short-term rates
to retail rates that matters for policy e¤ectiveness. There are often large
and persistent deviations of the market rates from the policy rates. The
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corresponding huge gap between the de facto and de jure policy stance tends
to weaken the transmission mechanism. According to Mishra et al. (2012),
this raises questions on the e¤ectiveness of the transmission of interest rate
signals to aggregate demand and ination. With such unclear outcomes, the
choice between the monetary aggregate and the interest rate as instruments
of macroeconomic stabilization remains a major unresolved issue in Africa.
The importance of this study is that it will assist policymakers to reduce
macroeconomic instability that is induced by sub-optimal choices of mone-
tary policy instruments. As shown by Baldini et al. (2015), inappropriate
instrument choice can worsen macroeconomic performance. Furthermore,
Mishkin (1999) and Kasekende and Brownbridge (2011) argue that mone-
tary policy implementation and e¤ectiveness in low income countries (LICs)
are a¤ected by several structural factors which are absent in AEs. Therefore,
by including some Africa-specic features, this study will assist authorities
to make evidence-based choices between the two policy instruments. Fur-
thermore, when authorities use appropriate monetary policy instruments,
the chances of achieving policy objectives tend to rise. When this happens,
monetary policy credibility is enhanced.
The gap that is lled by this paper is that standard New Keynesian liter-
ature, such as Ireland (2004), Woodford (2003), and Clarida et al. (1999),
tends to assume that central banks use the interest rate as the policy in-
strument. Even single-equation studies that explore policy rules in emerging
market economies, such as Mohanty and Klau (2004), Moura and Frömmel
et al. (2011) and de Carvallo (2010), consider only the interest rate as a mon-
etary policy instrument. In this regard, Mehrotra and Sanchez-Fung (2010)
stand out in that they provide a comprehensive assessment of policy rules
under di¤erent instruments across countries. These authors, however, con-
duct their study in a single-equation framework. From the standpoint of New
Keynesian models, several recent studies, like Araujo (2015) and Castelnouvo
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(2012), nd that the monetary aggregate plays a signicant role in driving
macroeconomic dynamics.
These ndings signal the need to re-examine the role of the monetary ag-
gregate as a policy instrument. This need is stronger for African economies,
where real rather than nominal shocks and also supply rather than demand
factors dominate. Under real shocks, Bhattacharya and Sigh (2008) argue
that welfare is enhanced by using the monetary aggregate and not the interest
rate. Furthermore, although the monetary aggregate has been a dominant
policy instrument in Africa, its operability is increasingly being questioned
due to the perceived shift in the velocity of money and the money multiplier.
It is therefore important to examine the relative e¢ ciency of the two policy
instruments in African economies in light of the perceived shift.
The contribution of this paper is fourfold: First, di¤erent from Baldini et al.
(2015), Muhanji and Ojah (2011), Berg et al. (2010) and Peiris and Saxe-
gaard (2010) who use one policy instrument, this paper compares two policy
instruments, the monetary aggregate and the interest rate. Secondly, di¤er-
ent from these studies, we derive both policy instruments from the central
banks optimization behavior. Thirdly, unlike the vast literature in Africa
which uses vector autoregressive models, this paper uses a New Keynesian
model that is formulated on the assumption that money and consumption
are non-separable in the utility function.
Finally, our model explicitly introduces the role of real balances as a pivotal
variable in driving macroeconomic dynamics in Africa. Most standard New
Keynesian DSGE models, such as Gali et al. (2001), give prominence to
inertial behavior in both ination and output. Others, such as Benchimol
and FourÇans (2012), de-emphasize inertial behavior in order to analyze the
role of the monetary aggregates. In our study, we combine inertial and the
monetary aggregate in the same framework and proceed to investigate the
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possible role of the interest rate and the monetary aggregates in African
economies.
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the litera-
ture. Section 2.3 lays out the theoretical model. In Section 2.4, we derive the
model. Section 2.5 describes the data and the estimation technique. Section
2.6 discusses the results while Section 2.7 concludes with policy options.
2.2 Literature review
Empirical evidence on the choice of money and interest rate instruments
remains divided. The literature converges on the fact that when economic
shocks are real, the use of money-based policy instruments is superior in
macroeconomic stabilisation. On the contrary, when shocks are nominal, in-
terest rate policy instruments perform better. Early evidence for this has
been documented by Canzoneri and Henderson (1989), Gordon (1979) and
Poole (1970). However, other earlier studies, such as Taylor (1999) and Sar-
gent and Wallace (1975), argue that equilibrium indeterminacy gives interest
rates a natural disadvantage. They contend that when ination is very high
or negative, ination expectations are not stable. In such cases, the interest
rate instrument loses its advantage over money supply.
The divergence of views on the role of monetary aggregates and interest
rates in driving macroeconomic uctuations is also reected in recent litera-
ture. For example, Ireland (2004) and Rudebusch and Svensson (2002) use
the New Keynesian framework and reject the role of monetary aggregates
in driving business cycles. Resurrecting a nearly concluded debate, Favara
and Giordani (2009) argue that estimation techniques could be responsible
for the insignicance of monetary aggregates. Indeed, recent studies e.g.
Araujo (2015), Benchimol and FourÇans (2012), Castelnouvo (2012) and
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Canova and Menz (2011), nd a signicant role of monetary aggregates in
driving macroeconomic dynamics. While reporting the signicance of mon-
etary aggregates, these studies, however, do not examine the e¤ectiveness of
money-based instruments as stabilization tools.
The divide in the literature on policy instruments also applies to Africa. For
example, Berg et al. (2010) argue that strict adherence to interest rates is
not benecial for ination and output stabilization in Tanzania, Uganda and
Ghana. On the contrary, Andrle et al. (2013), nd that monetary targeting
has not played a systematic role in Kenya. This is corroborated by Peiris
and Saxegaard (2010) who compare the exchange rate with the interest rate
and show that due to higher interest rate volatility, the interest rate performs
better in stabilizing the real sector in Mozambique. Furthermore, as shown
by Baldini et al. (2015), high risk aversion inuences liquidity conditions
in Africa and hence credit, output and ination. Given these conditions,
interest rates alone fall short in dealing with macroeconomic dynamics across
di¤erent countries.
A number of other scholars have examined the role of respective monetary
policy instruments in Africa. For example, Rasaki and Malikane (2015) iden-
tify monetary aggregates as signicant contributors to business cycle uctua-
tions. Muhanji et al. (2013) combine the Taylor (1993) and McCallum (1994)
rules and argue that to design context-specic optimal policy, there is need
to correctly congure key policy parameters. Davoodi et al. (2013) show
that in the East African Community, the reserve money and policy rate in-
struments are often deployed simultaneously. Most often, these instruments
exert divergent impacts on macroeconomic dynamics. We build on these
studies which do not directly compare the performance of the interest and
the monetary aggregate in stabilizing African economies.
Several factors make the examination of the two instruments in African con-
text compelling. Firstly, the key feature under interest rate rules in New
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Keynesian models is that they focus on management of aggregate demand
represented by output gap. In these models, ination is positively related to
output gap and output gap is negatively related to interest rates. When mon-
etary policy is tightened, both gaps close. Frankel et al. (2008), show that the
appeal of interest rate rules over money-targeting rules as a means of deliver-
ing lower ination volatility and lower output volatility only holds true when
demand shocks dominate. When supply shocks dominate, strict interest rate
rules continues to deliver lower ination volatility but at the cost of higher
output volatility. In these circumstances, a conventional money-based an-
chor will result in lower output volatility and the unambiguous welfare-based
argument in favour of interest rates rules disappears.
From a policy perspective, there is need to design specic policy rules fo-
cusing on African countries operating under conditions of imperfect nancial
markets, dependence on commodity exports and imports, volatile terms of
trade and scal slippages. The policy instruments debate must therefore
recognize that the majority of authorities in Africa are still pursuing mone-
tary policy objectives via balance-sheet instruments rather than the interest
rate instruments adopted in more conventional New Keynesian models and
in AEs. Meanwhile, while pursuing monetary policy through balance-sheet
instruments remains common practice, the global direction in policy conduct
that uses interest rate instruments is exerting signicant inuence on policy
direction in Africa.
2.3 Theoretical exposition
The theoretical discussion assumes that a country has chosen a exible ex-
change rate system and therefore has room to implement independent mon-
etary policy with the broad objective of stabilizing output, ination and ex-
change rate. There are contending views regarding the impact of monetary
30
policy on output and ination. These views are reected in the real business
cycle (RBC) and the New Keynesian (NK) schools. The RBC school pro-
posed by Prescott (1986) contends that ination and output uctuations are
a true reection of decisions undertaken by rational economic agents. This
implies that there is no role for monetary policy because economies tend to
achieve self equilibrium without policy intervention.
The RBC rmly establishes the use of the Dynamic Stochastic General Equi-
librium (DSGE) models for macroeconomic analysis. On the other hand, the
New Keynesian school argues that monetary policy can yield dividends in
the short-run. Proponents of this school extend the RBC-DSGE model to
include assumptions of nominal wage and price rigidities-a la Calvo features.
According to Mankiw (1985), price rigidities can be exploited so that mon-
etary policy a¤ects output and ination. The New Keynesian framework
is located within the traditional IS-LM model, but is grounded in dynamic
general equilibrium theory.
2.3.1 Basic tenets of a New Keynesian DSGE model
In a typical New Keynesian model, the economy is described by three in-
terrelated equations, namely aggregate demand (IS curve), aggregate supply
(Phillips curve) and the monetary policy reaction function (see Fig. 6).
The equations that dene these blocks are derived from micro-foundations
which detail explicit assumptions about the behavior of the main economic
agents in the economy, namely households, rms and the monetary authori-
ties. Households and rms interact in markets that clear every period leading
to the general equilibrium feature of the models. Based on Sbordone (2010),
we use Fig. 6 to describe the basic tenets of the New Keynesian DSGEmodel.
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Source: Sbordone (2010)
Figure 6: The theoretical DSGE model
2.3.2 The demand block (IS curve)
The IS curve represents the intertemporal Euler consumption equation which
results from households desire to maximize its expected discounted lifetime
utility subject to a budget constraint. Mathematically, households seek to
maximize:
Et0
1X
s=0
s

bt0+s[log(Ct0+s   Ct0+s 1) 
Z 1
0
v(Ht0+s(i))
di]

(2.1)
subject to the sequence of budget constraints:
PtCt +
Bt
Rt
 Bt 1 +
Z 1
0
wt((i)Ht(i)di] (2.2)
for t = t0; t0+1; ::::1; and given Bt0 1: Households like consumption Ct hence
it enters the utility function with a positive sign. Households dislike working
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denoted by number of hour Ht hence a negative sign. The level of dislike is
represented by a convex function v: The ow of utility depends on current
as well as past consumption dened by  (habit formation as in Smets and
Wouters 2003). As a result of this, consumers are unhappy if their level of
consumption falls below their recent past.
In order to consume, households work a certain amount of hours Ht(i) in a
number of i-rms where they earn nominal wage Wt(i). Wages are taken as
given when households decide how much to work. Using the income earned,
households can purchase nal goods at price Pt or save by accumulating one
period discounted government bonds Bt which earns a return of Rt between
t and t + 1. From the perspective of time t, the household discounts utility
in period t + 1 by a time varying factor bt+1=b; where bt+1=bt is an exoge-
nous random process. Changes to this process represent traditional demand
shocks.
Finding the optimal paths of the solution requires forming a Lagrangian
function of the form:
L = Et0
1X
s=0
fs

bt0+s[log(Ct0+s   Ct0+s 1) 
Z 1
0
v(Ht0+s(i))
di]

(2.3)
 t0+s(Pt0+s 1Ct0+s +
Bt0+s
Rt0+s
 Bt0+s 1  
Z 1
0
wt0+s((i)Ht0+s(i)di]g
where  is the Lagrangian operator. The rst order condition of L with
respect to Bt, Ct and Ht are:
@l
@Bt
: Et[t + 1]Rt = t (2.4)
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@L
@Ct
:
t
bt
pt =
1
Ct   Ct 1   Et

bt+1=bt
Ct+1   Ct

(2.5)
@L
@Ht(i)
:
v0(Ht(i))
t=bt
= Wt(i) (2.6)
for t = t0; t0+1; :::::1 and 8i[0; 1]: These conditions yield full state contin-
gent household choices, namely how much to work, how much to consume
and how much to invest in bonds. Although the household is uncertain at
any point in time about the way in which the future will unfold, it is as-
sumed that it is aware of the random shocks that can a¤ect its decisions.
Households also know the probability of occurrence of such shocks. Based on
this, households can form expectations about future outcomes which have a
feedback on current decisions. These expectations are assumed rational as
they are based on the knowledge of the economy and the shocks that bu¤et
it. Et(Xt+s) is thus used to denote these expectations which are formed at
time t of any future variable Xt+s:
Combining eqs.(2.5) and (2.6) after setting  = 0; yields:
1
Ct
= Et

bt+1
bt
1
Ct+ 1
Rt
Pt+1=Pt

(2.7)
Eq.(2.7) is an Euler equation where consumption decreases when gross real in-
terest rate

Rt
Pt+1=Pt

increases, when expected future consumption decreases
and when households become more patient (bt+1 goes up). Log-linearisation
of the Euler consumption equation together with macroeconomic equilibrium
condition which assumes that in this particular economy the only source of
aggregate demand in consumption ,i.e Yt = Ct; generates the demand block
in Fig.6. This block determines real activity yt as a negative function of the
ex ante real interest rate (it Ett+1) and a positive function of expectations
about future real activity yt+1. Mathematically, this is captured as:
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yt = Etyt+1   (it   Ett+1) + t (2.8)
where t+1 = pt=pt 1 is the rate of ination and it is the nominal interest
rate and t is a demand shock. This theoretical version of the IS curve is
forward looking. In practice, habit formation exists which implies that  6= 0:
When this happens, model dynamics are enriched and the IS curve features
a backward looking element. This helps to match the lagged and persistent
responses of ination and output to monetary policy (see Rudebusch and
Svensson 1999). With this, aggregate demand does not only depend on
future income but also on lagged income resulting into what Goodhart and
Hofman (2005) call a hybrid IS curve of the form:
yt = ayt 1 + bEtyt+1   c(it   Ett+1) + t; (2.9)
where a > 0 captures output persistence, b > 0 measures the response of
output to expected incomes while c < 0 is the interest rate sensitivity of
aggregate demand. In recent years, the characterization of the IS curve has
progressed with several extensions in addition to output gaps and real interest
rate arguments which have traditionally characterized the IS curve. These
extensions can be represented by 
t in eq. (2.10):
yt = ayt 1 + bEtyt+1   c(it   Ett+1) + d
t + t (2.10)
The nature of arguments contained in 
t largely depends on assumptions
and the functional form of the utility function as well as the nature of the
specied budget constraint. In empirical works, 
t has contained the fol-
lowing: (i) the real exchange rate, such as in Wollmeshauser (2006) and
Ball (1999). Typically, the exchange rate captures open economy e¤ects
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and according to Sanchez (2008), output is allowed to be positively or neg-
atively a¤ected by the exchange rate depending on whether depreciations
are contractionary or expansionary (ii) the monetary aggregates, such as in
Benchimol and FourÇans (2012) and Canova and Menz (2011).
Monetary aggregates are irrelevant for IS dynamics only if money enters the
utility function in separable form. Money may a¤ect the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure and hence the real wage. Fur-
thermore, high risk aversion in an economy can lead to a signicant role
of money in output dynamics. The higher the level of money, the more
economic activities implying a positive relationship between money and out-
put dynamics iii) foreign output which a¤ects domestic aggregate demand
positively as in Liu and Zhang (2010) and Rasaki and Malikane (2014). If
foreign incomes rise, the trade channel implies that there will be an increase
in demand for domestic goods.
With reference to Fig. 6, when real interest rates are high, people and rms
would rather save than consume. At the same time, people are willing to
spend more when future prospects of income are promising, regardless of the
level of interest rates. The line connecting the demand block to the supply
one reects the fact that the level of economic activity (yt) is a key input
in the determination of ination. Unlike in a traditional IS relationship,
though, this equation is dynamic and forward looking, as it involves current
and future expected variables. In particular, it establishes a link between
current output and the entire future expected path of real interest rates. At
any point in time, aggregate demand can be disturbed through exogenous
factors. These can also be micro-founded but for simplicity they are often
assumed to follow a simple AR(1) process.
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2.3.3 The supply block (Phillips curve)
The Phillips curve reects intertemporal optimal price setting decisions by
monopolistically competitive rms given the level of demand they face. In
prosperous times, demand is high and rms must pay their workers higher
wages. Similarly, if they are using domestic non-labour inputs, higher output
will result in an increase in demand for non-labour inputs. As a result, the
rms costs of production tend to increase and hence the prices of their
products. This generates a positive relationship between ination and real
activity.
To derive the supply block, it is assumed that the intermediate rm i hires
units of labor Ht(i) of type i on a competitive market to produce Yt(i) units
of intermediate good i with the technology given as follows:
yt(i) = AtHt(i); (2.11)
where At represents the overall e¢ ciency of the production process. It is fur-
ther assumed that At follows an exogenous stochastic process, whose random
uctuations over time capture the unexpected changes in productivity. The
market for intermediate goods is monopolistically competitive as in Dixit and
Stigliz (1997) such that rms price setting reects the need to meet demand
for their products which is characterized as:
yt(i) = yt

pt(i)
pt
 t
(2.12)
where pt(i) is the price of good i and t is the elasticity of demand. When
the relative price of good i increases, its demand falls relative to aggregate
demand by an amount that depends on t: It is further assumed that rms
change their prices only infrequently. This fact is modelled based on Calvo
(1983) where a fraction of rms denoted by (1   ) resets the prices each
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period while the rest maintain previous prices. This feature has important
implications for overall price outturn. The higher the (1 ); the less persis-
tent prices are and hence ination will be. Those that reset the prices face a
probability  that they may be unable to reset the price in future. The rms
objective function therefore is to maximize:
Et
X
s
st+s
t
fPt(i)Yt+s(i) Wt+s(i)Ht+s(i)g (2.13)
subject to eq. (2.11) and an additional constraint:
Yt+s(i) = Yt+s

Pt(i)
Pt+s
 t+s
(2.14)
Eq. (2.14) entails that rms must satisfy the demand for their product at each
point in time. In eq.(2.13), the rst term in brackets Pt(i)Yt+s(i) is total rm
revenue and the right term is an approximation of total costsWt+s(i)Ht+s(i).
The di¤erence between the two terms is discounted by 
st+s
t
to translate it
into the current value.
The aggregate price level is a function of newly set prices P t and of the past
prices pt 1 and is represented as:
pt =
h
(1  )p(1 t)t + p1 tt 1
i 1
1 t (2.15)
The rst order conditions (FOCs) are obtained by maximizing eq. (2.13)
subject to eqs. (2.11) and (2.14). Taylor approximation of the FOCs put to-
gether with the aggregate price dynamics in eq. (2.15) yields an approximate
New Keynesian Phillips of the form:
t = Ett+1 + rmct + t (2.16)
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where  = (1 )(1 )
(1+!)
and ! = v
00H
v0 is the elasticity of the marginal disutility
of work while  is the elasticity of demand. in Fig. 6 and in many other
models, such as Gali and Gertler (1999), output gap is assumed to be a sole
proxy of real marginal costs. t is a cost push shock which enable the model
to generate variations in ination that arise independently of movement in
excess demand. In Fig. 6, t is represented as Mark-up shocks.
Eq. (2.16) describes the relationship between ination and real activity. The
real marginal costs depend on aggregate economic activity. Higher economic
activity leads to higher wages and hence a rise in marginal costs. Thus
the rms increase their prices thereby boosting aggregate ination. Another
critical feature of eq. (2.16) is that it is forward looking just like the Euler
equation. A quick iteration of eq. (2.16) forward shows that todays ination
depends on the entire future expected path of marginal costs, and hence on
real activity. The model implies that, minus any pricing frictions, rms would
set prices as a xed markup over marginal cost; thus, inationary pressures
are generated by a high ratio of marginal cost to price.
Gali et al. (2001) argue that eq. (2.16) provides an adequate account of ina-
tion while Rudd and Whelan (2007) argue that a backward looking Phillips
curve better explain ination dynamics. In recent years, Phillips curve analy-
sis has progressed with several extensions. These have been driven by the
(i) need to introduce inertia to match empirical data (Gali and Gertler 999)
(ii) characterization of the rms cost function and hence real marginal costs
where (a) real exchange rate has been deemed as a key positive driver of
ination in open economies (Wollmeshauser 2006) (b) input prices as in Ma-
likane (2014) where input costs are positive drivers of real marginal costs (c)
monetary aggregates as in Canova and Menz (2011) where real balances act
as a forcing variable and enter as demand push factor.
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2.3.4 Monetary policy conduct
When the economy is hit with cost push or demand shocks, it is the duty of
monetary policy to stabilize it. The policy makers problem is composed of
nding suitable monetary policy frameworks and instruments to perform this
task thereby closing the model. In order to do this, monetary policy conduct
can either be characterized by the traditional interest rate instrument which
draws heavily from the New Keynesian economics or the money supply rules
whose existence can be located in the literature on Quantity Theory of Money
(QTM).
Interest rate rules: The theoretical underpinnings of the interest rate
channel can be described using the Taylor (1993) rule. In this class of policy
rules, when aggregate demand is high, represented by a positive output gap,
interest rates are raised. When this happens, output gap closes creating a
negative relationship between interest rates and output. Since output gap
is a key determinant of ination in the Phillips curve, when it goes down,
ination also goes down thereby creating a positive link between output gap
and ination. In this case, monetary policy stabilizes both ination and
output.
Money supply rules: Under money supply rules, authorities rst set a
forecast for real GDP growth and an ination objective. Secondly, estimates
of money velocity and the money multiplier are set. Then based on these
four variables, authorities construct an annual forecast for broad money and
they back out base money growth consistent with achieving the forecast GDP
growth and ination. The Broad money and base money are then typically
divided into quarters, in part by incorporating additional information about
government ows and seasonal patterns. These quarterly forecasts then be-
come the policy targets. Monetary policy is either tightened or loosened
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depending on whether the projected aggregates are above or below the tar-
gets. For example, when the velocity of circulation and money multiplier
are relatively constant a rise in ination above target, triggers authorities to
withdraw liquidity in order to meet the ination target..
With some modications, both rules can be derived by assuming that a
central bank seeks to minimize the deviation of some variables in its objective
function from the targets using the following loss function:
Lt+j = Et
1X
j=0
j
1
2
j(
nX
j=1
K2jt); (2.17)
where K includes the j = 1; :::n central bank targets, such as the exchange
rate, ination, real GDP or nominal GDP. j represents respective weights
with which authorities penalize the deviation of the target variables from
their trend. The monetary policy rules are generated by minimizing the loss
function subject to the Phillips curve alone or together with the IS curve.
Then one can solve for the values of mt to get the monetary aggregate rule
or it to get the interest rate rule. These rules can then be compared in terms
of their performance on how they stabilize aggregate demand and aggregate
supply.
Similarly, monetary policy frameworks are generated by changing the val-
ues of the weights in the loss function. For example, setting the weight on
the exchange rate equal to zero describes an ination targeting framework.
Such frameworks can be compared in terms of their role in stabilizing out-
put and ination. A key feature of the described model is its stochastic
nature. This means that it allows each block in Fig. (6) to be pertubed
by stochastic processes thereby generating uncertainty in the evolution of
the economy. Monetary policy frameworks and instruments are tasked to
stabilize the economy after these disturbances.
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The critical points of departure from the described theoretical model to the
empirical model that we derive in Section 2.4 are threefold: (i) the char-
acterization of the households utility function where we assume money is
non-separable in the utility function, (ii) the specication of a non-linear
production function for rms, iii) the specication of central bank loss func-
tions that enable us to 1) derive optimal interest as well as money supply
rules, 2) examine the role of exchange rate smoothing, 3) derive alternative
monetary policy regimes. The arguments that enter in the utility function,
the budget constraint and the rmsproduction function together with their
mathematical form have critical bearing on the distinctness of the IS curve,
Phillips curve as well as the monetary policy conduct that characterize this
research.
2.4 The model
2.4.1 Households
We specify a New Keynesian DSGE model inspired by Smets and Wouters
(2003). However, in our model, we include real money balances. As argued
by OConnell (2011) and Berg et al. (2010), Africa is largely a cash conti-
nent with scal dominance and low nancial market development such that
monetary aggregates may still play an important role. This role, as argued
by Canova and Menz (2011), can result from the e¤ect that real balances
have on the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure
and hence the real wage. Changes in the real wage a¤ect the Phillips curve
via the marginal costs. Furthermore, Benchimol and FourÇans (2012) argue
that higher risk aversion, a feature consistent with African economies, can
lead to a signicant role of money in output dynamics. Therefore, to capture
the role of real balances, we specify a model similar to Castelnouvo (2012)
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and Andrés et al. (2009) where money is non-separable from consumption
in the utility function.
Given the importance of imports in Africa, as observed by Senbeta (2011),
we assume that a household consumes domestically produced goods Cdt as
well as imports Cmt . Using a constant relative risk aversion utility function
Ut , the representative households preferences are given as follows:
Ut = Et
1X
j=0
j
(
1
1  
h 
Cdt   hCdt 1
1 
+
 
Cmt   hCmt 1
1 iMt
Pt

  N
1+'
t
1 + '
)
(2.18)
whereEt is an expectations operator, 
j 2 (0; 1) is the intertemporal discount
factor, 1= is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,  is the elasticity
of money demand with respect to interest rate, h is a measure of habit
formation as in Smets and Wouters (2003), while ' is the inverse of the Frisch
labour supply elasticity with respect to real wage. We assume that  > 0
and 0    1: Utility positively depends on consumption of domestic Cdt ,
imported goods Cmt and real money balances
Mt
Pt
but negatively on household
labour supply NtWhile households enjoy consumption, they dislike working
for it.
We also assume that households hold their current assets in three forms:
money Mt, domestic bonds Bt and foreign bonds B
f
t . With this assumption,
the household budget constraint is given as:
Mt
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
+
ZtB
f
t
Pt
=
WtNt
Pt
+
Mt 1
Pt
+
(1 + rt 1)Bt 1
Pt
+
Zt(1 + r
f
t 1)B
f
t 1
Pt
 Cdt QtCmt ;
(2.19)
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where Wt is the nominal wage, Zt is the nominal exchange rate measured
as domestic currency per unit of foreign currency, Qt stands for the real ex-
change rate, Pt is the overall domestic price level, P
f
t stands for the foreign
price level: The budget constraint implies that households holding of current
real balances, domestic and foreign bonds together with the current consump-
tion of domestically produced and imported goods is nanced by current real
wages plus real balances, domestic and foreign bonds carried over from the
previous period. Portfolio investors at any time t have the choice of holding
assets denominated in domestic currency, and earning a return of own rate
of interest rt between times t and t + 1. Alternatively, they can hold their
assets in foreign currency, o¤ering a rate of interest rft .The variables rt and
rft therefore denote returns on the domestic and foreign bonds, respectively.
The household problem constitutes choosing intertemporal paths of Cdt ; C
m
t ;
Bt; B
f
t ; Mt and Nt that maximize the expected utility in eq.(2.18) subject to
the budget constraint in eq.(2.19). The resulting rst order conditions are:
 
Cdt   hCdt 1
  Mt
Pt

= t; (2.20)
 
Cmt   hCmt 1
  Mt
Pt

= Qtt; (2.21)
Ett+1

1 + rt
1 + t+1

= t; (2.22)
Ett+1
 
1 + rft
1 + t+1
!
Zt+1
Zt

= t; (2.23)

1  

Mt
Pt
 1
Gt = t   Et

t+1

1
1 + t+1

;(2.24)
N't
t
=
Wt
Pt
; (2.25)
44
where t is the Lagrangian multiplier, and for ease of notation
Gt =
h 
Cdt   hCdt 1
1 
+
 
Cmt   hCmt 1
1 i
Taylor approximation of eq.(2.20) to eq.(2.25) around the steady state yields
the following:
c^dt =
1
1 + h
Etc^
d
t+1 +
h
1 + h
c^dt 1  
(1  h)
(1 + h)
(r^t   Et^t+1)
+
(1  h)
(1 + h)
(m^t   Etm^t+1) (2.26)
and
c^mt =
1
1 + h
Etc^
m
t+1 +
h
1 + h
c^mt 1  
(1  h)
(1 + h)
(r^t   Et^t+1)
+
(1  h)
(1 + h)
(m^t   Etm^t+1)  (1  h)
(1 + h)
(q^t   Etq^t+1): (2.27)
Eq:(2.26) and eq.(2.27) are Euler equations for domestic and imported con-
sumption. The small letters together with an accent above the variable stand
for the deviation of the variable from its steady state. Specically, c^mt ,c^
d
t ; ^t,
m^t, q^t and r^t are dened as deviations of consumption of imported goods,
consumption of domestic goods, ination, real money balances, real exchange
rate and nominal interest rates, respectively, from their steady state. Sub-
script (t + 1) stands for forward looking or model consistent expectations
while (t   1) stands for lagged value. The terms c^dt 1 and c^mt 1 stand for
lagged deviation of domestic and imported consumption, respectively, from
their steady state values.
Eq. (2.26) states that consumption of domestic goods positively depends on
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expected consumption and lagged consumption due to rational expectations
and habit formation, but it is negatively related to real interest rate. Real
money balances positively a¤ect domestic consumption while exchange rate
depreciation has negative impact on consumption of domestic goods. These
relationship also holds for Euler equation for the consumption of imported
goods depicted by eq. (2.27). To the extent that households consume foreign
goods, a depreciation of the current exchange rate reduces aggregate con-
sumption by raising costs of imports used in consumption as well as inputs.
Through this channel, the depreciation may generate a contractionary e¤ect
on output as pointed out by Edwards and Ahamed (1986). In order to derive
aggregate demand dynamics, we follow McCallum and Nelson (2000) and
state the following open economy macro-balance equation in deviation from
steady state.
y^t =  cc^
d
t + xx^t   mc^mt ; (2.28)
Eq. (2.28) states that in equilibrium, output is portrayed as the sum of
domestic consumption and exports less imports. x^t is the deviation of exports
from their steady state and the rest of the variables are as dened above.
The terms  c; x and m are steady state ratios of the adjacent variables to
total output. Following Woodford (2000), we abstract from investment in
the macro-balance equation. As in McCallum and Nelson (2000), we further
specify the following export function:
x^t = q q^t + f y^
f
t ; (2.29)
where q and f are elasticities of exports with respect to the exchange
rate and foreign income, respectively. y^ft is the deviation of foreign output
from steady state. This relationship states that when the exchange rate
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depreciates and foreign incomes rise, exports will rise. Substituting eq.(2.27)
and eq.(2.29) into eq:(2.28) yields the following expression:
y^t = 1Ety^t+1 + 2y^t 1   3(r^t   Et^t+1) + 4 (m^t   Etm^t+1)
+5 (q^t   Etq^t+1) + 6Etq^t+1 + 7q^t   8q^t 1 + 9Ety^ft+1
+10y^
f
t   11y^ft 1 + "yt; (2.30)
where
1 =
1
(1 + h)
; 2 =
h
(1 + h)
; 3 =
(1  h)
(1 + h)
; 4 =
(1  h)
(1 + h)
;
5 =
(1  h)
(1 + h)
; 6 =
xq

; 7 =
xq

; 8 =
xq

,
9 =
fx

; 10 =
xf

; 11 =
xf

;  =  c c   mm:
Eq.(2.30) is a hybrid open economy IS curve. It is similar to a traditional
IS equation since it describes the negative relationship between aggregate
demand and the ex ante real interest rate r^t   Et^t+1. However, unlike the
traditional IS relationship, eq.(2.30) is dynamic and forward looking. It fea-
tures current, lagged and expected variables. The term Et is an expectations
operator while the term t+ 1 stands for model consistent expectations.
Output gap y^t responds positively to the lead output gap y^t+1 and lagged out-
put gap y^t 1. As argued by Smets and Wouters (2003), these variables a¤ect
output positively due to rational expectations and habit formation. With
external habits, income depends on a weighted average of past and expected
future income. Parameter 1 is thus expected to be positive. When economic
agents expect higher incomes, their current expenditures tend to rise due to
rational expectations. 1 also captures the percentage of consumers who are
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forward looking. Its value therefore ranges between 0 and 1. Parameter 2 is
a measure of output gap persistence and it also measures the proportion of
economic agents who are backward looking. Its value also ranges between 0
and 1. The closer to 1 the value of this parameter is, the more persistent the
output gap. When output gap is persistent, it becomes more problematic to
stabilize ination.
Parameter 3 measures the interest rate sensitivity of aggregate demand.
According to Keynes theory of aggregate demand, this parameter carries a
negative sign. If 3  0; then aggregate demand will not respond to changes
in interest rates. In that case, monetary policy is likely to be ine¤ective
and vice-versa. The interest elasticity of output depends not only on the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, but also on the habit persistence pa-
rameter h. A high degree of habit persistence will tend to reduce the impact
of the real interest rate on consumption for a given elasticity of substitution.
Similar to Ireland (2004) and Zanetti (2012), eq.(2.30) also features real
money gap m^t   Etm^t+1 whose e¤ect on aggregate demand is captured by
4. This parameter determines whether money balances are important for
system dynamics. McCallum (2001) shows that real balances become irrele-
vant for output determination if and only if the utility function is separable
in consumption and real balances. In that case, there is good transmission
such that interest rate and money can be substituted with each other (Fan et
al. 2011). In African economies, the transmission may not be perfect, hence
the inclusion of real balances. With higher real balances, economic agents
reduce supply of labour which a¤ects the real wage and aggregate demand.
4 is thus expected to be positive. The higher the value, the more signicant
the role of the monetary aggregates in driving system dynamics.
In order to capture the open economy e¤ects, the IS curve also includes the
real exchange q^t. As shown by Senbeta (2011), Africas consumption largely
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relies on imports, making the exchange rate a key variable in output dy-
namics. As in Wollmershäuser (2006) and Rasaki and Malikane (2014), the
exchange rate a¤ects output dynamics in levels and changes. When a cur-
rency depreciates, it is expected to boost foreign demand for exports while
reducing imports. When this happens, aggregated demand goes up. This
generates a positive link between exchange rate depreciation and output.
But as argued by Sanchez (2008), this occurs when depreciations are expan-
sionary. In some cases, depreciations tend to be contractionary . This would
imply a negative relationship between the exchange rate and output.
Furthermore, to the extent that households consumption basket includes for-
eign goods, a depreciation of the exchange rate reduces household consump-
tion, which reduces aggregate demand. Through this channel, the exchange
rate may generate a contractionary e¤ect on output as pointed out by Krug-
man and Taylor (1978). Thus, the e¤ect of exchange rate on output, whether
in levels or changes will depend on whether depreciations are expansionary
or contractionary. Therefore, the sign of parameters 5, 6, 7 and 8 which
capture the e¤ect of exchange rate depreciation, exchange rate expectations,
current exchange rate and lagged exchange rate on aggregate demand, respec-
tively, will depend on whether the exchange rate a¤ects output positively or
negatively.
Another feature of the IS curve arising from the imposition of the macroeco-
nomic resource balance is the presence of foreign output variables. Foreign
output may a¤ect domestic output through various channels, such as foreign
direct investments, foreign aid and trade. Higher foreign incomes may in-
duce high aid levels, high demand for Africas exports and also high foreign
direct investment. Under all these circumstances, it would be expected that
parameters 9; 10 and 11 which measure the response of domestic output
to expected foreign incomes, current foreign incomes and expected foreign
income to be positive. Just like the exchange rate variables, the foreign out-
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put variables serve to capture the open economy e¤ects. This variable is key
due to the perceived high dependence of African countries on aid, commodity
trading and foreign direct investments.
The major di¤erence between eq. (2.30) and the Convetional demand curves
estimated for AEs and some EMEs is that eq. (2.30) features money, ex-
change rate and foreign output which are assumed to be critical in driving
macroeconomic dynamics in Africa. As in Ireland (2004), we also include an
aggregate demand shock "yt which captures exogenous inuences on aggre-
gate demand and is assumed to follow an AR(1) process.
2.4.2 Exchange rate determination
Since the economies being modelled are linked to the rest of the world, the
determination of the exchange rate dynamics is critical. The exchange rate
is key in ensuring that domestic and foreign entities transact. Our starting
point is Gali (2008) who assumes that the economies have access to interna-
tional markets. In this case, the evolution of the exchange rate follows the
Uncovered Interest rate Parity (UIP) condition. The UIP states that the
nominal exchange rate is determined by interest rate di¤erentials between
domestic interest rates r^t and foreign interest rates r^
f
t . The basic concept of
the UIP recognizes the fact that portfolio investors at any time t have the
choice of holding assets in domestic currency. In which case, they earn a
return of own rate of interest rt.
Alternatively, portfolio investors can hold their assets in foreign currency. In
this case they will earn a rate of interest rft . Whenever the return on one asset
is higher than the return on the other asset, arbitrage conditions are created
and depending on the spot exchange rate, investors tend to move their assets
between the two investment options. These movements create demand and
supply of foreign exchange which drive exchange rate movements. In order
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to generate the UIP condition similar to Gali (2008), we combine Taylor
approximation around steady state of eq.(2.22) and eq.(2.23) which yields
the following:
Etz^t+1 = r^t   r^ft : (2.31)
Svensson (2000) argues that the typical UIP condition enters the open econ-
omy models in its real version. However, Thomas (2012) shows that the UIP
condition does not hold in some African countries. These countries include
South Africa, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Instead he
nds that the foreign exchange risk premium is a signicant driver of ex-
change rate developments in these economies. We, therefore, augment the
exchange rate equation with the term "qt . This term captures deviations
from the UIP condition. We then transform eq. (2.31) to describe real ex-
change rate dynamics as follows:4
Etq^t+1 =  
h
(r^t   ^t+1)  (r^ft   ^ft+1)
i
+ "qt; (2.32)
Eq. (2.32) states that real exchange rate dynamics are determined by in-
terest rate di¤erentials and the risk premium. The exchange rate channel
is triggered by changes in the nominal interest rates. When domestic in-
terest rates rise or ination declines, the real exchange rate appreciate and
viceversa. When foreign interest rates rise or foreign ination declines, the
real exchange rate depreciates. The e¤ect of the exchange rate changes on
aggregate demand can either be direct or indirect. The direct channel af-
fects ination via the pass-through of exchange rate to import prices and
hence ination. Indirectly, the real exchange rate a¤ects the relative price
4See Appendix to Chapter II for the detailed derivation of the UIP condition
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between domestic and foreign goods. This ignites expenditure switching be-
tween demand for domestic and foreign goods. In turn this a¤ect aggregate
demand.
The term "qt is typically referred to as the foreign exchange risk premium.
The risk premium follows an AR(1) process such that "qt = q"qt 1 + qt
where qt is the risk premium shock and qt  N(0; 2q). The higher the
risk premium the greater the exchange rate depreciation. A similar spec-
ication has been used in other open economy models for EMEs, such as
Wollmershäuser (2006) and in AEs such as Svensson (2000).
2.4.3 Money market dynamics
We combine steady state forms of eq.(2.22) and eq.(2.24) and use the economy
wide macro-balance described by eq.(2.28) to derive the following money
market equilibrium condition:
m^t = 	1y^t +	2y^t 1  	3(r^t   Et^t+1) 	4Et^t+1 +	5q^t +	6q^t 1  	7y^f
+	8y^
f
t 1 + "mdt: (2.33)
When the economy is faced with a money demand shock, real balances evolve
according to eq. (2.33). As in Castelnouvo (2012), eq.(2.33) is of dynamic
nature. It determines real money balances as a function of output, interest
rates, expected ination, the real exchange rate and foreign output. Parame-
ter 	1 is the income elasticity of money demand and its value lies between 0
and 1. According to Keynes theory, transactional motives compel economic
agents to hold more real balances when their incomes rise. The presence
of habits in the utility function generates a dynamic equation which makes
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demand for money to also depend on lagged income. Coe¢ cient 	2 which
measures the impact of lagged income on money demand is thus expected to
be positive.
Parameter	3 is the interest rate elasticity of money demand. It measures the
contemporaneous opportunity cost of holding money. According to Keynes
theory of money demand, this parameter is expected to be negative. Its
value lies between 0 and 1. The closer to 0 the parameter is the less sensitive
money demand is to changes in income. Under such circumstances, monetary
policy will nd it di¢ cult to inuence macroeconomic variables. Parameter
	4 which measures the response of money demand to expected ination
is expected to be positive. Rational agents will increase their demand for
money, particularly for transactional purposes if they anticipate ination to
rise.
Parameters	5 and	6 measure the response of money demand to current and
lagged exchange rates, respectively. These parameters can take any real num-
ber depending on whether depreciations are contractionary or expansionary.
If the depreciation is contractionary, it will reduce output which will eventu-
ally reduce demand for money thereby generating negative values for 	5 and
	6:When depreciations are expansionary, they will raise output and increase
demand for money. Alternatively, when depreciations are inationary, an in-
crease in the exchange rate will tend to raise demand for money as economic
agents take positions again loss of value. Due to the nature of the specied
utility function and budget constraint, eq. (2.33) also features foreign out-
put variables. Parameter 	7 links money demand positively to changes in
foreign incomes while 	8 links money demand negatively to lagged foreign
income. Equivalently, a corollary of eq.(2.33) can be specied with r^t as an
endogenous variable as follows:
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r^t = 1y^t + 2y^t 1   3m^t   4^t+1 + 5q^t + 6q^t 1 + 7y^ft
 8y^ft 1 + "rdt; (2.34)
Eq. (2.34) is similar to Rasaki and Malikane (2014) and Andrés et al. (2006).
1 measures the positive relationship between market interest rates and
changes in income. As incomes rise, demand for money rises and market
rates must rise to cool o¤ excess demand. Due to habit formation, 2 which
captures the response of market rate to lagged income is also expected to
be greater than 0. Parameter 3 measures the response of market rates to
changes in money supply. The higher the money supply the lower the inter-
est rate, hence a negative relationship. By extending the argument raised by
Sanchez (2008), parameters 5 and 6 can take either positive or negative
sign, depending on whether depreciations trigger an expansion or a contrac-
tion in output. Parameters 7 and 8 show that money market rates are
increasing in foreign income through a positive link that foreign income is
theoretically expected to have on domestic income. The terms "rdt and "mdt
in eq. (2.33) and eq. (2.34), respectively, are money demand shocks which
follow an AR(1) process5. The reduced form parameters in eq.(2.33) and
eq.(2.34) are given as follows:
5This alternative description of money market dynamics which involves rt is simply
found by setting rt as subject of the formula after estimation. We then use the calculated
values for simulations.
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	1 =
(x   m)(1  )(xx   mm)
2(1  )(1  h) ; 	2 =
h(1  )(x   m)(xx   mm)
2 (1  ) (1  h) ;
	4 =
1
2(1  ) ; 	5 =
q(1  )(x   m)x
2 (1  ) (1  h) ; 	6 =
q(1  )(x   m)xh
2 (1  ) (1  h) ;
	7 =
f (1  )(x   m)x
2 (1  ) (1  h) ; 	8 =
fh(1  )(x   m)x
2 (1  ) (1  h) ; 1 =
	1
	3
,
2 =
	2
	3
, 3 =
1
	3
, 4 =
1 + 	4
	3
, 5 =
	5
	3
, 6 =
	6
	3
, 7 =
	7
	3
,
8 =
	8
	3
; 	3 =
1
2(1  ) :
2.4.4 Firms
Following Malikane (2014) and Batini et al. (2005), we assume that rms
exhibit non-linear input demand. The rationale for this type of production
function is that in the short-run, rms may be unable to substitute between
labour and material inputs. Furthermore, if rms use capital equipment
whose e¢ ciency varies with output, at the margin as output rises, less ef-
cient capital is called to duty. These machines demand relatively large
amounts of material inputs to produce a unit of output. The non-labour
input demand therefore takes the following form: Xjt = Y
j
t ; where Xjt
stands for inputs other than labour and 
j
is the elasticity of input j in the
production process. We assume that one of the major non-labour inputs in
the production process is imported. Thus, this general specication helps to
account for the impact of changes in costs of imported raw material prices
and also serves to capture the fact that African economies largely rely on
imported inputs for production.
Firms are assumed to seek prot maximization but operate in a monopolis-
tically competitive environment and face staggered price setting as in Calvo
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(1983). Following Baldini et al. (2015) and Batini et al. (2005), we normal-
ize the capital stock to unity. The production function is Cobb-Douglas in
nature and is specied as follows:
Yt = AtN

t
"
mY
j=1
Y
jj
t
#
: (2.35)
The term Yt stands for total output which is produced by rms and is equal to
the real GDP. Similar to Andrés et al. (2006), At is an AR (1) technological
process. Nt is the amount of labour used in production. Parameter 0 <  < 1
therefore measures the labour share in income, and j is the elasticity of
output with respect to input j.  is an m   array product function and
serves to capture the rms non-linear requirement of the non-labour input.
m is the number of non-labour inputs required by the rm. The majority
of countries we are investigating do not have labour statistics which can be
used to estimate eq. (2.35). We therefore present it in its reduced form as
follows:
Yt = AtN

t ; (2.36)
where  = 
1 	 ; 	 =
mP
j=1
jj and At = A
1
1 	
t : The rms real total costs TCt
can thus be expressed as:
TCt =
WtY
1

t
Pt A
1

+
mX
j=1
PjtY
j
t
Pt
; (2.37)
where the real wage and real non-labour costs are denotes as WtY
1

t
Pt A
1

and
PjtY
j
t
Pt
; respectively. The term Pt is the domestic price level which is used to
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deate nominal wages and nominal non-labour input costs. Eq. (2.37) states
that total costs for the rms are a sum of real wage and real non-labour input
costs. Combining eq.(2.25) and eq.(2.36) yields the following real wage (Wt
Pt
),
expression:
Wt
Pt
=

Yt
At
 '
 1
t
: (2.38)
Combining eq.(2.37) and eq.(2.38), and letting pit denote the real price of
non-labour input yields the following real marginal cost, rmct; expression:
rmct = 1
Y
2
t
A
3
t
1
t
+
mX
j=1
jpitY
i 1
t ; (2.39)
where 1 =
'+1

; 2 =
1 +'

and 3 =
+(1 	)(1+')
(1 	) : The term t is the
Lagrangian function as dened in eqs. (2.20-2.25). The Taylor approximation
of eq.(2.39) yields:
rm^ct = 1y^t   2a^t   3^t +
mX
j=1
4p^it; (2.40)
In eq. (2.40) real marginal costs increase with a rise in output gap 1 > 0;
decrease with a rise in technology 2 < 0 and increase with a rise in prices
of imported inputs 4 > 0:
1 =
1
MC0
"
2Y
2 1
0
A
3
0 0
+
mX
j=1
(j   1)jpj0Y j 10
#
; 2 =
1
MC0
"
3Y
2
0
A
3
0 0
#
;
3 =
1
MC0
"
1
0
Y
2
0
A
3
0
#
; 4 =
1
MC0
"
mX
j=1
jY
j 1Pi0
#
:
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Next, we combine the steady state forms of eq.(2.21), eqs.(2.28) and (2.29)
and substitute the result in eq.(2.40) to get the following expression:
rm^ct = 1y^t +

3 + m
1  h

Ety^t+1  

3 + hm
1  h

y^t 1 + 3q^t
+
3qxm
1  h Etq^t+1  
3qhxm
1  h q^t 1   3m^t
+
3fxm
1  h Ety^
f
t+1  
3fhxm
1  h y^
f
t 1 + 4p^it   2a^t:(2.41)
Eq.(2.41) states that the rms real marginal costs rm^ct positively depend on
current output gap y^t and expected output gap Ety^t+1, negatively depend on
lagged output gap y^t 1, positively depend on current real exchange rate q^t,
positively depend on expected real exchange rate Etq^t+1; negatively depend
on lagged real exchange rate q^t 1; negatively depend on real money balances,
positively depend on expected foreign incomes, negatively depend on lagged
foreign income, positively depend on real input prices and negatively depend
on technology. The novelty in eq. (2.41) is that it expands on the traditional
assumption of output gap as the sole proxy of real marginal costs as in Gali
and Gertler (1999). This specication is more elaborate and is also in line
with Malikane (2014) and Petrella and Sontoro (2012).
Therefore substituting the more elaborate real marginal cost function rep-
resented by eq.(2.41) into the baseline hybrid new-Keynesian Phillips curve
proposed by Gali and Gertler (1999) yields the following:
^t = fEt^t+1 + b^t 1 + 1y^t + 2Ety^t+1 + 3y^t 1 + 4q^t
+5Etq^t+1   6q^t 1 + 7m^t + 8Ety^ft+1   9y^ft 1
+ 10p^it + "t; (2.42)
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where
1 = c1; 2 =

c
3m(mm    c c)
1  h ; 3 =

c
h(mm    c c)
1  h ;
3 =

c
h)( 2m    2c)
1  h ; 4 = c3; 5 =

c
3xmq
1  h ;
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Eq. (2.42) is a hybrid Phillips curve. As in Gali and Gertler (1999), parame-
ters 0 <  f < 1 and 0 <  b < 1 capture the degree of forward and backward
looking price setting, respectively. The closer to 1  b is the higher the degree
of ination indexation and the more persistent ination is. Monetary policy
faces a di¢ cult task of bring ination down if price setting is mostly back-
ward looking. Parameters 1 captures the impact of output gap on ination
and is expected to be greater than 0. Higher output comes from higher pro-
duction. An increase in rms production raises demand for raw materials
which tends to push up real marginal costs. Since output gap depends on
interest rates, this parameter also shows how expectations about monetary
policy a¤ects ination.
Parameter 2 > 0 captures the impact of income expectations on price set-
ting. With anticipated increase in income, rms project higher demand for
their goods and services and tend to produce more in order to meet the
anticipated demand. Again higher production calls for increase in resource
deployment which bids up resource prices thereby raising real marginal costs.
This process has the tendency of pushing up prices. Parameter 3 captures
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the response of ination to lagged output gap which as suggested by Berg et
al. (2010) is expected to be greater than zero.
As argued by Senbeta (2011), rms in Africa are assumed to import the bulk
part of their raw materials. This makes the exchange rate a key driver of
the rms real marginal costs. A depreciated currency raises real marginal.
This generates a positive link between ination and exchange rate such that
4 > 0: When rms anticipate the exchange rate to depreciate, they also
tend to adjust current prices of their products in order nance the purchase
of raw materials under a depreciated currency. This suggests that 5 which
measures the response of current ination to exchange rate expectations takes
a positive sign. However, as shown by Sanchez (2008), since depreciations
can either be contractionary or expansionary. Therefore parameters 4; 5
and 6 might be ambiguous:
The presence of real money balances m^t may reduce rmscosts associated
with searching for alternative nancing to procure inputs. In this case 7
can be expected to be negative. But Castelnouvo (2012) argues that real
balances may also act as a forcing variable capturing demand push on prices.
Furthermore, money may also a¤ect household labour supply decisions and
hence the real wage due to the non-separability assumption. When agents
have high real money balances, they may decide to reduce their supply of
labour. Firms must then o¤er higher wages in order to induce economic
agents to work. When this happens, real marginal costs can increase gener-
ating a positive link between real money balances and ination.
Ination is also inuenced positively by foreign output through trade and aid
which act as demand push factors:The impact of expectation about foreign
income and lagged foreign income on domestic ination development are cap-
tured by parameters 8 and 9. The Phillips curve also exhibits the response
of ination to changes in input prices, 10. Recent studies, such as Malikane
(2014) show that including input prices generates a theoretically consistent
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response of ination to the output gap. Parameter 10 is thus expected to
carry a positive sign. Higher input prices raise real marginal costs which
manifest in an increase in prices.
Finally, following Ireland (2004), the Phillips curve also exhibits an aggregate
supply shock "t. This shock may capture technology or cost push factors
and is assumed to follow an AR(1) process "t = "t 1 + t; where t
 N(0; 2)t . According to Clarida et al. (2001), this shock may also
arise from stochastic wage mark-up in imperfect labour markets. Similar
specication has also been used by Rasaki and Malikane (2014).
2.4.5 Monetary policy reaction function
Consistent with the exposition by McCallum (2000) and Liu and Zhang
(2010), we characterize monetary policy conduct by specifying two alter-
natives, money and interest rate rules. This is also in line with the current
debate and monetary policy conduct in most African countries. According
to Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) and Henderson and McKibbin (1993),
the central bank can optimize monetary policy instead of following an adhoc
approach. Optimization also helps in the objective comparison of the mone-
tary policy rules. In order to derive optimal monetary policy rules, we follow
Svensson (1999) and Woodford (2003) and specify the following central bank
loss function:
Lt = Et
1X
j=0
j
1
2
(^2t+j +y^
2
t+j); (2.43)
where 0 <  < 1 is the policymakers discount factor similar to the private
sector discount factor in eq.(2.18). The parameter  > 0 signies that au-
thorities place some weight on output stabilisation. The central bank seeks
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to minimize eq.(2.43) subject to eqs. (2.30) and (2.42) where it can either
control r^t or m^t at any point. We follow Svensson (1999) who argues that in
order to increase e¢ ciency, monetary policy must respond to drivers of tar-
get variables as described by eqs.(2.30) and (2.42). We therefore minimize
eq.(2.43) subject to these equations and get the rst order conditions for ^t,
y^t, q^t; r^t as follows:
^t + b1t+1   1t = 0; (2.44)
yy^t + 22t+1   2t + 11t + 31t+1 = 0; (2.45)
 2t5   72t + 82t+1   41t   61t+1 = 0; (2.46)
2t3 = 0; (2.47)
where 1t and 2t are Lagrangian multipliers. Eqs. 2.44 to 2.47 represent
period t optimal discretionary policy conditions which yield the following
reduced form optimal relationship between ination and output:
y^t =   1
y
[1^t + 2^t 1] ; (2.48)
where 1 =
43
(6 4b) and 2 =
41
(6 4b) : The optimal condition in eq. (2.48)
can be interpreted as follows: if ination is above target, contract demand
below the natural output by increasing the interest rate. If ination is below
its target expand demand above capacity by decreasing interest rates. The
coe¢ cients of proportionality 1 and 2 depend positively on coe¢ cients of
output gap and exchange rate in the Phillips curve and inversely on the weight
y attached to output stabilization in the objective function. The smaller the
value of y the stronger is the demand contraction initiated by the central
bank if ination deviates from the target and vice versa. Following Evans
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and Honkapohja (2003), we combine the real sector equilibrium dynamics
described by eq.(2.30) with the optimal condition (2.48) to derive the central
banks optimal interest rate reaction function as follows:
r^t = 1yy^t+1 + 2yy^t 1 + 1^t + 2^t 1 + 3^t+1 + m(m^t   m^t+1)
+1q(q^t   q^t+1) + 2q q^t+1 + 3q q^t   4q q^t 1 + 1f y^ft+1
+2f y^
f
t   3f y^ft 1 + "rt, (2.49)
Where
1y =
1
3
; 2y =
2
3
; 1 =
2
3
; 2 =
1
3
; 3 = 1; m =
4
3
; 1q =
5
3
2q =
6
3
; 3q =
7
3
; 4q =
8
3
; 1f =
9
3
; 2f =
10
3
; 3f =
11
3
:
Eq. (2.49) is a reduced form optimal Taylor-type interest rate reaction func-
tion (IRR). Some studies such as Gali and Gertler (1999) set monetary policy
to react to current ination and output gaps only. However, following Svens-
son (1999), who argues that to increase monetary policy e¢ ciency, authorities
must react to drivers of target variables rather than target variables them-
selves, eq. (2.49) also features factors that drive both the IS and the Phillips
curve. The structure of the policy rule also reects habit formation in the
utility function.
Parameters 1y and 2y measure the reaction of monetary policy to expected
output gap and lagged output gap. If authorities expect an increase in output
gap, they will preemptively tighten monetary policy. Furthermore, if output
gap has been positive and it is persistent, authorities will also maintain tight
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monetary policy stance. Therefore, the expectation is that 1y > 0 and
2y > 0: Parameters 2y is expected to be higher for countries that have high
ination persistence. Parameters 1; 2 and 3 capture the reaction of
monetary policy to current ination, lagged and expected ination. Similarly,
if current ination is positive, ination is persistent and ination expectations
are high, monetary authorities will maintain tight policy stance to deal with
ination pressures. It is therefore expected that 1 > 0; 2 > 0 and 3 > 0.
Similar to Benchimol and FourÇans (2012), the non-separability assumption
leads to the appearance of the real balances in the Taylor rule. Monetary
policy responds positively to a rise in real money gap m > 0. Parameters
1q; 2q, 3q and 4q measure the reaction of monetary policy to real ex-
change rate depreciation, exchange rate expectations, current exchange rate
and lagged exchange rate, respectively. Similar to Wollmeashäuser (2006),
monetary policy is concerned with exchange rate in level and changes. As
argued by Mohanty and Klau (2004), exchange rate depreciations can be in-
ationary. Furthermore, Garcia et al. (2011) also show that exchange rate
depreciations can have negative balance sheet e¤ects. It is therefore expected
that monetary policy will be tightened following threats from exchange rate
depreciations, such that 1q > 0; 2q > 0 3q > 0 and 4q > 0:
Just like in Rasaki and Malikane (2014), monetary policy also responds to ex-
pected and current foreign income through parameters 1f > 0 and 2f > 0;
respectively. A rise in foreign income is likely to trigger a rise in foreign
interest rates. Depending on the strength of the UIP, domestic monetary
policy may respond accordingly in order to guard against exchange rate de-
preciation. Through derivations, 3f which measures the impact of lagged
foreign income on domestic monetary policy conduct is negative. The term
"rt is a shock to monetary policy and it follows an AR(1) process.
Alternatively, McCallum (2000) states that the central banks reaction func-
tion can be described in terms of the monetary aggregate rule. We com-
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bine the optimal dynamics in eq.(2.48) with the Phillips curve described by
eq.(2.42) to get the following:
m^t =  3yy^t 1   1yy^t   2yy^t+1   b^t 1   f ^t+1   3q q^t 1
 1q q^t   2q q^t+1 + 2ff y^ft 1   1ff y^ft+1   odoilpt + "mt; (2.50)
where
3y =
3
7
; 1y =
y + 1
17
; 2y =
2
7
; b =
b + 2
7
; f =
f
7
,
3q =
6
7
; 1q =
4
7
; 2q =
5
7
, 2ff =
9
7
; 1ff =
8
7
; o =
10
7
:
Eq. (2.50) is an optimal Taylor-type money aggregate rule (MAR). It is
consistent with Taylor (1979) proposal that the optimal money supply can
be set as a function of ination and the output gap. As pointed out by
Svensson (1999), eq.(2.50) represents pragmatic monetary rule . In this rule,
additional information beyond output and ination which characterize the
basic QTM is considered when undertaking policy decisions. Similar to Fan
et al. (2011), the rule incorporates the role of the exchange rate, foreign
output and crude oil prices on monetary policy conduct. When output gap
increases, authorities contract money supply. This is denoted by negative
signs on coe¢ cients of lagged output gap 3y, current output gap 1y and
expected output gap 2y. Similarly, authorities contract money supply when
there is high ination persistence and ination expectations. This is captured
by parameters b < 0 and f < 0.
Parameters 3q; 1q; and 2q measure the reaction of monetary policy to
lagged, current and expected exchange rate. Exchange rate depreciations
65
are assumed to be inationary, and hence monetary policy reacts by reduc-
ing money supply. As a result, these coe¢ cients carry negative signs. If we
assume that exchange rate depreciations are expansionary, monetary policy
will respond by withdrawing liquidity as well. However, if exchange rate
depreciations are contractionary, they will reduce output thereby generat-
ing a contrary policy reaction. Therefore, the sign of these parameters will
ultimately depend on whether output responds positively or negatively to ex-
change rate changes. These will be buttressed by the positively pass-through
of the exchange rate depreciation.
Parameters 2ff and 1ff capture the inuence of foreign income on do-
mestic monetary policy conduct. To the extend that foreign incomes push
up domestic income, monetary policy reacts by contracting money supply.
Therefore, the expectation is that 2ff < 0 and 1ff < 0: Finally, similar to
Fan et al. (2011), monetary policy responds to input prices. If input prices
are high, they lter into the real marginal costs. The real marginal costs show
up in ination. Monetary policy therefore responds by contracting money
supply, such that o < 0:
Eqs.(2.49) and (2.50) describe monetary policy conduct under exible ina-
tion targeting. The two rules are both of a Taylor-type and according to
Adam (2011), they can be compared in terms of their implication for macro-
economic stabilization in Africa. Within the context of the rules versus dis-
cretion debate, our rules feature some degree of exibility and considerable
scope for policy adjustment. This is premised on their robustness as they
respond to several variables a part from ination and output gaps. They
also di¤er from those of the AEs such as in Smets and Wouters (2003) and
Ireland (2004). The rules are in line with Africas macroeconomic landscape
as they include the exchange rate, foreign input prices and foreign output.
Uncertainty in monetary policy lags, a feature more prominent in African
countries is taken care of by responding to di¤erent lags of variables.
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2.4.6 Estimable System
We are interested in policy implications of the system rather than recovering
the underlying parameters. We, therefore, follow Zanetti (2012) and estimate
a reduced form model. We reproduce below the derived reduced form New
Keynesian model together with the way these equations have been numbered
in the text. The equations describing money market dynamics and those
describing monetary policy conduct enter the system interchangeably.
IS Curve
y^t = 1Ety^t+1 + 2y^t 1   3(r^t   Et^t+1) + 4 (m^t   Etm^t+1)
+5 (q^t   Etq^t+1) + 6Etq^t+1 + 7q^t   8q^t 1 + 9Ety^ft+1
+10y^
f
t   11y^ft 1 + "yt (2.30)
Exchange rate dynamics
Etq^t+1 =  
h
(r^t   ^t+1)  (r^ft   ^ft+1)
i
+ "qt (2.32)
Money market dynamics
m^t = 	1y^t +	2y^t 1  	3(r^t   Et^t+1) 	4Et^t+1 +	5q^t +	6q^t 1  	7y^f
+	8y^
f
t 1 + "mdt (2.33)
r^t = 1y^t + 2y^t 1   3m^t   4^t+1 + 5q^t + 6q^t 1 + 7y^ft
 8y^ft 1 + "rdt (2,34)
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Phillips curve
^t = fEt^t+1 + b^t 1 + 1y^t + 2Ety^t+1 + 3y^t 1 + 4q^t
+5Etq^t+1   6q^t 1 + 7m^t + 8Ety^ft+1   9y^ft 1
+ 10p^it + "t (2.42)
Interest rate policy rule
r^t = 1yy^t+1 + 2yy^t 1 + 1^t + 2^t 1 + 3^t+1 + m(m^t   m^t+1)
+1q(q^t   q^t+1) + 2q q^t+1 + 3q q^t   4q q^t 1 + 1f y^ft+1
+2f y^
f
t   3f y^ft 1 + "rt, (2.49)
Money supply rule
m^t =  3yy^t 1   1yy^t   2yy^t+1   b^t 1   f ^t+1   3q q^t 1
 1q q^t   2q q^t+1 + 2ff y^ft 1   1ff y^ft+1   odoilpt + "mt (2.50)
Following Woodford (2003), we seek to identify which of the policy rules
between eqs. (2.49) and (2.50) generates lower macroeconomic loss as mea-
sured by eq. (2.43) and also restores the economy back to the steady state
in a relatively shorter period. We analyze impulse responses which represent
the expected path of the endogenous variables conditional on a one stan-
dard deviation contractionary shock in period one. In estimating the model,
we assume that exogenous variables are driven by the following stochastic
processes: & t = && t 1+&t and #t = #t#t 1+t, where &t =

y^ft ; r^
f
t ; ^
f
t ;
doilpt
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and #t = ("yt; "t; "rt; "mt; "mdt; "rdt). Furthermore, &t  N(0; 2& ) and
#t  N(0; 2#).
2.5 Data, parameterization and estimation
2.5.1 Data
We estimate the model using nine macroeconomic variables described as fol-
lows: i) ination is calculated as a log di¤erence of the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) between one quarter and the same quarter of the previous year, ii) real
balances are calculated as the log di¤erence between money supply and the
CPI, iii) output gap is calculated as the di¤erence between the log of real
GDP and its trend. In countries where quarterly GDP statistics are not
available, e.g. Malawi, Tanzania, Morocco, Zambia and Nigeria we interpo-
late the data, iv) real exchange rate is calculated as the sum of the logs of
the nominal bilateral US dollar exchange rate and the US CPI less the log
of the domestic CPI, v) foreign output is proxied by the US real GDP, vi)
we use the US ination to proxy foreign ination, vii) Brent crude oil price
is used as a proxy for the price of imported raw material.
Similar to Baldini et al. (2015) who use interest rate on government bonds
as policy instrument, we also use (viii) Treasury bill rate as proxy for o¢ cial
policy rates, ix) foreign interest rate is proxied by the three months London
Interbank O¤er Rate (LIBOR). We use the LIBOR because it represents a
benchmark rate that leading global banks charge each other for short-term
loans. Unlike the federal funds rate, the LIBOR is determined by the equilib-
rium between supply and demand on the funds market, and it is calculated
for ve currencies. The LIBOR is an important rate used worldwide by -
nancial institutions to determine the interest rate to be charged on various
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loans. Although there are several maturities, we choose the three month LI-
BOR because it is the most popular and is in line with quarterly data that
we use in this study. Similar studies like Rasaki and Malikane (2014) also
use the same rate.
Data is de-trended using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) lter (HP lter) as
part of the estimation procedure. The HP lter decomposes the data into
a cyclical component and a growth component and removes the latter. As
argued by Canova (2007), the HP lter has been and is still one of the
preferred methods for extracting cycles from economic series. Del Negro and
Schorfheide (2003) explains that the rationale behind ltering is that the
model is designed to explain business cycles as opposed to very short-run or
long-run movements in data. The variables are thus in deviation from steady
state.
The model is estimated using quarterly data on 10 African countries. The
countries are chosen to reect various stages of economic development as well
as di¤erent stages and aspirations in monetary policy conduct. A common
feature across them is that they are either actively using the interest rate
instrument, e.g. South Africa, Ghana, Kenya and Uganda or contemplat-
ing migration, e.g. Malawi, Egypt, Zambia, Morocco, Nigeria and Tanzania.
Some countries, such as, South Africa, Egypt and Morocco are categorized as
EMEs while the rest are categorized as Low Income Countries. Furthermore
some countries, such as South Africa, Uganda, Kenya, Egypt are considered
as frontier economies in Africa. It is therefore important to understand their
monetary policy processes if they have to e¤ectively act as benchmarks for
other African countries. The diverse choice of countries also serves to high-
light di¤erences and compare monetary policy performance across African
countries. Consistent with data availability, estimation is done using di¤erent
sample periods as shown in Table 5. Data is obtained from the International
Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund.
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Table 5: The sample periods for each country
Country Sample period
South Africa 1990:Q12014:Q4
Ghana 1990:Q12014:Q4
Uganda 1990:Q12014:Q4
Nigeria 1992Q1-2014:Q4
Malawi 1990:Q12014:Q4
Morocco 1994:Q12014:Q4
Egypt 1990:Q12014:Q4
Kenya 1995:Q12014:Q4
Tanzania 1993:Q12014:Q4
Zambia 1993:Q12014:Q4
2.5.2 Model parameterization
The coe¢ cients used for simulation in the study are estimated using actual
data. However, in calibrating exogenous processes, we follow Svensson (1999)
where all exogenous variables are assumed to follow AR(1) processes. The
AR(1) persistence parameters are obtained by regressing equilibrium values
of the variables proxied by the HP lter on their one period lag (see Table
27 in the Appendix to Chapter 3 and 4). Liu and Zhang (2010) use a simi-
lar approach and estimate the persistence of foreign output, foreign ination
and foreign interest rates at 0.96, respectively. Rasaki and Malikane (2014)
estimate foreign output and foreign interest rate persistence at 1.0 while per-
sistence in commodity prices is estimated at 0.92. Therefore our persistence
estimates are largely in line with those from literature. These parameters are
held constant across the models for all countries.
2.5.3 Estimation
There are several techniques to estimate DSGE models. Ruge-Murcia (2007)
provides a succinct summary of them. The Bayesian technique, the General-
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ized Method of Moments (GMM) and the Maximum Likelihood Estimation
(MLE) are the most popular. The Bayesian technique is applied by Smets
and Wouters (2003). This method combines the information contained in the
models likelihood function with some prior distribution of the parameters to
provide the posterior distribution of the parameters. In general, the Bayesian
method is useful in addressing identication issues. The generation of the
priors, however, remains contentious in literature.
The GMM can be estimated as a system as in Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992) or as single equations as in Braun (1994). In the former, the solu-
tion seeks to minimize the distance between empirical moments of the actual
data and the theoretical moments. In the latter, each equation is estimated
separately. As explained by Ruge-Murcia (2007), both methods are not with-
out shortcomings. The system GMM may su¤er from the weak instrument
problem when the moments in the objective function do not carry su¢ cient
information about the structural parameters. The single equation GMM
does not exploit cross-equation restrictions. As a result, the GMM estimates
tend to be less e¢ cient and su¤er identication problems. In addition, using
instruments to deal with endogeneity may lead to biased estimates.
The third method is the MLE technique as applied by Ireland (2004) and
Andrés et al. (2006). Hansen and Sargent (2007) show that this estimator is
consistent and asymptotically e¢ cient in DSGE models. This study, there-
fore, uses the MLEmethod and applies the Kalman (1960) ltering technique.
This allows us to deal with unobserved or poorly measured predetermined
variables. It yields the optimal solution to the problem of predicting and up-
dating the state-space which enables the construction of inferences about the
unobserved state vector. It also allows the evaluation of the joint likelihood
function of observable endogenous variables.
One major drawback of the MLE method is the singularity problem. How-
ever, literature suggests three strategies to deal with this problem. First,
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is to estimate the model using as many observable variables as structural
shocks as in Boukez et al. (2005). Secondly, is to extend the model to per-
mit additional structural shocks as in Leeper and Sims (1994). However, as
observed by Ruge-Murcia (2007), additional shocks may only reduce but not
eliminate the stochastic singularity problem.
In this study, we follow Ireland (2004) and use a third method which adds
error terms to the observation equations of the state-space representation.
This limits the e¤ects of specication errors in the estimates and helps to
deal with identication issues. This representation may also capture the lim-
itations of the modelling framework to exhaustively capture macroeconomic
dynamics in the African context. We are interested in estimating the pa-
rameters that characterize the stochastic processes jointly. The state space
form of the model is expressed as follows:
EtX^t+1 =  1X^t +  2"t; (2.51)
where X^t+1 = [y^t 1; ^t 1; r^t 1; m^t 1]0 is a state vector, and "t = ["yt; "t; "rt; "mdt]0
is a vector of error terms.
Using the Blanchard-Kahn (1980) solution, we can solve for the elements
in matrices  1 and  2 in each iteration of the optimization process of the
Log-likelihood function. The system computes standard errors by taking
the square root of the diagonal elements of the inverted Hessian of the Log-
likelihood function evaluated at the maximum. The equilibrium condition
of our stochastic model does not have an analytical solution. Instead, the
dynamics have been characterized by linearizing them around the steady
state. The model is solved using a pure pertubation algorithm developed by
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). The solution is found when the number
of explosive characteristic roots of the system of linear di¤erence equations
equals the number of non-predetermined variables. Based on guidelines in
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Pfeifer (2014), we use the output gap, ination, real exchange and real bal-
ances as our observables.
2.6 Results
The key results of our study are based on analysis of macroeconomic loss
and impulse responses. However, before discussing these, we rst discuss the
parameter estimates which are subsequently used for model simulations.
2.6.1 Parameter estimates
Estimates for the IS curve: Parameter estimates for the IS curve are
presented in Table 6. 1 which measures the response of output to expected
income is statistically signicant and ranges from 0.37 in Kenya to 0.78 in
Uganda. These estimates suggest that when economic agents expect more
income, they increase their current spending regardless of the level of interest
rates. As suggested by Smets and Wouters (2003) this estimate reects eco-
nomic agents rational expectations. Optimistic view of expected real GDP
growth will increase current spending thereby raising current incomes. The
response of output to lagged income measured by 2 is statistically signi-
cant. It ranges from 0.33 in Uganda to 0.87 in Kenya. In all the countries,
except in Uganda, the estimates of this parameter are in line with Berg et al.
(2006) who suggest that it should typically lie between 0.5 and 0.9. These
estimates show relatively high output gap persistence except in Uganda and
South Africa where this parameter is estimated at 0.33 and 049, respectively.
On average 2 > 1:This suggests that there are more backward than forward
looking agents in Africa. Expectations of future income play a relatively
small role in output dynamics compared to previous output. The hysteresis
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in output gap implies that booms are likely to be followed by booms while
slumps will be followed by slumps. As shown by Batini and Yates (2003),
this makes ination di¢ cult to control as the persistence tends to impair the
output gap channel leading to higher ination variability. Since output gap
is a key determinant of ination, its persistence also contributes to ination
persistence. This is one of the reasons why authorities in Africa nd it
di¢ cult to break the ination cycles. As argued by Andrle et al. (2015),
the structural features of the majority of African countries compel economic
agents to mostly rely on previous outcomes to make decisions hence larger
backward looking coe¢ cients.
The estimates for 3 are theoretically consistent but insignicant in 3 coun-
tries, namely Malawi, Morocco and Tanzania. In Egypt and Zambia, this
estimate is quite low but also carries a contrary sign. This parameter is
statistically signicant, theoretically consistent but is also estimated at rela-
tively small values in Ghana, Kenya, South Africa and Uganda. In Nigeria,
it is statistically signicant but Counterintuitively carries a contrary sign.
Nelson (2002) terms the relatively low estimates of this parameter as an IS
puzzle. Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004) also nd conicting signs and rela-
tively low estimates for this parameter. Similarly, Goodhart and Hofman
(2005) nd that aggregate demand is less sensitive to interest rate changes.
The insignicance and relatively small size of this parameter suggests that
there is weak interest rate transmission in African economies. In the tradi-
tional New Keynesian models, the interest rate transmission channel is key
in stabilizing ination and output. However, for e¤ective transmission of
interest rate signals, there is need for e¢ cient nancial system. With this,
the interest rate channel is unlikely to play a signicant role in Low Income
Countries (Mishra et al. (2012). The relatively low estimates together with
the insignicance of this parameter therefore reects the underdeveloped na-
ture of the nancial system in Africa. This nding poses unique challenges in
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monetary policy management as interest rates can not be used e¤ectively to
control aggregate demand. To use interest rates, policy makers would have to
change them with relatively large magnitudes in order to bring about desired
impact on ination and aggregate demand. This approach might however be
inconsistent with other goals, such as nancial and scal stability.
As shown by Zanetti (2012) and Ireland (2004), 4 is critical in evaluating
the importance of monetary aggregates in output dynamics. In all coun-
tries, except Tanzania and Zambia, real balances signicantly drive output
dynamics. The estimated coe¢ cients range from 0.001 for Zambia to 0.63 for
Uganda. The absolute average sensitivity of aggregate demand to changes
in monetary aggregates is calculated at 0.16. Zanetti (2012) estimates this
parameter at 0.12 for the US. This suggests that real balances play an im-
portant role in output dynamics in Africa compared to AEs. In absolute
terms, the average sensitivity of aggregate demand to changes in monetary
aggregates is higher than that for interest rates. This suggests that monetary
aggregates play a more prominent role in aggregate demand dynamics than
interest rates in Africa. This nding also reects the underdeveloped nature
of nancial markets. The interest rates are not market clearing. In which
case, output dynamics can not only be explained by interest rates alone but
also money balances.
Parameter 5 which measures the impact of exchange rate depreciations on
output is signicant in Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco and Nigeria. In the
rest of the countries, 5 is not signicant. Although in Ghana and Kenya
5 is signicant, it carries a negative sign. 6 which measures the response
of output to exchange rate expectations is signicant in 7 countries, namely
Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda. However
in 2 countries, namely Malawi and Nigeria, it a¤ects output negatively. In
Morocco, South Africa and Zambia 6 is not signicant. Similarly, 7 which
measures the response of output to current exchange rate is signicant in 8
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countries, namely Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa,
Tanzania and Uganda. This estimate is not signicant in Egypt and Zambia.
8 which captures the response of output to lagged exchange rate is signicant
in 7 countries countries, namely Kenya, Malawi, Morocco, Nigeria, South
Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. This parameter however carries a negative
sign in Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. In the other 3 countries, namely
Egypt, Ghana and Zambia this estimates is not signicant.
The estimates for exchange rate coe¢ cients can be summarized as follows.
First, depreciations have signicant impact on output in 5 countries. How-
ever, it exerts contractionary e¤ect in 2 of these countries. Second, exchange
rate expectations have signicant e¤ect in 7 countries but exert contrac-
tionary force in 3 of these countries. Third, the current level of the exchange
rate has signicant impact in 8 countries but exerts contractionary e¤ect in 4
of these countries. Fourth, the lagged exchange rate is signicant in 7 coun-
tries but exerts contractionary e¤ects in 4 of these countries. On aggregate
therefore, exchange rate terms are signicant in driving output dynamics in
Africa. These ndings are similar to Andrle et al. (2015) and they suggest
a relatively important role of the exchange rate channel in Africa. African
counties rely on imports for both production and consumption. They also
rely on commodity exports. Changes in the exchange rate therefore directly
transmit to changes in demand.
However, the nding that in some countries exchange rate terms are either
contractionary or have no e¤ect on output is also of signicant importance.
This nding is consistent with Bahmani-Oskooee and Gelan (2013) who show
that in 14 of the 23 African countries they examined, the exchange rate de-
preciations are contractionary. When exchange rate depreciations are con-
tractionary, they reduce output. One of the channels through which the
exchange rate may be contractionary or have no e¤ect on output is when
import and export demands are inelastic. The majority of African countries
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have inelastic demand for products they do not produce, such as fuel and
pharmaceuticals. Exchange rate depreciation ends up hurting the countries
balance sheets and growth prospects. Under these circumstances, exchange
rate depreciations will either have no or negative e¤ect on output. This
process is worsened by the high pass-through of the exchange rate to ina-
tion.
9 which measures the response of output to expected foreign income is signif-
icant and positive only in 2 countries, namely Zambia and Uganda. Similarly,
10 which measures the response of output to current foreign income is only
signicant in Zambia, Uganda and Tanzania. 11 which captures the response
of output to lagged foreign income is signicant in 6 countries, namely Egypt,
Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia. In Kenya, lagged for-
eign income carries a negative sign. The signicance of the lagged foreign
income could be due to lags of transmission from foreign incomes to domes-
tic incomes. It also supports the operability of trade, aid and foreign direct
investment channels in these countries.
Estimates for the Phillips Curve: The Phillips curve estimates are pre-
sented in Table 7. The estimates for 
f
are theoretically consistent and
statistically signicant, ranging from 0.35 for South Africa to 1 for Ghana.
Estimates for parameter 
b
which measures ination persistence (inertia) or
ination indexation ranges from 0.19 for Ghana to 0.58 for Malawi. In 7 coun-
tries, namely Ghana, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Uganda, Tanzania and Zam-
bia, 
f
> 
b
; suggesting that in these economies agents are mostly forward
looking in forming ination expectations. When agents are forward looking,
it is less di¢ cult to manage ination. On the contrary, South Africa, Nigeria
and Malawi display higher backward looking behavior in forming ination
expectations as 
b
> 
f
. Authorities faced with high ination hysteresis,
nd it relatively di¢ cult to break an ination cycle. The relatively large
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values of 
b
also shed light on why ination is persistent in many African
countries.
Estimates for 1 which capture the impact of output gap on ination rate
are positive and statistically signicant in all countries, except in Nigeria. It
ranges from 0.02 for South Africa to 1.96 in Ghana. Similarly, 2 which cap-
tures the impact of expected output gap on ination is statistically signicant
and theoretically consistent in all countries. It is mostly estimated between
0.12 (Egypt) and 0.73 (Zambia), except in Uganda where it is estimated at
1.39. The impact of lagged income on ination, measured by parameter 3
is statistically signicant and carries a correct sign in all countries except in
Kenya where it is signicant but carries a negative sign.
Overall, these coe¢ cients suggest that the output gap is critical in deter-
mining ination dynamics in Africa. This nding is similar to Rudd and
Whelan (2005). The measure of output used in this study encompasses agri-
culture GDP. Similarly, ination includes food items. As observed earlier,
agriculture signicantly contributes to ination and GDP dynamics in Africa.
Changes in output gap therefore may reect swings in production of agricul-
tural products, such as food. When food production goes down, output gap
rises. Ination also rises due to the relatively large weight of food in the
ination basket. This is one of the channels through which output gap is
found to have positive impact on ination in African economies. One of
the policy implications of this nding is that if authorities succeed in sta-
bilizing the output gap, they will also be successful in stabilizing ination.
Put di¤erently, demand management policies are key in stabilizing ination
in Africa. However, authorities must be careful in recognizing sources of
demand pressure.
Parameter 4 captures the impact of the current exchange rate on ination. It
is signicant in all countries except in Egypt. It ranges from 0.25 in Egypt to
0.80 in Malawi. This estimate however carries a negative sign in 2 countries,
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namely Morocco and Uganda. This result reects the estimates under the IS
curve where current exchange rate is found to exert contractionary e¤ect in
Morocco and Uganda. Parameter 5 which captures the impact of exchange
rate expectations on ination is signicant in all countries and it ranges from
0.10 for Uganda to 0.55 for Nigeria and Kenya. This parameter is statistically
signicant in all countries but carries negative sign in 5 countries, namely
Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa. Parameter 6 captures
the impact of lagged exchange rate on ination. It is statistically signicant
in all countries, except in Uganda. It ranges from 0.01 for Uganda to 0.79
for Uganda. This estimate is negative in Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda.
The coe¢ cients of the exchange rates can be summarized as follows: Firstly,
in 9 of the 10 countries, the current exchange rate is a signicant driver of
ination dynamics. However, in 2 of these countries, the exchange rate has
negative impact on ination. Secondly, exchange rate expectations are key
drivers of ination in all the countries. However, in 5 of these countries ex-
pectations exert negative impact on ination. Thirdly, the lagged exchange
rate is signicant driver of ination in 9 of the 10 countries. In 3 of these
countries, the lagged exchange rate generates depressing e¤ects on ination.
These results suggest that the exchange rate is key in driving ination dy-
namics in Africa.
Razamahefa (2012) similarly nds a relatively large average exchange rate
pass-through to ination of 0.4 in Sub-saharan Africa. This pass-through is
found to be higher under depreciations. It is found to be lower in countries
with relatively more exible exchange rate systems. To the e¤ect that African
countries are characterized by frequent depreciations and frequent interven-
tions in the foreign exchange market to manage exchange rate uctuations,
it would be expected that the impact of the exchange rate on ination will
be relatively large. In some countries such as Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria and
Uganda, the majority of exchange rate parameters carry a negative sign.
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This could reect IS curve estimates where some exchange rate terms a¤ect
output negatively.
One of the key parameters of interest is 7 which captures how ination reacts
to monetary aggregates. This parameter is statistically signicant in all
countries and it ranges from 0.02 in South Africa to 0.50 in Zambia. However,
in 3 countries, namely Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania, real balances are found
to be deationary. In some cases, money acts as a demand push factor as
suggested by Castelnouvo (2012) hence generating a positive sign while in
other cases its availability can reduce the costs associated with searching
for alternative nancing hence generating negative e¤ect on real marginal
costs. The overall signicance of this parameter suggests that policy makers
in Africa can not dispel the role of real balances in ination dynamics as this
would be inconsistent with macroeconomic stabilisation.
Parameter 8 measures the impact of foreign income expectations on domestic
ination. This parameter is signicant in 4 countries, namely Kenya, South
Africa, Uganda and Zambia. Its estimate ranges from 0.14 in Egypt to 0.81
in Zambia, except in Uganda where it is estimated at 1.02. Parameter 9
measures the impact of lagged foreign income on domestic ination and it is
signicant in Kenya, Morocco, Uganda and Zambia. These ndings suggest
that imported ination which may arise from higher foreign incomes is not a
major threat to ination in the majority of African economies. However in
those countries which display relative large level of openness, such as Kenya,
South Africa, Uganda and Zambia, the pass-through of foreign ination to
domestic prices is relatively high. Parameter, 10; which measures the impact
of imported inputs on ination is signicant only in 3 countries, namely South
Africa, Uganda and Zambia. This suggests that imported inputs are not a
signicant determinant of the rmsreal marginal costs in the majority of
African economies.
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Estimates for Money Demand6 Parameter estimates for money demand
are presented in Table 8. 	1 which measures the income elasticity of money
demand is statistically signicant and theoretically consistent. It ranges from
0.53 in Egypt to 1.83 Ghana. In 2 countries, name Ghana and South Africa,
money demand displays overreaction to changes in income with estimates of
greater than unity. Near unity estimates are also obtained for Kenya, Nigeria
and Zambia. Parameter 	2 captures the impact of lagged income on money
demand. Similarly, this parameter is statistically signicant in all countries
except in Zambia. It ranges from 0.22 in Malawi to 2.55 in South Africa.
These ndings are in line with the unity value found by Chari et al. (2000)
and Jonsson (1999) and also the long-run calibrated values in the literature.
Africa is still characterized by high and volatile ination environment. Un-
der these conditions, ndings of high income elasticity of demand are not
farfetched. If ones income rises and is faced with a threat of ination, their
demand for money should be high. Similarly, Africa is characterized by lower
nancial market development. This implies that access to facilities like credit
cards and online banking remains limited. Under such circumstances, the in-
come elasticity of money demand is expected to be high. Thus as shown by
Knell and Six (2005), the development of nancial system has considerable
impact on the structure of money demand. High income elasticities of money
demand is also associated with demand for luxury goods and services. Luxu-
ries are typically priced higher that normal goods. A high estimate for South
Africa, for example, may reect the fact when economic agents in South
Africa face a rise in income the demand for luxuries signicantly jumps rais-
ing the demand for money. This might also reect growth of the middle class
in South Africa.
	3 which measures the interest rate elasticity of money demand is signicant
6The alternative description of money market dynamics which involves rt is found by
setting rt as subject of the formula after estimation and using the calculated values for
simulations.
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in 8 countries. In 2 of these countries, namely Uganda and Tanzania, the
estimates shows an overreaction of money demand to interest rate changes.
Counterintuitively, in 2 countries, Ghana and Zambia, money demand rises
in response to an interest rate hike, a feature akin to liquidity puzzle. On av-
erage, all estimates of 	3 are signicant, except in South Africa and Uganda.
Parameter estimates for 	4 which captures the impact of ination expecta-
tions on demand for money is signicant in all countries except in Malawi.
Furthermore, except in Ghana and Zambia, ination expectations are pos-
itive drivers of demand for money. When economic agents expect a rise in
ination, transactional demand for money rises.
Parameter 	5 which captures the impact of exchange rate on demand for
money is statistically signicant in all countries. However, in 2 countries,
namely Ghana and Tanzania, these estimates are negative implying that a
depreciation in the exchange rate reduces demand for Money. This may oc-
cur if a depreciation reduces output and hence demand for money. We noted
from the anlaysis on IS curve estimates that the current exchange rate exerts
negative e¤ect on output in Tanzania while exchange rate depreciation is
contractionary in Ghana. Parameter 	7 captures the e¤ect of foreign income
on domestic money demand and is signicant in 6 countries, namely Kenya,
Malawi, Morocco, South Africa, Uganda and Zambia. Similarly, lagged for-
eign income measured by 	8 is signicant in Kenya, Malawi, Morocco, Nige-
ria, South Africa and Zambia. When foreign incomes rise, they contribute to
a rise in domestic income. Through this channel, foreign income positively
a¤ects domestic money demand.
Estimates for the interest rate rule: Following Zanetti (2012), we di-
rectly estimate parameters of the policy rule. This approach is consistent
with a black box search for an appropriate policy rule. The estimated pa-
rameters are presented in Table 9. Parameter 1y captures the response of
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monetary policy to income expectations. This parameter is statistically sig-
nicant across all countries and ranges from 0.18 as smallest reaction for
South Africa to 1.19 as the highest reaction for Malawi. In Malawi, Tanza-
nia, Zambia and Morocco this estimate is above unity implying an expected
increase of 1 percent in output gap triggers a more than 1 percent increase
in interest rates. Mohanty and Klau (2004) estimate this parameter at 2.00
for South Africa. Parameter 2y measures how monetary policy responds to
lagged output gap and is also statistically signicant across all countries with
reactions of more than unity estimated for Malawi, Morocco, South Africa
and Tanzania.
Overall, it can be observed that monetary policy strongly penalizes deviations
of actual output from trend. Output gap has been identied as one of the
key drivers of ination. It is therefore not surprising that authorities also
strongly react to it. If inationary pressures are motivated by demand factors
as found under the Phillips curve, then these ndings are consistent with
stabilizing ination and output, simultaneously. It is however critical to
understand whether output gap uctuations arise from supply or demand
factors and ensure that monetary policy does not excessively react to output
gap uctuations that arise from supply factors. For example, scal policy
in Africa tends to accentuate rather than attenuate demand shocks. Central
banks therefore are left to respond to demand uctuations that have origins
in the scal sector (see Sidaoui 2003). This is even more problematic when
the rise in aggregate demand follows decit driven scal expansion.
Parameter 1 captures the reaction of monetary policy to ination. Its
estimates range from 0.17 for Zambia to 1.97 for South Africa. Parameter
2 captures the inuence of lagged ination on monetary policy conduct.
The estimate is signicant but carries a contrary sign in Ghana and Tanzania.
3 which measures policy reaction to ination expectations is also signicant
in all countries. In 4 countries, namely Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria and South
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Africa, 3 obeys the Taylor principle. Mohanty and Klau (2004) and Houssa
et al. (2010) nd similar results. Despite, the presence of non-monetary
price pressures, estimates for 1; 2 and 3, suggests that monetary policy
strongly reacts to ination variables. This shows that authorities do not
accommodate inationary pressures regardless of the source.
m captures how monetary policy responds to the deviation of real balances
from the trend. In 9 countries, authorities signicantly react to excessive
money growth. In South Africa, authorities do not pay attention to mone-
tary aggregates when setting policy rates. Overall, our ndings suggest that
authorities still consider the monetary aggregate as relevant to macroeco-
nomic dynamics. In Africa, money still contains information about future
output and prices that can not be observed via the interest rate. Movements
in money balances therefore reect information on multiple observable and
unobservable yields that directly a¤ect aggregate demand. It is therefore
not surprising that in the majority of African economies, authorities tend to
strongly react to movements in monetary aggregates. These ndings are also
consistent with Nelson (2003).
Parameter 1q measures the reaction of monetary policy to exchange rate
depreciations. This parameter is statistically signicant in all countries, ex-
cept in Uganda, and it ranges from 0.23 in South Africa to 1.70 in Morocco.
Similarly, parameter 2q which measures authorities reaction to exchange
rate expectations is statistically signicant across all countries with estimates
ranging from 0.09 in South Africa to 1.69 in Morocco. Coe¢ cient 3q which
captures how authorities react to current exchange rate is also signicant
across countries but carries a negative sign in Tanzania and Uganda. The
estimates for 4q which measures the response of authorities to lagged ex-
change rate are equally signicant in all countries and they range from 0.01
in South Africa to 1.75 in Morocco. The extreme reaction of Morocco to ex-
change rate movements is consistent with the authorities desire of pursuing
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xed exchange rate.
Overall, the estimated exchange rate parameters suggest that central banks
strongly react to exchange rate movements in Africa. The positive and signif-
icant coe¢ cients suggest mean reversion. Due to the UIP condition, central
banks would eventually reverse their interest rate actions. This feature is in
line with Mohanty and Klau (2004) who show that exchange rate dynamics
signicantly inuence output and ination uctuations. These ndings also
reect earlier results where the exchange rate is found to be critical in in-
ation and aggregate demand dynamics in Africa. They further capture the
tendency of African authorities to announce exible exchange rate systems
and pursue monetary policies that constrain exchange rate pass-through to
ination.
The majority of central banks do not react to changes in foreign income. This
is shown by the insignicance of parameters 1f ; 2f and 3f In all countries,
except Uganda, Zambia and Kenya, these parameters are not signicant.
These parameters also reect the fact that in the majority of African countries
foreign incomes do not signicantly inuence ination and output. This
reduces the need for authorities to directly react to them. In summary,
the analyzed results rule are in line with Svensson (1999) who argues that
monetary authorities must react to drivers of target variables. The Output
gap, exchange rate and money are key drivers of ination and aggregate
demand. Authorities in Africa therefore strongly reacts to these variables in
order to constrain the behaviour of ination and output to be in line with
the authoritiesmacroeconomic trajectory.
Estimates for the money supply rule: Estimates for the money supply
rule are presented in Table 25. The response of money supply to lagged out-
put gap is signicant in Ghana, South Africa, Uganda and Zambia. It carries
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a negative sign in Ghana and Zambia. The response of money supply to cur-
rent output gap is not signicant in 7 countries, except in Kenya, Malawi
and Zambia. In Kenya and Malawi the coe¢ cient carries a positive sign sug-
gesting that instead of contracting money supply authorities increase money
supply to support demand pressures (Muhanji et al. 2013). Similarly, in 5
countries, namely Morocco, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia authori-
ties increase money supply in response to an increase in income expectations.
In Morocco and Tanzania, authorities react by contracting money supply.
Consistent with a priori expectations, liquidity is withdrawn in response to
lagged ination in all countries except in Morocco where b is statistically
insignicant. The estimates range from 0.12 for South Africa to 1.13 for
Nigeria. f which measures the response of monetary policy to expected
ination is signicant in 5 countries, namely Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Tan-
zania, Zambia and Uganda. Similar to Muhanji et al. (2013), these estimates
carry conicting signs with money supply responding positively to expected
ination in Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania.
Coe¢ cients 3q, 1q and 2q capture the reaction of monetary policy to
lagged, current and expected exchange rates. In 7 countries, authorities
react to exchange rate expectations while authorities in 5 countries react to
current exchange rate and in 4 countries, authorities react to lagged exchange
rates. On aggregate, except in Egypt and Nigeria, monetary policy tends to
withdraw liquidity in the economy in light of exchange rate depreciations.
This suggests that authorities stand ready to smooth exchange rate uctu-
ations. This nding is premised on the signicance of the exchange rate is
driving output and ination dynamics. Authorities therefore tend to limit
the pass-through of exchange rate change to ination. Morocco contracts
money supply more than other countries to deal with exchange rate rate
movements.
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Captured by 0, in 7 countries, money supply responds negatively to a rise
in foreign input prices. The estimate ranges from -0.003 in Morocco to -
0.18 in Ghana. When prices of inputs rise, rmsreal marginal costs go up.
Firms pass this cost onto prices of their products which is reected in overall
ination. Therefore, by contracting money supply monetary policy works
in two ways: First, by contracting credit expansion which reduces demand
for foreign exchange to purchase foreign inputs. This helps to stabilize the
exchange rate and limit the pass-through to ination. Secondly, contracting
money supply constrains demand for rmsnal products. Both of these
channels lead to a decline in ination.
2.6.2 Impulse responses and variance analysis
In this section, we analyse impulse responses and variances of ination and
output following one standard deviation contractionary shocks applied to the
interest rate and money supply rules. As in McCandless (2008), the economy
begins in a stationary state, with all shocks to stochastic processes set to
zero since variables are log di¤erences from the stationary state. Results
presented in Figs. 7 and 8, and Table 10 show that the monetary aggregate
rule (MAR) performs better in macroeconomic stabilization of 5 countries,
namely Nigeria, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Morocco. In the other 5
countries, namely South Africa, Egypt, Ghana, Uganda and Kenya, it is the
IRR which is optimal.
Figs. 7 and 8 show that in South Africa, both rules lead to output and
ination stability after 22 quarters. However, the IRR yields lower volatility
for both ination and output leading to an absolute loss of 0.00022 compared
to 0.00048 under the MAR. In Malawi, output stabilizes after 16 quarters
under the MAR compared to 20 quarters under the IRR. However, under both
rules, ination reverts to steady state after 21 quarters. The absolute loss is
92
estimated at 0.2569 under the MAR owing to a signicant decline in ination
volatility compared to 1.1184 under the IRR. In Zambia, output reverts to
steady after 55 quarters under both rules. Ination however stabilizes after
27 quarters under the MAR compared to 55 quarters under the IRR. The
MAR leads to lower volatility in both ination and output with absolute loss
estimated at 0.0141 compared to 0.0318 under the IRR.
In Tanzania, it takes 16 quarters for output to revert to the steady state
under the MAR and 28 quarters under the IRR. The absolute loss is estimated
at 0.3189 under the MAR compared to 0.3453 under the IRR. In Nigeria, the
absolute loss is estimated at 0.00963 under the IRR compared to 0.00257
under the MAR. Output stabilizes after 19 quarters under the IRR while its
takes 13 quarters under the MAR. The absolute loss for Morocco is estimated
at 0.0008 under the MAR compared to 1.4755 under the IRR. It takes about
13 quarters for output to stabilize under the IRR compared to about 25
quarters under the MAR.
In Egypt, output reverts to steady state after 25 quarters under the IRR
while it takes 42 quarters under the MAR. Ination reverts to the steady
state after 37 quarters under the IRR compared to 55 quarters under the
MAR. At 0.093, the variance of ination is higher under IRR compare to 0.02
under the MAR. The two rules, however, generate similar output volatility of
0.0001. In Ghana, output stabilizes after 11 quarter under the IRR compared
to 26 quarters under the MAR. Ination stabilizes after 21 quarters under
the MAR and 26 quarters under the IRR. However, the monetary aggregate
rule generates higher volatility in both ination and output compared to the
interest rate.
In Uganda, output reverts to the steady state after 31 quarters under MAR
compared to 36 quarters under IRR. However, ination stabilizes after 28
quarters under the IRR compared to 16 quarters under the MAR. The ab-
solute loss function value is estimated 0.0022 under IRR compared to 0.09
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under MAR implying that the IRR performs better. Results for Kenya show
that the MAR yields lower output uctuations and higher ination uctu-
ations while the IRR yields lower ination uctuations and higher output
uctuations. Output reverts to steady state after 16 quarters under the
MAR compared to 22 quarters under the IRR. Under both rules, ination
reverts to steady state after 25 quarters. The absolute loss is estimated at
0.00073 under the IRR compared to 0.0113 under the MAR.
On aggregate, the results show that in 5 countries, namely South Africa,
Egypt, Kenya, Uganda and Ghana, it is the interest rate rule that performs
better while in the other 5 countries, name Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, Nige-
ria and Morocco it is the monetary aggregate rule which performs better.
These results reect several factors: First, is the di¤erence in the level of
nancial development. South Africa and Egypt compete favorably with Ad-
vanced Economies in terms of their level of nancial development. Uganda
and Kenya are also relatively above the rest of the countries in our sample
in terms of nancial development. According to Mishra et al. (2012), a
developed nancial system is critical for the transmission of interest rates
signals.
Secondly, countries where the interest rate instrument is found to be optimal
are characterized by comparatively large interest rate sensitivity of aggregate
demand. This implies that authorities in these countries can use the interest
rates to stabilize output and ination. Thirdly, the size of food in the overall
CPI is relatively less in these countries. This leaves a bigger segment of the
CPI to be inuenced by the interest rates. Fourth, in the countries where
interest rate instruments is found to be optimal, the authorities have already
adopted (South Africa, Ghana and Uganda) ination targeting which actively
uses interest rate instruments. In Kenya, authorities have for sometime been
laying solid foundation for the adoption of the IT regime. IMF (2015) argues
that the e¤ectiveness of the interest rate instrument is not divorced from the
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monetary policy framework within which they are implemented.
Fifth, non-monetary GDP which can be approximated by the share of agri-
culture in the GDP is relatively small in countries where the interest rate rule
performs better. The small size of non-monetary GDP implies that interest
rate signals are capable of reaching a wider portion of the economy. These
factors which explain why the interest rate instrument performs better in
the South Africa, Ghana, Uganda, Egypt and Kenya are mostly absent in
the other economies making the monetary aggregate instrument to have an
upper hand.
With respect to the estimated parameters, it can be observed that the av-
erage absolute sensitivity of ination to monetary aggregates is 0.31 in the
5 countries where monetary aggregate targeting is optimal. This is compar-
atively larger than the average of 0.18 for countries where the interest rate
performs better. Since ination responds more to the monetary aggregate
than the interest rate in the former, it follows that the monetary aggregate
instrument performs better in handling ination uctuations. Similarly, in
the other 5 countries where the interest rate is optimal, the absolute aver-
age interest rate sensitivity of aggregate demand is estimated at 0.07. This
estimate is relatively large than an average of 0.4 in the other 5 countries.
Therefore, the optimality of the monetary policy instruments also reects
the role of money and interest rates in driving macroeconomic dynamics in
respective countries.
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Note: Scale in percentage deviations from steady state (x103)
Figure 7: Impulse responses of output gap to monetary policy shocks
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Note: Scale in percentage deviations from steady state (x103)
Figure 8: Impulse responses of ination to monetary policy shocks
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2.7 Conclusion
This study compares the performance of the monetary aggregate and the
interest rate as policy instruments for macroeconomic stabilization in 10
African economies. To do this, we estimate the new-Keynesian DSGE model
where real balances are non-separable from consumption in the utility func-
tion. This feature serves to capture the role of money in driving macroeco-
nomic dynamics in Africa. The model also features the real exchange rate,
foreign output and crude oil prices as additional drivers of macroeconomic
dynamics. We estimate and compare two models: One with the interest rate
and another with the monetary aggregate as policy instruments.
We nd several results. In 5 countries, namely Nigeria, Malawi, Tanzania,
Morocco and Zambia, it is the monetary aggregate instrument that performs
better in stabilizing the economies. In the other 5 countries, namely South
Africa, Egypt, Ghana, Uganda and Kenya, it is the interest rate that performs
better. These results can be attributed to several factors. Firstly, di¤erences
in the level of nancial development amongst these countries. The relatively
low level of nancial market development together with a GDP which is
mostly dominated by agriculture implies that the interest rate signals are not
e¤ectively transmitted in the rst group of countries. Secondly, the estimated
coe¢ cients suggest that ination is more sensitive to the monetary aggregate
in the rst 5 countries than the latter. Similarly, aggregate demand is more
sensitive to interest rate changes in the last 5 countries than in the former.
These ndings imply that the current monetary policy modernization process
in Kenya and Egypt is consistent with macroeconomic stabilisation. Kenya is
formally embracing active use of interest rate instruments. With assistance
from the IMF, Egypt is equally taking necessary step to enhance the use
of interest rate instruments. We also nd the use of interest rates in South
Africa, Ghana and Uganda to be consistent with the predictions of our model.
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Similarly, our models predictions are consistent with the monetary policy
conduct in Nigeria, Malawi, Tanzania, Morocco and Zambia. However, the
overall weak role of the interest rate is reminiscent of challenges in using the
interest rate as a policy instrument to inuence macroeconomic dynamics in
Africa. On the contrary, the larger role of the real balances suggests that
dispelling the use of monetary aggregates in monetary policy conduct may
be inconsistent with macroeconomic stabilization goals in Africa.
In terms of monetary policy response, the interest rate reaction to ination
exceeds or is quite close to unity suggesting a non-accommodating stance
of monetary policy towards price shocks. This evidence is also in line with
Mohanty and Klau (2004). This nding, however, poses particular policy
challenges in some countries due to the dominance of non-monetary GDP.
Non-monetary GDP is beyond the reach of monetary policy impulses. It is
therefore important for authorities in countries with huge agriculture GDP
to take analyze the sources of demand pressures before responding with mon-
etary policy. Where output gap uctuations are driven by scal and agri-
cultural activities, it would probably be important to limit policy response.
We thus underscore the importance of understanding sources of output gap
pressure to avoid excessively responding to supply factors.
Exchange rate depreciations are found to either have contractionary or no
e¤ect on output. However, they are found to be inationary in all countries.
In line with this, authorities strongly react to exchange rate movements.
Given the diversity in results, we caution policymakers against a generalized
adoption of the interest rate instrument in Africa. The nding that the
interest rate instrument performs better in countries with relatively large
non-monetary GDP and improved nancial markets suggests that countries
that aspire to improve monetary policy conduct by adopting interest rates
must develop their nancial markets and enhance the industrial sectors rst
in order to broaden the demand base.
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2.8 Appendix to Chapter 2: Derivation of the UIP
Condition
Households seek to maximize utility Ut given by:
Ut = Et
1X
j=0
j
(
1
1  
h 
Cdt   hCdt 1
1 
+
 
Cmt   hCmt 1
1 iMt
Pt

  N
1+'
t
1 + '
)
(A2.01)
Subject to budget constraint BCt given by:
BCt =
Mt
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
+
ZtB
f
t
Pt
 
"
WtNt
Pt
+ Mt 1
Pt
+ (1+rt 1)Bt 1
Pt
+
Zt(1+r
f
t 1)B
f
t 1
Pt
 Cdt  QtCmt
#
= 0
(A2.02)
Combining A2.01 and A2.02 yields the following Lagrangian function:
Lt = Ut + t[BCt] (A2.03)
First Order Condition for domestic bonds Bt is given as follows:
Lt
Bt
= Ett+1

1 + rt
1 + t+1

= t (A2.04)
First Order Condition for foreign bonds Bft is given as follows:
Lt
Bf t
= Ett+1
 
1 + rft
1 + t+1
!
Zt+1
Zt

= t; (A2.05)
Taylor approximation (or log linearization) of A2.04 yields:
r^t   ^t+1 + ^t+1 = ^t (A2.06)
Taylor approximation (or log linearization) of A2.05 yields:
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r^ft   ^t+1 + z^t+1   z^t + ^t+1 = ^t (A2.07)
It follows from A2.06 and A2.07 that:
r^t   ^t+1 = r^ft   ^t+1 + z^t+1   z^t (A2.08)
) z^t   z^t+1 =  (r^t   ^t+1) + r^ft   ^t+1 (A2.09)
Hence Etz^t+1 =  (r^t   ^t+1) + r^ft   ^t+1 (A2.10)
Transforming the left side of A2.10 into the real exchange requires adding the
term (^ft+1   ^t+1) which represents ination di¤erentials between domestic
and foreign economy to both sides of the equation. This yields:
Etz^t+1 + ^
f
t+1   ^t+1 =  (r^t   ^t+1) + r^ft   ^t+1 + ^ft+1   ^t+1 (A2.11)
) Etq^t+1 =  (r^t   ^t+1)  (r^ft   ^ft+1) (A2.12)
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3 Should central banks smooth exchange rate
uctuations in Africa?
3.1 Introduction
This paper investigates the e¤ects of exchange rate smoothing on macro-
economic performance in 10 selected African economies. African economies
are characterized by frequent shocks. As argued by Lubik and Schorfheide
(2007), these shocks alter business cycles and lead to persistent exchange rate
uctuations. Sanchez (2008) observes that exchange rate uctuations tend
to create unstable balance sheets which are associated with volatile macro-
economic performance. Furthermore, exchange rate developments in small
open economies can have a substantial inuence on prices and output, which
makes it a potentially important indirect channel of the transmission mech-
anism. An important research questions therefore arises. Should African
central banks smooth exchange rate uctuations?
Some studies, such as Taylor (2001) and Bernanke and Gertler (2001), argue
that responding to exchange rate movements either leaves macroeconomic
performance unchanged or worsens it. However, Calvo (2001) and Eichen-
green (2006) argue that there is high exchange rate pass-through to ination
in emerging economies. The high pass-through of the exchange rate also
applies to Africa. Apart from high pass-through, the situation in Africa is
complicated by thin foreign exchange markets and high levels of external debt
denominated in foreign currencies. The thinness of foreign exchange markets
implies that trading on the foreign market does not only depend on demand
and supply. Furthermore, high debt denominated in foreign currency implies
that exchange rate depreciations tend to worsen countriesbalance sheets.
Based on these factors, other scholars, such as Sekkat and Varoudakis (2000),
argue that exchange rate management matters for macroeconomic stability.
103
The signicance of this study is that it will shed light on the relative per-
formance of the monetary aggregate and the interest rate instruments, when
exchange rate smoothing is explicitly specied as a monetary policy objec-
tive. As argued by Sanchez (2008), exchange rate smoothing must be guided
by whether depreciations are contractionary or expansionary. Monetary pol-
icy tightening in response to a contractionary depreciation is likely to worsen
macroeconomic performance. This observation is particularly relevant for
African economies because, as Bahmani-Oskooee and Gelan (2013) show,
depreciations are mostly contractionary. Given the challenge posed by con-
tractionary depreciations, balance sheet e¤ects and pass-through to ination,
understanding the e¤ect of monetary policy reaction to exchange rate uc-
tuations is critical for macroeconomic stability in Africa.
The gap that is lled by this paper is twofold. First, studies like Hufner
(2004) only estimate simple policy rules for emerging market economies and
nd that the authorities react to the exchange rate variable. However, these
studies do not examine the implication of this reaction on macroeconomic
stability. Those that examine the implication on macroeconomic stability in
general also tend to produce divergent results. For example, Wollmershäuser
(2006) and Ball (1999) nd some reduction in ination volatility when au-
thorities engage in exchange rate smoothing while Garcia et al. (2011) do not.
Thus in this study, we combine both elements. We examine whether central
banks react to the exchange rate by including the exchange rate variable in
the policy rules. We then proceed to analyze the implication of exchange rate
smoothing on macroeconomic performance. This is done by explicitly includ-
ing exchange rate smoothing as a central bank objective. Secondly, studies
on exchange rate smoothing, such as Mohanty and Klau (2004) and Wollmer-
shäuser (2006), are mostly on emerging market economies but remain scanty
for African economies.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, similar studies to ours,
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such as Alpanda et al. (2010), Wollmershäuser (2006) and Leitemo and
Söderström (2005), examine the role of the exchange rate under Taylor-type
rules only. We build on this literature by responding to the question raised
by Taylor (2001): "how should the instruments of monetary policy (interest
rate or a monetary aggregate) react to the exchange rate"? We therefore
extend the literature by including a comparison of the performance of inter-
est rate and money supply rules, when exchange rate smoothing is explicitly
specied as a policy objective. Secondly, we examine whether changing the
weight placed on exchange rate smoothing inuences the choice between pol-
icy instruments. For example, a mild response of the interest rate rule may be
the most e¢ cient while a more aggressive response may be the least e¢ cient,
even compared to some monetary aggregate rules. Thirdly, we approach the
research question by simulating an estimated New Keynesian model where
money is non-separable from consumption. We use optimal policy rules for
each of the selected African economies.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 consists of lit-
erature review. Section 3.3 lays out the model. Section 3.4 describes data
and the estimation technique. Section 3.5 discusses the results. Section 3.6
concludes with some policy recommendations.
3.2 Literature review
There are two major approaches used by central banks to smooth exchange
rate uctuations. The rst approach is through foreign exchange market in-
terventions. According to Ghosh et al. (2015), this approach is appealing
when monetary policy changes fail to direct capital ows due to high risk
premium. The second approach is through the interest rate rule. Monacelli
(2004) and Calvo and Reinhart (2002) observe that interest rate policy rules
which respond to exchange rate volatility are increasingly replacing foreign
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exchange interventions as devices for smoothing exchange rate uctuations.
However, Mishkin and Savastano (2001) observe that responding heavily,
frequently and not transparently to exchange rate changes whether by inter-
ventions or interest rate policy raises the risk of making the exchange rate a
de-facto anchor for monetary policy over an ination target.
The literature on policy rules with exchange rate feedback takes two strands.
First, there are those studies which examine whether the exchange rate is
signicant in estimated policy rules. Furlani et al. (2010), Ades et al. (2002)
and Brischetto and Voss (1999) follow this approach. Their results show that
monetary policy responds to exchange rate movements. The second strand
of literature seeks to examine whether responding to exchange rate move-
ments enhances macroeconomic stability. The literature under this strand,
e.g. Wollmershäuser (2006), Ball (1999) and Batini et al. (2003), compares
the performance of models which feature exchange rate smoothing vis-à-vis
those that do not. These studies also tend to nd that when a policy rule
responds to exchange rate uctuations, macroeconomic performance is some-
what enhanced.
According to Taylor (2000), the omission of the exchange rate in policy rules
has been empirically validated for advanced economies. In terms of emerg-
ing economies, Mohanty and Klau (2004) argue that exchange rate stability
appears to be a key policy concern. The reasons for this are partly articu-
lated by Ho and McCauley (2003). They show that most emerging market
economies miss their ination targets due to sharp exchange rate volatil-
ity. This suggests that central banks stand alert to change monetary policy
in light of large swings in exchange rates. However, empirical evidence for
emerging markets is still divided. Moura and Carvalho (2009) nd that,
except for Mexico, the other six Latin American Countries do not react to
exchange rate uctuations. Similarly, Furlani et al. (2010) nd that Brazil
does not react to the exchange rate.
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Unlike the vast literature on advanced and emerging economies, the evidence
on the subject in Africa is little but also divided. For example, Alpanda
et al. (2010) nd no evidence of weight on the exchange rate in monetary
policy setting in South Africa. On the contrary, Gupta and Jooste (2014) and
Ades et al. (2002) provide this evidence. In a di¤erent view, Sanchez (2008)
advocates reacting to the exchange rate only when depreciations are temporal
but not structural or expansionary. A study by Bahmani-Oskooee and Gelan
(2013) shows that depreciations are mostly contractionary in 14 out of the 22
African countries examined. This nding partly provides the justication for
some central banks in Africa to engage in exchange rate smoothing. Central
banks are further cautious about movements in the exchange rate since the
nominal exchange rate has an important inuence on ination. Similarly, the
real exchange rate matters for the competitiveness of traded goods.
As observed by the IMF (2008), risks arising from exchange rate smoothing
abound. Firstly, a failed attempt to smooth exchange rate uctuations may
weaken policy credibility. Secondly, central banks may lack capacity to iden-
tify episodes that require smoothing. Pavasuthipaisit (2010) refers to this as
the inability to observe the true exchange rate. He advocates not reacting
to the exchange rate if it is already reected in the state of the economy.
This is corroborated by Taylor (2001) who does not see the need to react di-
rectly to exchange rate changes. Rather, he argues that inertia and rational
expectations ignite an indirect exchange rate channel to policy rules. This
channel reduces interest rate uctuations. Mishkin and Savastano (2001)
further argue that smoothing of the exchange rate may confuse the public
into believing that the central banks objective is to achieve some exchange
rate target and not the ination target.
A further risk is highlighted by Wollmershäuser (2006), who argues that the
link between exchange rate and monetary policy remains uncertain, espe-
cially because of the controversy surrounding the empirical strength of the
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UIP. There is therefore a likelihood that policy rules with feedback from the
exchange rate may fail to successfully stabilize economies. This likelihood is
more pronounced in Africa where the validity of the UIP condition is more
uncertain. Furthermore, monetary policy transmission is still weak. In ad-
dition, many central banks in the region are still faced with challenges to
model the true state of the economy. Given these factors, the implication of
exchange rate smoothing on macroeconomic performance in Africa remains
a fertile area of research.
3.3 The Model
Similar to Canova and Menz (2011) and Castelnouvo (2012), we use a New
Keynesian DSGE model where money features as non-separable from con-
sumption in the utility function. Benchimol and FourÇans (2012) argue that
higher risk aversion which is prevalent in the majority of African economies
can lead to a signicant role of money in output and ination dynamics. All
model derivations except the monetary policy rules are presented in Appendix
to Chapters 3 and 4. Detailed explanation of the model is provided in Chap-
ter 2. For brevity, we therefore only extract and present the estimable system
in Table 11. The system is composed of aggregate demand, aggregate supply,
money market dynamics and exchange rate equations. These equations are
briey explained from subsection 3.3.1 to subsection 3.3.4. Consistent with
the objectives of this chapter, the optimal monetary policy reaction functions
which distinquish this chapter are derived in detail in subsection 3.3.5.
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Table 11: The reduced form DSGE model
                               
y^t = '1Ety^t+1 + '2y^t 1   '3(r^t   Et^t+1) + '4 (m^t   Etm^t+1)
+ '5 (q^t   Etq^t+1) + '6q^t+1 + '7q^t   '8q^t 1 + '9Ety^ft+1
+'10y^
f
t   '11y^ft 1 + "yt; (3.01)
^t =  fEt^t+1 +  b^t 1 +  1y^t +  2Ety^t+1 +  3y^t 1+ 4q^t
+ 5Etq^t+1  6q^t 1+ 7m^t+ 8Ety^ft+1    9y^ft 1
+  10p^it + "t; (3.02)
m^t = $1y^t +$2y^t 1  $3(r^t   ^t+1) +$4^t+1 +$5q^t +$6q^t 1
+$7y^
f
t  $8y^ft 1 + "mdt or (3.03)
r^t = 1y^t + 2y^t 1   3m^t   4^t+1 + 5q^t + 6q^t 1 + 7y^ft
 8y^ft 1 + "rdt; (3.04)
Etq^t+1 =  
h
(r^t   ^t+1)  (r^ft   ^ft+1)
i
+ "qt: (3.05)
y^t = output gap, r^t = Three months treasury bill rate, ^t = domestic ina-
tion, ^ft = US ination, p^it = crude oil price, q^t =real exchange rate; y^
f
t =
foreign output, r^ft = LIBOR rate. & t = && t 1 + &t and #t = #t#t 1 + t;
where &t =

y^ft ; r^
f
t ; ^
f
t ; p{^t

; and #t = ("yt; "t; "mdt; "rdt; "qt; "rt; "mt; ) :
Furthermore; &t  N(0; 2& ) and #t  N(0; 2#):
All variables are deviation from steady state, represented by a hat on top of a
variable. The focus of our paper is on policy analysis rather than recovering
the underlying parameters. We, therefore follow Zanetti (2012) and Fujiwara
(2007) and use a reduced form New Keynesian model.
                                
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3.3.1 Aggregate demand
The aggregate demand (IS) dynamics described by eq.(3.01) in Table 11 arise
from householdsdesire to maximize utility subject to a constrained budget.
It features the lead y^t+1 and lagged y^t 1 output variables. As argued by
Smets and Wouters (2003), these variables a¤ect output positively due to
rational expectations and habit formation. Output is negatively related to
the real interest rate (r^t Et^t+1). The terms t+1 stands for model consistent
ination expectations. Similar to Ireland (2004) and Zanetti (2012), eq.(3.01)
also features real money balances m^t which positively drive output dynamics.
According to Canova and Menz (2011), this could result from the impact of
money on the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure
and hence the real wage.
The IS curve also includes the real exchange q^t. As shown by Senbeta (2011),
Africas consumption largely relies on imports, making the exchange rate a
key variable in output dynamics. As in Wollmershäuser (2006), the exchange
a¤ects the output dynamics in levels and changes. Another feature arising
from the imposition of the macroeconomic resource balance is the presence
of foreign output variable y^ft . Foreign output may a¤ect domestic output
through various channels, such as foreign direct investments, foreign aid and
trade. The exchange rate and foreign output variables serve to capture the
open economy e¤ects. As in Ireland (2004), we include the aggregate demand
shock "yt which is assumed to follow an AR(1) process.
3.3.2 Aggregate supply
Eq.(3.02) is a hybrid Phillips curve. As in Gali and Gertler (1999), para-
meters  
f
and  b capture the degree of forward and backward looking price
setting, respectively. Ination is also positively a¤ected by the output gap
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at various lags. Consistent with Senbeta (2011), supply dynamics are also
driven by the real exchange rate q^t since most inputs are imported. The
presence of real money balances m^t may reduce rmscosts associated with
searching for alternative nancing to procure inputs. Castelnouvo (2012) ar-
gues that real balances may also act as a forcing variable capturing demand
push on prices. Money may also a¤ect household labour supply decisions
and hence the real wage due to the non-separability assumption, generating
a positive link with ination. Eq.(3.02) also exhibits input prices p^it: Recent
studies, e.g. Malikane (2014), show that including input prices generates
a theoretically consistent response of ination to the output gap. Ination
is also inuenced by foreign output y^ft through trade and aid which act as
demand push factors: We also include an aggregate supply shock "t which
follows an AR(1) process.
3.3.3 Money market dynamics
Eq.(3.03) describes money demand. Money demand is positively inuenced
by current income y^t and lagged income y^t 1. The presence of habits in
the utility function makes money demand depend on lagged and expected
incomes. It also features the contemporaneous opportunity cost of holding
money (r^t   ^t+1). The real exchange rate q^t and q^t 1, positively a¤ect
demand for money through several channels, e.g. domestic consumption of
imported goods. The foreign output y^ft a¤ects demand for money positively
through its impact on domestic income. The equation also exhibits a money
demand shock "mdt. Eq.(3.04) is a corollary of eq.(3.03).
3.3.4 Exchange rate determination
In eq.(3.05), the real exchange rate dynamics are described as a function of
the real interest rate di¤erentials also known as the Uncovered Interest Parity
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condition (UIP). We however augment it with the term "qt which serves to
capture the deviations from the parity condition. Studies similar to ours
e.g. Wollmershäuser (2006) typically refer to "qt as the foreign exchange
risk premium. This specication is consistent with African economies, where
the UIP condition remains contentious due to higher risk premiums. This
equation underpins the majority of the recent open economy models and
has been used by Coenen and Wieland (2003) and Svensson (2000), among
others.
3.3.5 Monetary policy conduct
Monetary policy is described by two alternative rules, the monetary aggre-
gate and the interest rate. According to Liu and Zhang (2010), the monetary
aggregate may fail to capture policy dynamics in an environment where the
interest rate plays a signicant role in driving macroeconomic dynamics and
vice versa. To derive these policy rules, we specify a central bank intertem-
poral loss function similar to De Paoli (2009):
Lt+j = Et
1X
j=0
j
1
2
(^2t + yy^
2
t + q q^
2
t ); (3.06)
where q^2t measures the exchange rate volatility. Its presence in the loss func-
tion captures the policy makers inclination to penalize exchange rate devia-
tions from the trend. According to Ghosh et al. (2015), this could reect the
need for authorities to protect competitiveness and deal with balance sheet
concerns. q > 0 is the weight placed on stabilization of the real exchange
rate by authorities. y > 0 is the weight placed by the central bank on output
stabilization. We follow Evans and Honkapojha (2003) and Walsh (2001) to
derive the rst order conditions for [^t; y^t; q^t] by minimizing eq.(3.06) subject
to eq.(3.02). We get the following rst order conditions:
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^t +  bt+1   t = 0; (3.07)
yy^t +  3t+1 + t 1 = 0; (3.08)
q q^t + t 4   t+1 6 = 0; (3.09)
where t is the Lagrangian multiplier. Substituting eq. (3.07) into (3.09) and
combining the result with eq.(3.08) yields the following optimal relationship:
y^t =   1
y
[#1^t + #2^t 1 + #3q^t + #4q^t 1] ; (3.10)
where
#1 =
 3 4
( 6    b 4)
; #2 =
 1 4
( 6    b 4)
#3 =
 3q
 ( 6    b 4)
; #4 =
 1q
 ( 6    b 4) :
The optimal dynamics in eq.(3.10) feature the current and lagged real ex-
change rate terms which are activated only when authorities engage in ex-
change smoothing i.e q > 0. Eq. (3.10) states that if ination is above
target, contract demand below the natural output by increasing the interest
rate. This is captured by the negative relationship between output gap and
ination, both current and lagged. Similarly, authorities can increase the
interest rate in order to appreciate the exchange rate and knock o¤ excess
demand. This feature is again captured by the negative relationship between
output gap and exchange rate terms, namely q^t and q^t 1. The coe¢ cients of
proportionality #1 up to #4 depend positively on coe¢ cients of output gap
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and exchange rate in the Phillips curve and inversely on the weight y at-
tached to output stabilization in the objective function. Furthermore, #3 and
#4 positively depend on exchange rate smoothing parameter q: The higher
the value of q;the less the pass-through to ination and higher the output.
The smaller the value of y the stronger is the demand contraction initiated
by the central bank if ination deviates from the target and vice versa.
Combining eq.(3.01) and eq.(3.10) leads to the following interest rate rule:
r^t = {1y^t 1 + {2y^t+1 + {3^t + {4^t 1 + {5^t+1 + {6(m^t   m^t+1)
+{7(q^t   q^t+1) + {8q^t+1 + {9q^t   {10q^t 1 + {11y^ft+1
+{12y^ft   {13y^ft 1 + "rt; (3.11)
Where
{1 =
'2
'3
;{2 =
'1
'3
;{3 =
#2
'3
; {4 =
#2
'3
; {5 = 1;
{6 =
'4
'3
;{7 =
'5
'3
;{8 =
'6
'3
;{9 =
'7 + #3
'3
;{10 =
'8+#4
'3
;
{11 =
'9
'3
;{12 =
'10
'3
; {13 =
'11
'3
:
Eq.(3.11) shares the same dynamics with eq. (2.49). The di¤erence is that
in eq. (3.11) authorities must pay additional attention to current and lagged
exchange rates by adjusting the interest rate with additional magnitudes
of #3 and #4; respectively, in order to address real exchange rate volatility.
The values of #3 and #4 depend on the exchange rate smoothing factor q.
When q = 0; these magnitudes collapse to zero, giving rise to a comparable
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case in which authorities use the interest rate instrument without smooth-
ing exchange rate uctuations. Alternatively, we can combine eq.(3.02) and
eq.(3.10) to get the following money supply rule:
m^t =  1y^t 1   2y^t   3y^t+1   4^t 1   5^t+1
 6q^t 1   7q^t   8q^t+1   9y^ft 1
 10y^ft+1   11p^jt + "mt; (3.12)
where
1 =
 3
 7
; 2 =
y +  1
#1 7
; 3 =
 2
 7
; 4 =
 b + #2
 7
;
5 =
 f
 7
; 6 =
 6 + #4
 7
; 7 =
 4 + #3
#1 7
; 8 =
 5
 7
; 9 =
 9
 7
;
10 =
 8
 7
; 11 =
 10
 7
:
Eq. (3.12) shares same dynamics with eq. (2.50). However, the novelty in
eq.(3.12) is that authorities adjust the monetary aggregate instrument by
further magnitudes of #3 and #4 to respond to the current and lagged real
exchange rates, respectively. Again, the values of #3 and #4 depend on q.
When q = 0; these terms collapse to zero, giving rise to a comparable case
where authorities use the monetary aggregate instrument but do not respond
to exchange rate uctuations. When q = 0; the response of the interest rate
and the monetary aggregate instruments to the real exchange rate is only
triggered by the implication of exchange rate developments on aggregate
demand and supply dynamics, a feature akin to what Taylor (2001) terms
indirect exchange rate e¤ect.
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Table 12: Data description
Ination Calculated as a log di¤erence of the CPI between one
quarter and the same quarter of the previous year
Real balances Calculated as the log di¤erence between of the
money supply and the CPI
Output gap Calculated as the di¤erence between the log of
real GDP and its trend
Real exchange rate Calculated as the sum of the logs of the nominal bilateral
US dollar exchange rate and the US CPI less the log of
the domestic CPI
Foreign interest rate Proxied by the three months London Interbank O¤er Rate,
Foreign output Proxied by the US real GDP
Foreign ination Proxied by US ination
Raw material price Proxied by Brent crude oil price
Policy rate Proxied by three months Treasury bill rate
3.4 Data, calibration and simulation
3.4.1 Data
Data used is obtained from the International Financial Statistics of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund and is described in Table 12. Due to di¤erences
in data availability from di¤erent countries, the sample periods considered
vary from country to country as follows: For South Africa, Ghana, Uganda,
Malawi and Egypt we use quarterly data from 1990-2014. For Tanzania and
Zambia, we estimate our models with quarterly data from 1993-2014. For
Morocco, we use quarterly data from 1995 to 2014. For Nigeria, we use
1995-2014 while for Kenya we use quarterly data from 1993-2014. Where
quarterly GDP is not available, e.g. Malawi and Tanzania, we interpolate.
All variables are in deviation from steady state.
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3.4.2 Calibration
We pay particular attention to the choice of parameters characterizing the
loss function described by eq.(3.06), namely q;  and y. The parameters
represent the weights with which authorities penalize the deviations of ex-
change rate, ination and output from their targets, respectively. Similar to
Ghosh et al. (2015) on emerging market economies, we set  = 1. There are
diverse calibrations for q in literature. For emerging economies, Nordstrom
et al. (2009) set q = 0:3 and nd this value to be consistent with dampening
ination volatility while slightly increasing output variability in the presence
of demand and risk premium shocks. They also nd that welfare is compro-
mised when a smoothing parameter of more than 0.6 is used. Ghosh et al.
(2015) set q = 0:1. Garcia et al. (2011) compare smoothing parameters of
between 0.25 and 0.7. They also consider cases where weights are applied on
levels and changes of the exchange rate. They nd that beyond a smoothing
parameter of 0.75, ination and output variability tend to go up signicantly.
In line with the Taylors (1993) proposal and other studies, e.g. Leitemo and
Söderström (2005), we calibrate the output smoothing parameter at y = 0:5:
Following an approach similar to Garcia et al. (2011), we set the minimum
weight for the exchange rate smoothing parameter q = 0 and adjust this
by margins of 0.1 up to q = 0:5. Varying the values of q enables us to
examine two cases: i) whether the e¤ect of exchange rate smoothing on
macroeconomic performance is invariant to the level of aggressiveness of the
central bank towards exchange rate uctuations, ii) whether there is a change
in the choice of the monetary policy instrument when authorities smooth the
exchange rate using the interest rate or money supply rules. The rest of the
parameters used for simulations in this Chapter are estimated in Chapter 2
and are presented in Appendix to Chapter 3 and 4 as Tables 22-26.
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3.4.3 Simulation
We simulate the model using the Maximum Likelihood (ML) technique.
Hansen and Sargent (2007) show that this estimator is consistent and as-
ymptotically e¢ cient in DSGE models. In order to deal with a probable
problem of singularity, we follow Ireland (2004) and add error terms to the
observation equations of the state-space representation. This limits the ef-
fects of misspecication and helps to deal with identication issues. This
representation also captures the limitations of the DSGE models to exhaus-
tively capture macroeconomic dynamics in African context. We use output,
ination, real exchange and real money balances as observables.
According to Taylor (2000), a good policy rule is the one that minimizes uc-
tuations of the goal variables. We therefore simulate the estimated model
by applying a 0.01 standard deviation contractionary shock to the mone-
tary aggregate and the interest rate rules. We follow Wollmershäuser (2006)
and seek to identify a model that yields lowest macroeconomic loss and re-
stores the economy back to the steady state in a relatively short period. The
macroeconomic loss is dened by eq.(3.06). The paper is for monetary pol-
icy analysis rather than recovering the underlying parameters. We therefore
follow Zanetti (2012) and Fujiwara (2007) and use the reduced form model.
The system to be simulated is presented in Table 13.
118
Table 13: The estimable system
Models with interest rate rule
Model q Included equations
1 0.0 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.05 3.11
2 0.1 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.05 3.11
3 0.2 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.05 3.11
4 0.3 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.05 3.11
5 0.4 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.05 3.11
6 0.5 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.05 3.11
Models with money supply rule
Model q Included equations
7 0.0 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.05 3.12
8 0.1 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.05 3.12
9 0.2 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.05 3.12
10 0.3 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.05 3.12
11 0.4 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.05 3.12
12 0.5 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.05 3.12
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Variance of output and ination
The key results addressing the questions raised in this chapter arise from
analysis of variance and impulse responses. The variances are presented in
Table 14 while impulse responses are presented in Figs. 9 and 10. When
exchange rate smoothing is excluded from the central banks objective, i.e.
q = 0, macroeconomic loss is minimized when authorities use the interest
rate instrument in Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa and Uganda. How-
ever, in Malawi, Morocco, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia it is the monetary
aggregate instrument which minimizes macroeconomic loss7. This result is
replicated in Table 14 by comparing Model 1 and model 7.
7These results are similar to what we obtained in Chapter 2
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When exchange rate smoothing is explicitly included as a central bank objec-
tive, i.e q > 0, several other results appear. Firstly, exchange rate smoothing
improves macroeconomic performance in Ghana, Kenya, Malawi and Tanza-
nia. These results reect estimates from the Phillips curve which show that
the response of ination to the exchange rate variables is relatively large in
these countries compared to others. Similarly, the impact of the exchange
rate on aggregate demand is on average higher in these countries compared
to others. Therefore, the signicance of exchange rate smoothing in these
countries reects the authoritiesdesire to deal with high pass-through of
the exchange rate to ination, an observation also made by Pavasuthipaisit
(2010).
In addition, ToTs are either more volatile or declining in these countries. The
behaviour of the ToTs together with the signicance of the exchange rate in
driving ination and output dynamics compel authorities to engage in ex-
change rate smoothing. Fig. 4 suggests that in the 2000s, these countries
should have experienced signicant depreciations of the currencies because
they were faced with declining ToTs. Declining ToTs imply that a country
imports relatively more than it exports. Typically, this should translate into
signicant depreciation of the exchange rate. However, during this period,
the exchange rates for these countries marginally moved suggesting that au-
thorities implemented policies to buoy the currencies (also see Fig. 19 in
the Appendix to Chapter 3 and 4). This buoyed stability constitutes ex-
change rate smoothing which helped to improve macroeconomic performance
in these countries.
Our results further suggest that the weight with which authorities smooth
exchange rate uctuations has implications for macroeconomic stabilization.
Below certain thresholds, exchange rate smoothing is not su¢ cient such that
the pass-through of the exchange rate to ination and aggregate demand
remains high which generates ination and output volatility. Beyond cer-
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tain thresholds, the situation is akin to running a near xed exchange rate
regime which as argued by Baldini et al. (2015) leads to higher macroeco-
nomic volatility. Indeed, as we nd in this study, exchange rate smoothing
in Morocco, Nigeria and Egypt which pursue conventional peg, stabilization
arrangement and other managed oat worsens macroeconomic performance.
We also nd that exchange rate smoothing worsens macroeconomic perfor-
mance South Africa, Uganda and Zambia. With relatively more open nan-
cial accounts and independent monetary policies, managing exchange rate
uctuations through active monetary policy in these countries generates more
volatile interest rates. As argued by Calvo, Reinhart and Végh (1995) this
leads to volatile output and ination. Therefore in 6 of the 10 countries, ex-
change rate smoothing worsens macroeconomic performance. These ndings
are also consistent with other empirical studies, such as IMF (2008), Taylor
(2001) and Calvo, Reinhart and Végh (1995). Despite the fact that exchange
rate smoothing worsens macroeconomic performance in the majority of coun-
tries, authorities still react to exchange rate changes. This is evidenced by
the signicance of the exchange rate parameters in the policy rule. One pos-
sible reason is the "fear of oating" syndrome. The fear of oating arises
from the observed signicance of the exchange rate in driving ination and
output dynamics in Africa.
However, as suggested by Ghosh et al. (2015), authorities in these coun-
tries should consider relying more on sterilized foreign exchange interventions
rather than monetary policy instruments to smooth exchange rates. Steril-
ized foreign exchange interventions would also be applicable to countries
which nd gains from exchange rate smoothing but cannot adjust monetary
policy to deal with exchange rate uctuations, for instance, due to nancial
or scal stability concerns. This approach would be critical in ensuring that
fundamental exchange rate level is not a¤ected while also maintaining suit-
able interest rate and money supply levels to meet other domestic objectives.
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Sterilized interventions can be e¤ective in inuencing the exchange rate be-
cause capital mobility is not perfect due to high risk premium and also the
small size of domestic nancial markets in Africa.
The use of foreign exchange interventions allows authorities to address two
policy objectives, namely ination and exchange rate stability by using two
policy instruments, namely interest rates or money supply and foreign ex-
change interventions. This is di¤erent from loading a single interest rate or
money supply instrument with achieving ination and exchange rate stabil-
ity. According to Timbergen (1952), pursuing multiple objectives with one
instrument can be recipe for policy ine¤ectiveness. Sterilized interventions
should however be motivated by the need to dampen short term exchange
rate volatility rather than averting structural misalignment. Under structural
misalignment, repeated interventions would contribute to the accumulation
or drainage of liquidity thereby increasing risks to ination targets. This ap-
pears to have been the case in Malawi and Nigeria in periods leading to 2012
and 2016, respectively. While trying to achieve exchange rate stability, the
liquidity that ensued due to interventions threatened ination stability. Just
like Open Market Operations, foreign exchange interventions are costly and
therefore require the central banks to have relatively strong balance sheets.
A feature that African authorities must leave with if they opt for an inde-
pendent monetary policy.
Our ndings also suggest that in Tanzania there is a switch in the optimal
rule. When exchange rate uctuations become a concern for the authorities,
macroeconomic loss is minimized at 0.1723 using the interest rate instrument
with a smoothing parameter of 0.5 instead of the monetary aggregate. In the
other 9 countries, there is no trade-o¤ in policy instruments. However, we
observe that the interest rate instruments only performs better in Tanzania
at very high level of smoothing, i.e q = 0 .5. This suggests that if an overly
tight policy stance on account of exchange rate uctuations is not feasible
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due to other domestic objectives, such as nancial stability, the monetary
aggregate instrument may still be preferred.
3.5.2 Impulse responses
We present impulse responses of output and ination in Figs. 9 and 10.
In the baseline case (where monetary policy does not respond to exchange
rate uctuations), it would be expected that a monetary policy tightening
represented by an increase in interest rate or a withdraw of liquidity would
result in a decline in aggregate demand and induce a decline in ination. In
the alternative case, where authorities smooth exchange rates, it would be
expected that impulse responses will behave in similar way to the baseline
case but that the economy should revert to steady state earlier and the level of
deviation after a shock should be relatively smaller compared to the baseline
case.
Fig. 9 shows that the response of ination to policy tightening is theoretically
consistent in Egypt. Without interest rate smoothing, the interest rate rule
generates less volatility although it is the money rule which stabilizes ination
earlier. In Ghana and Kenya, the interest rate rule with an exchange rate
smoothing parameter of 0.1 brings the economy back to steady state earlier
than that without exchange rate smoothing. In Uganda, it is the interest rate
rule without exchange rate smoothing that stabilizes the economy earlier.
Fig. 9 also shows the impulse responses of output. In Egypt, output stabi-
lizes at around 55 quarters under monetary aggregate rule with an exchange
rate smoothing parameter of 0.3, similar to the interest rate rule without
exchange rate smoothing. In Ghana and Uganda, reacting to exchange rate
volatility generates a contrary response of output to monetary policy shock.
In Ghana, output reverts to steady state after 11 quarters under the interest
rate rule without exchange rate smoothing compared to 19 quarters under
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exchange rate smoothing. In Uganda, output gap stabilizes after 19 quarters
without exchange rate smoothing compared to 80 quarters under exchange
rate smoothing.
In Fig. 10, we present impulse responses of ination to the monetary ag-
gregate shock. In Nigeria, Malawi, Morocco, Zambia, Tanzania and South
Africa, monetary policy tightening represented by a contraction in money
supply generates theoretically consistent impulse responses. Exchange rate
smoothing results in earlier reversion of output to steady state in Nigeria and
Tanzania. For example, in Nigeria, Ination reverts to steady state after 13
quarters under exchange rate smoothing with a value of 0.1 compared to 10
quarters without exchange rate smoothing.
Overall, the ndings from the analysis of variance and impulse responses are
rather mixed. On one hand, engaging in exchange rate smoothing enhances
macroeconomic performance in 4 countries, namely Ghana, Kenya, Malawi
and Tanzania. The gains in macroeconomic performance mostly arise from
lower ination and exchange rate volatility. Exchange rate smoothing lowers
the pass-through of the exchange rate to ination and minimizes the volatil-
ity of the exchange rate itself. This nding is supported in literature by
studies such as Wollmershäuser (2006), Batini et al. (2001) and Ball (1999).
In practice, caution must be exercised such that exchange rate smoothing
is exclusively used to smooth exchange rate uctuations and not achieve an
ination objective. The interest rate or the monetary aggregate should re-
main a primary instrument for monetary policy. Their level of adjustment
should however be adjusted only when there are eminent threats of excessive
exchange rate uctuations. One clear risk is that economic agents might be-
lieve that authorities have changed policy objectives such that ination and
exchange rate stability are both primary goals of monetary policy. To avoid
this, clear communication about why authorities are smoothing the exchange
rate would be key.
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On the other hand, there seems to be no additional benet in responding to
the exchange rate uctuations in the other 6 countries, namely Egypt, South
Africa, Morocco, Uganda, Zambia and Nigeria. As argued byWollmershäuser
(2006), the economic rationale behind this result can also be directly derived
from the exchange rate model underlying the open economy models. Ac-
cording to the UIP the real exchange rate moves in response to real interest
rate di¤erentials as well as disturbances to the UIP. Low level of openness
and thinness of foreign exchange markets mean that reaction to foreign inter-
est rate changes is limited. At the same time, subscription to international
programmes, such as those from the IMF and World Bank together with
improved governance structures suggest that the risk premium might some-
what be decreasing. In this case, real exchange rate is mostly determined
by the domestic real interest rate, which can be controlled by authorities.
From this, it directly follows that the contemporaneous movement of the ex-
change rate contains no extra information for the decision making process
of the central bank. As a result, if the exchange rate is not an independent
source of disturbances, there is no additional information to be had from re-
sponding to the exchange rate itself. The exchange rate is endogenous such
that responding to it will not deal with the uctuations but nevertheless will
inuence interest rate volatility which as argued by Calvo et al. (1995) will
contribute to more macroeconomic volatility.
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Figure 9: Impulse responses of ination and output to the interest rate shock
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Figure 10: Impulse responses of output to the monetary aggregate shock
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3.6 Conclusion
African economies are faced with frequent and diverse shocks. Lubik and
Schorfheide (2007) show that these shocks generate persistent exchange rate
uctuations which as shown by Sanchez (2008) create unstable balance sheets
and volatile macroeconomic performance. Observed data attests to these.
Given these observations, in this paper we examine whether exchange rate
smoothing can yield dividends in form of enhancing macroeconomic perfor-
mance in African countries. We use the New-Keynesian framework esti-
mated using the Maximum Likelihood method. The loss function is specied
as a quadratic expression of output, ination and the real exchange rate.
Apart from output and ination stability, the authorities are therefore also
concerned with exchange rate volatility and hence engage in exchange rate
smoothing. The implication of exchange rate smoothing on macroeconomic
performance is examined by varying the level of aggressiveness by the mon-
etary authorities towards exchange rate volatility.
The results show that in 4 countries, namely Ghana, Kenya, Malawi and
Tanzania there is strong evidence for authorities to engage in exchange rate
smoothing as it enhances macroeconomic performance. These countries are
faced with more volatile and declining terms of trade which compel author-
ities to engage in exchange rate smoothing. This is also reected in the
behaviour of the exchange rates which does not fully reect developments in
terms of trade. This suggests that indeed authorities smooth uctuations.
In these countries, the exchange rate also exerts a relatively large inuence
on macroeconomic variables. Exchange rate smoothing therefore limits the
pass-through of the exchange rate to ination which results in improved
macroeconomic performance (see Pavasuthipaisit 2010). Put di¤erently, in
the absence of ination risks warranting policy adjustments, threats from
exchange rate uctuations are a justiable reason for authorities to adjust
monetary policy.
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Secondly, in the other 6 countries, namely Egypt, South Africa, Morocco,
Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia engaging in exchange rate smoothing worsens
macroeconomic performance. This result is also consistent with some studies,
such as Batini et.al (2003) and Ball (1999), which nd no or small macroeco-
nomic improvement when the exchange rate is included in policy rules. The
ndings are also supported by Taylor (2001) who argues that policy rules
which react to the exchange rate movements may perform worse than their
counterparts. As of 2014, Nigeria and Morocco had relatively xed exchange
rate systems. Exchange rate smoothing in an environment where authorities
already pursue xed exchange rate system generates more macroeconomic
volatility. Fixed exchange rates contain little information about the econ-
omy. Responding to an exchange rate when it does not contain any new
information tends to increase interest rates volatility resulting into policy
induced instability.
Thirdly, we nd evidence that the level of aggressiveness towards exchange
rate uctuations has implications for macroeconomic performance. Below
some threshold, the smoothing is not su¢ cient to contain the pass-through
to ination. Above certain levels, there is too much smoothing which is tan-
tamount to implementing near xed exchange rate regimes. According to
Baldini et al. (2015), xed exchange rate regimes generate more macroeco-
nomic volatility. The threshold of smoothing is however found to be country
specic.
Fourth, our results suggest that exchange rate smoothing succeeds in reduc-
ing macroeconomic instability by mostly reducing the volatility of ination.
The exchange rate is characterized by two transmission channels, direct and
indirect channels. Under the direct channel, a depreciation of the exchange
rate immediately translates into a rise in imported goods which translates
into higher domestic prices. This is the case in Africa since the produc-
tion and consumption patterns are largely based on imports (see Senbeta
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2011). Exchange rate smoothing therefore works by directly leveraging the
pass-through under the direct channel.
Overall, our results are rather mixed. On one hand, they suggest that ex-
change rate smoothing is benecial in 4 countries. On the other hand, they
do not support smoothing in 6 countries. We can thus conclude that ex-
change rate smoothing using monetary policy rules is harmful in Africa. The
results further suggest that where smoothing delivers gains, authorities must
carefully determine appropriate thresholds to minimize policy induced macro-
economic instability. Under circumstances where adjusting monetary policy
to deal with exchange rate uctuations does not seem feasible, but never-
theless authorities are concerned with exchange rate uctuations, authorities
should consider alternatives such as sterilized foreign exchange intervention
(Gosh et al. 2015). Using sterilized interventions would allow authorities
to pursue ination and exchange rate stability objectives using two di¤erent
instruments, namely the interest rates or money supply and exchange rate
interventions (see Timbergen 1952).
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4 Ination targeting versus nominal income
targeting in selected African economies: An
empirical assessment
4.1 Introduction
This study compares the performance of ination targeting and nominal GDP
targeting as alternative monetary policy regimes for macroeconomic stabi-
lization in 10 African economies. The spike in commodity prices between
2006 and 2008, their subsequent reversal and the dislocation of trade that
followed the global nancial crisis brought a long period of relatively benign
macroeconomic conditions to an abrupt halt (IMF 2015). There is mounting
evidence that price volatility has increased thereafter and it is likely that
policy challenges will continue. Authorities around the world are thus forced
to reassess the reach and limits of their macroeconomic management tools.
Africa is not spared. One of the critical tools for macroeconomic management
is monetary policy. IMF (2015) observes that despite the success in reducing
ination to single digits, most central banks in LICs including those from
Africa do not have e¤ective monetary policy frameworks for formulating and
implementing monetary policy to deal with shocks. The absence of clear
policy frameworks, numerous macroeconomic challenges and the authorities
dissatisfaction with current monetary policy regimes has created a search for
alternatives.
According to the 2011 IMFWorld Economic Outlook, the number of ination
targeters increased by 25 percent, globally, between 2003 and 2011. Although
there is evident shift in research and practice towards ination targeting by
several countries, recent studies, such as Woodford (2014) and Bill (2013),
argue that the IT regime has been unable to su¢ ciently resuscitate aggregate
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demand in AEs after the 2008 nancial crisis. Some studies, such as Sumner
(2012), show that the severity of the 2008 crisis would have been limited
if countries pursued NGDP targeting instead of ination targeting. Several
recent studies, such as Belongia and Ireland (2015), Frankel (2014) and Mc-
Callum (2011), also propose NGDP targeting as a potential framework for
macroeconomic stabilization in the presence of huge supply shocks.
As argued by Frankel (2014), the IT framework is gaining more popularity
among AEs and EMEs because it is robust to aggregate demand shocks which
are dominant in these economies. However, this framework could be ill-suited
to deal with supply and terms of trade shocks as it leads to excessively tight
monetary policy. In Africa, the choice of appropriate monetary policy regimes
is blemished by these features. Other studies such as IMF (2008) emphasize
responding to second round e¤ects other than rst round e¤ects under supply
shocks. However, the distinction between rst and second round e¤ects is a
useful construct but fraught with uncertainty as it is di¢ cult to tell where
rst round e¤ect stop and where second round e¤ects kick in. It also requires
an understanding of the structural features of the economy, the state of the
economy, and a thorough assessment of available data which the majority of
African economies still lack. Not surprising, the frequency of these shocks
have seen the enthusiasm for ination targeting that was widespread in the
early 2000s being replaced by a i) more sober assessment of how such regime
might best be modied for the conditions of Africa, ii) search for alternative
regimes that are robust to prevailing shocks.
In Africa, several studies, like Heintz and Ndikumana (2011), Loening et al.
(2009) and Nell (2004), show that ination is mostly driven by supply shocks.
Kose and Riezman (2001) show that roughly 50 percent of the economic
uctuations in Africa are driven by trade shocks. Rasaki and Malikane (2015)
nd external debt, exchange rate and commodity price shocks as signicant
drivers of output uctuations in Africa. Nguyen et al. (2017) nd that
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45 percent of ination uctuations in Africa arise from supply shocks. IMF
(2011) further shows that the probability of terms of trade and disaster shocks
are higher in Africa compared to AEs and EMEs.
Despite this evidence, there are no studies on Africa that examine the relative
macroeconomic performance of the NGDP targeting as alternative to the IT
regime under these conditions. The focus on the IT regime alone contradicts
the features characterizing African economies and also stands in contrast to
some studies, such as Sumner (2015) and Frankel (2014) who argue that
the e¤ectiveness of this regime is dwarfed when supply or terms of trade
shocks dominate. Unfortunately, the majority of the studies on monetary
policy frameworks are on AEs which makes choices on the subject di¢ cult
for Africa. These studies are also lopsided in favour of the IT frameworks.
This study contributes to literature in several ways. Firstly, similar studies
like ours, such as Frankel (2014), Bill (2013), Houssa et al. (2010) and Garin
et al. (2015), focus their analysis on two regimes, namely exible versions of
nominal GDP targeting and ination targeting. In this study, we extend the
analysis by dening the strict versions of these frameworks thereby generating
additional comparable monetary policy regimes. Secondly, di¤erent from
these studies, we address our research question by simulating a reduced form
NewKeynesian model where money is non-separable from consumption in the
utility function. Furthermore, our study uses optimized policy rules thereby
enhancing objective comparison of the policy regimes. By examining the
NGDP regime, this study provides an alternative potential framework against
which the conventional IT framework can be evaluated in Africa.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 consists of lit-
erature review. Section 4.3 lays out the model. Section 4.4 describes data
and the estimation technique. Section 4.5 discusses the results. Section 4.6
concludes with some policy options.
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4.2 Literature review
There are various monetary policy regimes. The popular ones are Exchange
Rate Targeting (ERT), Monetary Aggregate Targeting (MAT), Ination Tar-
geting (IT) and Nominal GDP Targeting (NGDP). As explained by Mishkin
(1999), ERT involves either xing the value of a domestic currency to a low
ination currency or use of policies that do not allow the exchange rate to
move beyond some prescribed values. Under the MAT, authorities use the
central bank balance sheet items, typically reserves, to programme monetary
developments to be consistent with the ination target. The IT involves an
announcement of a medium term ination target. Interest rates are then
moved to steer the ination projection towards the ination target. Under
the NGDP targeting, authorities change monetary policy to ensure that the
growth of nominal income is consistent with the sum of targeted real GDP
growth and ination.
As observed by Frankel (2014), the ERT is quite successful in anchoring
expectations in small open economies. As argued by IMF (2015), some LICs
have and will continue to choose xed exchange rate regimes. These regimes,
which include currency unions, currency boards, and hard pegs in which
an explicit exchange rate commitment represents the main nominal anchor,
have advantages and represent a viable choice for many countries. Indeed
for some of these countries, strengthening their xed exchange rate regime
may be the preferred direction of policy reform. However, by denition, the
exchange rate target would not allow the exchange rate to move in line with
macroeconomic fundamentals.
In Africa, weak balance of payments positions, poor terms of trade and dom-
inance of supply shocks make the ERT regime not suitable. Indeed a com-
parison of the exchange rate peg against ination targeting in Mozambique
by Peiris and Saxegaard (2010) shows that ination targeting is superior in
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stabilizing the economy due to higher interest rate volatility. In terms of
the MAT, Mishkin (1999), observes that its e¤ectiveness relies on the sta-
bility of the velocity and money multiplier. Some studies, e.g. Sichei and
Kamau (2010) document instability of the velocity and the money multiplier
in Kenya while in Uganda they nd that the money multiplier is unstable
in the short run. Similarly, Adam and Kessy (2010) show that the money
multiplier is unstable in Tanzania. These challenges are rendering the MAT
framework ine¤ective and have generated the quest for alternative regimes
in Africa.
The IT framework has been the preferred alternative over the MAT regime.
Under IT, authorities can either follow strict ination targeting (SIT) or
exible ination targeting (FIT). In the former, real sector developments are
not considered when setting interest rates while in the latter, authorities pay
some attention to output developments when setting interest rates. Rude-
busch and Svensson (1999) argue that the SIT framework is suboptimal and
leads to higher macroeconomic loss compared to the FIT. However, Frankel
(2014) argues that under both cases, sticking with the announced regime in
the aftermath of an adverse trade shock would likely yield an excessively
tight monetary policy. A further caveat of the IT is highlighted by Mishkin
(1999) who argues that ination targets are just hard to hit, a process which
is complicated by long lags of monetary policy e¤ects.
A contending regime to the IT is the NGDP targeting. Originally proposed
by Meade (1978) and Tobin (1980), a nominal GDP target accommodates the
adverse supply shocks by automatically dividing it between real output and
ination. Belongia and Ireland (2015) show that the nominal GDP targeting
implemented using the monetary base instrument is transparent, convenient
to implement and monitor in real time and therefore easy to communicate to
the public. Their proposal is therefore appealing to the majority of African
economies who still use the MAT framework. In terms of AEs, Frankel (2014)
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argues that NGDP targeting can help them to achieve credible monetary
expansion and raise ination expectations. This, for example would help
AEs deal with economic weaknesses that ensued following the severe negative
demand shock in 2008.
Empirical evidence on the performance of IT and NGDP targeting remains
divided. Bill (2013) nds that for a standard calibration, the IT under dis-
cretion generates a deationary trap while the NGDP level targeting does
not. Frankel (2014) nds that a NGDP rule performs better than the IT rule
except when the Phillips curve is steep or when the weight placed on price
stability is quite high. Frisch and Staudinger (2003) nd that the IT regime
generates a trade o¤ between ination and output under a supply shock.
This trade o¤ depends on the relative weights in the loss function. Under
NGDP targeting, authorities face a constant trade o¤ between ination and
output. According to Garin et al. (2015), the NGDP targeting produces a
smaller welfare loss than an estimated Taylor rule and signicantly outper-
forms the IT. This is the case particularly when wages are sticky and supply
shocks dominate. Kim and Henderson (2004) argue that SIT and NGDP tar-
geting are suboptimal under full or partial information but NGDP targeting
dominates FIT for some reasonable parameters.
According to Jensen (2002), when the economy is subject to shocks that do
not involve monetary policy trade-o¤s, the IT is preferable. In the absence
of this, NGDP targeting may be superior because it induces inertial policy
making which improves the ination-output trade-o¤. He argues that the IT
may be relatively less favorable, the more society dislikes ination and the
more persistent are the shocks. To the contrary, Rudebusch and Svensson
(2002) show that the NGDP targeting is ine¢ cient compared to the IT in the
Euro area. In a di¤erent approach, Aoki (2001) and Kamps and Pierdzioch
(2002) argue that instead of targeting overall ination under IT, countries
must use indices, such as the core ination to prevent policy mistakes of
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responding to noisy shocks. This should improve the performance of the IT
regime. However, the relatively small size of the core ination component
in many countries in Africa means that authorities still analyze the overall
ination and would therefore fail to circumvent this problem.
Frisch and Staudinger (2001) put forward two other arguments that justify
the need for further examination of the NGDP regime vis-à-vis the IT regime.
First, despite historical academic discussions, NGDP targeting has received
little practical application compared to the IT. Secondly, some central banks
e.g. the European Central Bank still use reference values which largely incor-
porate an ination target as well as a real GDP target adjusted by the decline
in the velocity of money. Besides these observations, McCallum (1997), Or-
phanides (1999) and Rudebusch (1999) argue that there is a tendency for
economies to wrongly predict real GDP growth and ination. This leads to
unreliable forecasts which may a¤ect policy e¤ectiveness under the IT regime
which relies more on an ination forecast. The unreliability of output gap
estimates is also underscored by Orphanides and van Norden (2002). The
challenge to precisely measure these variables is more pronounced in African
countries than in advanced economies.
Clearly, there is little consensus in literature on the performance of the IT and
NGDP targeting regimes. The performance of each regime seems to depend
on a lot of factors. These factors include the level of ination aversion by au-
thorities, prevailing shocks and the level of their persistence, the denition of
the ination target and also whether monetary policy is implemented under
discretion or commitment. Since countries face di¤erent shocks with di¤er-
ent intensities and have di¤erent levels of ination aversion, it follows that
the choice of a particular monetary policy regime requires country-specic
analysis. Furthermore, the majority of the studies are on AEs. The IMF
AREAER (2016) places three of the countries in our sample, namely Zam-
bia, Egypt and Kenya as pursuing "Other" policy frameworks. They have
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been described as putting in place necessary steps for the adoption of Ina-
tion targeting. Together with South Africa, Ghana and Uganda, this brings
"IT" countries to 6 in our sample. This trend raises a compelling case for
this study.
4.3 The model
We specify a DSGE model which features real money balances as non-
separable from consumption in the utility function. Canova and Menz (2011)
argue that the e¤ect that real balances have on the marginal rate of substitu-
tion between consumption and leisure and hence the real wage can result in
a non-trivial role of money in macroeconomic dynamics. Changes in the real
wage do a¤ect marginal costs and hence may have impact on aggregate de-
mand and supply. Furthermore, Benchimol and FourÇans (2012) argue that
higher risk aversion which is prevalent in the majority of African economies
can lead to a signicant role of money in output dynamics. To capture this
role, we specify a model similar to Castelnouvo (2012) and Andrés et al.
(2009) where money is non-separable from consumption.
All the derivations of the model, except the monetary policy rules, are pre-
sented in the Appendix to Chapters 3 and 4. The model used here is the
one derived and discussed in Chapter 2. In Table 15, we reproduce the
equation and briey explain them in subsequent subsection. The model is
composed of the aggregate demand equation (IS curve), the aggregate supply
equation (Phillips curve), the money market dynamics (LM curve) and the
exchange rate equation. Consistent with the objectives of this paper, the
detailed derivations of the monetary policy reaction functions are presented
in subsection 4.3.5.
139
Table 15: The reduced form New Keynesian DSGE model
                               
y^t = '1Ety^t+1 + '2y^t 1   '3(r^t   Et^t+1) + '4 (m^t   Etm^t+1)
+ '5 (q^t   Etq^t+1) + '6q^t+1 + '7q^t   '8q^t 1 + '9Ety^ft+1
+'10y^
f
t   '11y^ft 1 + "yt; (4.01)
^t =  fEt^t+1 +  b^t 1 +  1y^t +  2Ety^t+1 +  3y^t 1+ 4q^t
+ 5Etq^t+1  6q^t 1+ 7m^t+ 8Ety^ft+1    9y^ft 1
+  10p^it + "t; (4.02)
m^t = $1y^t +$2y^t 1  $3(r^t   ^t+1) +$4^t+1 +$5q^t +$6q^t 1
+$7y^
f
t  $8y^ft 1 + "mdt or (4.03)
r^t = 1y^t + 2y^t 1   3m^t   4^t+1 + 5q^t + 6q^t 1 + 7y^ft
 8y^ft 1 + "rdt; (4.04)
Etq^t+1 =  
h
(r^t   ^t+1)  (r^ft   ^ft+1)
i
+ "qt: (4.05)
y^t = output gap, r^t = three months treasury bill rate, ^t = domestic ina-
tion, ^ft = US ination, p^it = crude oil price, q^t = real exchange rate; y^
f
t =
foreign output, r^ft = LIBOR rate. & t = && t 1 + &t and #t = #t#t 1 + t;
where &t =

y^ft ; r^
f
t ; ^
f
t ; p{^t

; and #t = ("yt; "t; "mdt; "rdt; "qt; "rt; "mt; ) :
Furthermore; &t  N(0; 2& ) and #t  N(0; 2#):
                                
4.3.1 Aggregate demand
The aggregate demand (IS) dynamics described by eq.(4.01) arise from house-
holdsdesire to maximize utility subject to a constrained budget. The IS
equation features lead y^t+1 and lagged y^t 1 output variables which a¤ect out-
put positively due to rational expectations and habit formation (see Smets
and Wouters 2003). The term (r^t  Et^t+1) represents real interest rate and
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is negatively related to output. Similar to Ireland (2004) and Zanetti (2012),
eq.(4.01) also features real money balances m^t which are positively related
to output.
The IS equation also features the real exchange q^t. According to Senbeta
(2011), the bulk of Africas consumption are imports. This makes the ex-
change rate a key variable in macroeconomic dynamics. Following other
studies, e.g. Wollmershäuser (2006), we allow the exchange rate to a¤ect
the output dynamics in levels and changes. The equation also features the
foreign output y^ft variable which may a¤ect domestic output through for-
eign direct investments, foreign aid and trade. Similar to Ireland (2004), we
include an aggregate demand shock "yt which follows an AR(1) process.
4.3.2 Aggregate supply
Eq.(4.02) is a hybrid Phillips curve based on Gali and Gertler (1999), Baltini
et al. (2005) and Malikane (2014). Parameters  
f
and  b capture the degree
of forward and backward looking price setting, respectively (see Gali and
Gertler 1999). Ination is also positively a¤ected by the output gap at various
lags. Consistent with Senbeta (2011), supply dynamics are also driven by the
real exchange rate q^t since most inputs are imported. The presence of real
money balances m^t may reduce rms costs associated with searching for
alternative nancing to procure inputs. Castelnouvo (2012) argues that real
balances may also act as a forcing variable capturing demand push on prices.
Money may also a¤ect household labour supply decisions and hence the real
wage, due to the non-separability assumption, generating a positive link with
ination. The Phillips curve also exhibits input prices p^it: Recent studies, e.g.
Malikane (2014), show that including input prices generates a theoretically
consistent response of ination to the output gap. The term "t may capture
technology or cost push factors and is assumed to follow an AR(1) process
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"t = "t 1 + t; where t  N(0; 2)t is the aggregate supply shock.
According to Clarida et al. (2001), such a shock may arise from stochastic
wage mark-up in imperfect labour markets.
4.3.3 Money market dynamics
Eq.(4.03) describes money demand dynamics. Money demand is positively
related to current income y^t. Due to habit formation, eq.(4.03) also features
lagged income y^t 1:The term (r^t   ^t+1) captures the opportunity cost of
holding money. The derivations also lead to the inclusion of the real ex-
change rate in contemporaneous and lagged forms q^t and q^t 1 which may
a¤ect demand for money positively through several channels, like domestic
consumption of imported goods. The foreign output y^ft also a¤ect demand
for money positively through its impact on domestic income. The equation
also exhibits a money demand shock "mdt which is assumed to follows AR(1)
process. Eq.(4.04) is a corollary of eq.(4.03).
4.3.4 Exchange rate determination
Eq.(4.05) describes the exchange rate behaviour in terms of the Uncovered
Interest rate Parity (UIP) condition. The UIP describes the real exchange
rate dynamics as a function of real interest rate di¤erentials between domestic
and foreign economies. We however extend it with the foreign exchange risk
premium term "qt which captures the probable divergence of the exchange
rate behavior from the parity condition (see Wollmershäuser 2006). The risk
premium is also assume to follow AR(1) process. This specication is consis-
tent with African economies, where the UIP condition remains contentious.
This equation forms the basis of the majority of the recent open economy
models and has been used by Coenen and Wieland (2003) and Svensson
(2000).
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4.3.5 Monetary policy conduct
The conduct of monetary policy is described by two alternatives, ination
targeting and nominal GDP targeting regimes. As opposed to policy rules
which only respond to drivers of target variables, a policy regime is char-
acterized by the inclusion of the target variable in the central bank loss
function. Following Jensen (2002), monetary policy conduct is characterized
by the following state independent quadratic loss function delegated by the
government to the central bank:
Lt = Et
1X
j=0
j
1
2
 
^
2
t+j + yy^
2
t+j + nn^
2
t+j

; (4.06)
where n^t = ^t + y^t   y^t 1 is the rate of nominal GDP growth relative to its
real trend value. According to McCallum (2011), targeting the growth rates
of NGDP instead of levels is consistent with achieving the planned policy
path. Among other studies, Mitra (2003), Ball (2000) and Dennis (2001)
also advocate targeting the growth in NGDP instead of levels. Parameters
; y and n represent weights with which authorities penalize ination,
real GDP and nominal income deviations from their steady state.
Since monetary policy conduct is delegated by the government to the central
bank, xing the weights on the outset guards against the materialization
of the McCallum (1995) critique i.e. where government revises the social
loss function it delegates to the central bank. Jensen (2002) argues that a
monetary institution whose characteristics are constant across business cycles
is less subject to discretionary maneuvers. Mishikin (1999) further argues
that transparency and accountability are crucial to constraining discretionary
monetary policy so that it produces desirable long-run outcomes. In our
context, xing the weights also helps to eliminate arbitrariness in comparing
the performance of the monetary policy regimes.
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The regimes are implemented using the Taylor type interest rate rules. To
derive these rules, we follow Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and optimize
monetary policy by minimizing eq.(4.06) subject to eq.(4.02). We get the
following rst order conditions for ^t and y^t :
^t + nn^t +  bt+1   t = 0; (4.07)
yy^t + nn^t   nn^t+1 + t+1 3 +  1t = 0; (4.08)
where t is the Lagrangian multiplier. Combining eqs.(4.07) and (4.08) and
using the fact that n^t = ^t+ y^t  y^t 1 yields the following optimal condition:
1^t + 2^t+1 + 3^t 1 + 4y^t + 5y^t+1 + 6y^t 1   7y^t 2 = 0; (4.09)
where
1 =  + n  
 1 b   n b(1   1)  1
 1 b +  3
; 2 =
 bn
 1 b +  3
3 =
 1 + n(1 +  1)
 1 b +  3
; 4 = n  
(1  n b(1   1))   b(y + n)
 1 b +  3
5 =
 bn
 1 b +  3
; 6 =
n(1   1)(1  n) + y   n   1
 1 b +  3
;
7 =
n(1   1)
 ( 1 b +  3)
:
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In eq.(4.09), pushing the output gap terms to the right shows a trade-o¤ that
results from a disination process. In order to deal with ination, authorities
would raise the interest rates which will negatively a¤ect output. The equa-
tion describes optimal dynamics where monetary policy conduct is guided
by concerns to stabilize ination, real GDP and nominal income. Combining
eq.(4.01) with eq.(4.09) yields the following:
r^t = #1y^t+1 + #2y^t 1   #3y^t 2 + #4^t + #5^t+1 + #6^t 1 + #7(m^t   m^t+1)
+#8(q^t   q^t+1) + #9q^t+1 + #10q^t   #11q^t 1 + #12y^ft+1
+#13y^
f
t   #14y^ft 1 + "rt; (4.10)
where
#1 =

'14 + 5
4'3

; #2 =

'24 + 6
4'3

;
#3 =

7
4'3

; #4 =

1
4'3

; #5 =

1 +
2
4'3

;
#6 =
3
4'3
; #7 =
'4
'3
; #8 =
'5
'3
; #9 =
'6
'3
;
#10 =
'7
'3
; #11 =
'8
'3
; #12 =
'9
'3
; #13 =
'10
'3
; #14 =
'11
'3
:
Eq.(4.10) is a general Taylor-type interest rate rule and its dynamics are sim-
ilar to eq. (2.49). In the spirit of the New Keynesian models and also in-line
with the current wave of policy conduct sweeping across Africa, we compare
the regimes using the interest rate rule. The distinction in the policy regimes
is based on the conguration of the weights ; y and n that characterize
authoritiesaversion towards ination, output, and nominal GDP uctua-
tions, respectively. We are interested in assessing the performance of ve
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di¤erent monetary policy regimes arising from the general specication in
eq. (4.10). These policy regimes are presented in Table 16.
First, is the hybrid policy regime described by Model 1. As shown by Jensen
(2002), in Model 1 authorities are required to balance the volatility of ina-
tion, output and nominal income growth. Examination of this case serves
to complement the comparison of exible versions of the IT and NGDPT
regimes because it provides information on how strong an emphasis on either
variable should achieve if a combination regime is feasible. As can be shown
from eq. (4.10), n enters positively in all parameters describing the policy
rule. This serves to capture the fact that in order to respond to nominal
income, the parameters of the policy rule must now be adjusted by n. For
example, if n = 0; the coe¢ cient #5 which capture the response of mone-
tary policy to ination expectations collapses to a value of 1 but if nominal
income uctuations matter, this parameter will be inuenced by estimates
from the Phillips curve and also the discount factor . Eq.(4.10) shows that
by including nominal income targeting, the interest rate response to expected
income, lagged income, current ination, expected ination and lagged ina-
tion measured by parameters #1; #2; #3; #4 and #5 are adjusted accordingly
by the weight that authorities put on nominal income uctuations..
Similarly, Model 2 captures strict ination targeting. In this framework,
authorities do not pay attention to nominal income and real GDP devel-
opments. Therefore ; y = 0 and n = 0 but  > 0: The authorities are
only concerned with the deviations of ination from the target or steady
state. This makes the real GDP and nominal GDP terms to disappear from
the authoritiesloss function. Jensen (2002) refers to this case as pure dis-
cretion, where authorities share societys loss function. It corresponds to
a case where a benevolent government conducts discretionary policy by it-
self. Frisch and Staudier (2003) argues that by design, under strict ination
targeting a supply shock is prevented from a¤ecting ination while demand
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contraction reaches its maximum value since the weight on output in the loss
function is negligible. The higher the weight on output, the more ination
economic agents expect in future. When the weight is zero, private agents
expect su¢ cient contraction in demand due to a big rise in interest rates.
Model 3 describes Flexible Ination Targeting framework (see Svensson (1999).
In this framework, n = 0 but y > 0 and  > 0: This implies that the cen-
tral is concerned with controlling ination but not at the expense of real
GDP. This case is more consistent with current practice of monetary policy
by central banks (see King 1997). Authorities will normally pay some atten-
tion to real sector developments as they decide on the course of monetary
policy direction that is consistent with ination objective. Even when both
y and  are greater than zero, authorities may still choose to be more
conservative (Hawkish) by setting  > y. This case relates to a scenario
where authorities put more weight on stabilizing ination than real GDP
(see Rogo¤ 1985). By setting n = 0 in the objective function, authori-
ties do not consider nominal GDP developments when setting direction of
monetary policy.
Model 4 represents strict nominal GDP where authorities disregard devel-
opments in ination and real GDP but are only concerned with stabilizing
nominal GDP. In this framework  = 0 and y = 0 making the real GDP
and ination terms disappear from the authoritiesloss function. However,
Jensen (2002) argues that there is no need for authorities to disregard real
GDP just like they do not do so under exible ination targeting. He there-
fore suggest a fth case which is captured under Model 5 as Flexible nominal
GDP. Under this framework,  = 0 and hence the ination objective dis-
appears from the authoritiesloss function but y > 0 and n > 0 implying
that authorities still pay attention to real GDP developments as they target
nominal income.
All policy frameworks exploit cross-equation restrictions in order to constrain
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Table 16: Conguration of policy regimes based on the loss function
Model Weights
 y n
1. Hybrid regime > 0 > 0 > 0
2. Strict ination targeting > 0 = 0 = 0
3. Flexible ination targeting > 0 > 0 = 0
4. Strict NGDP targeting = 0 = 0 > 0
5. Flexible NGDP targeting = 0 > 0 > 0
the behavior of the target variables to be consistent with the policymakers
macroeconomic trajectory.
4.4 Data, calibration and simulation
4.4.1 Data and simulation
The data used is obtained from the International Financial Statistics of the
International Monetary Fund and is described in Table 17. The sample
periods used di¤er from country to country due to data availability as follows:
South Africa, Ghana, Uganda, Malawi and Egypt: 1990-2014; Tanzania and
Zambia:1993-2014; Morocco:1995 to 2014; Nigeria:1995-2014; Kenya: 1993-
2014. Where quarterly GDP is not available, e.g. Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia,
Egypt and Uganda, we interpolate.
We follow Zanetti (2012) and simulate a reduced form model using the Max-
imum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) method. This is consistent with an-
swering policy questions rather than recovering the underlying parameters.
According to Hansen and Sargent (2007), the MLE is consistent and asymp-
totically e¢ cient in DSGE models. As in Ireland (2004), we add error terms
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Table 17: Data description
Ination Calculated as a log di¤erence of the CPI between one
quarter and the same quarter of the previous year
Real balances Calculated as the log di¤erence between of the
money supply and the CPI
Output gap Calculated as the di¤erence between the log of
real GDP and its trend
Real exchange rate Calculated as the sum of the logs of the nominal bilateral
US dollar exchange rate and the US CPI less the log of
the domestic CPI
Foreign interest rate Proxied by the three months London Interbank O¤er Rate
Foreign output Proxied by the US real GDP
Foreign ination Proxied by US ination
Raw material price Proxied by Brent crude oil price
Policy rate Proxied by three months Treasury bill rate
to the observation equations in order to limit the e¤ects of misspecica-
tion and to deal with identication issues. The possibility of misspecication
abounds since the application of DSGE models in African economies remains
a relatively new area of research. We use output, ination and real balances
as our observable variables. In our model, we assume the following exogenous
stochastic processes also drive macroeconomic dynamics: & t = && t 1 + &t
where &t =

y^ft ; r^
f
t ; ^
f
t ;
doilpt and &t  N(0; 2& ): The estimable system is
composed of eqs. 4.01, 4.02, 4.03, 4.05, and 4.10.
4.4.2 Calibration
During simulations, we mostly use the estimated parameters which are pre-
sented in Tables 21 to Table 23. These parameters together with parameters
o; rf ; yf , and ff which measure persistence of AR(1) exogenous processes
are presented in the Appendix to Chapters 3 and 4. One key challenge is
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the choice of weight ; y and n characterizing the central bank loss func-
tion. There are several approaches in literature. First, they can be derived
from micro-foundations based on utility function of the households. However,
Woodford (2003) shows that when this approach is followed,  is frequently
found to be abnormally huge. This implies an extremely ination averse pol-
icy which is contrary to what is observed in practice. Due to this problem,
Chen et al. (2014) argue that estimation and calibration of these parameters
have become natural alternatives. Calibration is more appealing because the
conservatism of the central bank may di¤er from that of the representative
households.
In line with this, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) set y = 0:5 while Jensen
(2002) set y = 0:25: Broadbent and Barro (1997) set y = 0:33: Garin et al.
(2015) set n = 0:037: Other studies use the grid search to nd weights that
optimize the loss function. For example, Jensen (2002) uses a grid search and
nds that n = 1:2 is consistent with minimizing the loss function. The grid
search however also relies on initial calibration to dene the grid range and
setting of the grid steps may be considered adhoc. In our study, we follow
Chen et al. (2014) and calibrate parameters of the loss function. When
the weight on nominal income is positive, we follow Jensen (2002) and set
n = 1:2: Similar to Ghosh et al. (2015), we set  = 1. Furthermore,
in line with Taylors (1993) proposal and other studies, e.g. Leitemo and
Söderström (2005), we calibrate the output smoothing parameter at y = 0:5:
The calibration of the discount factor follows standard practice in literature
i.e.  = 0:99:
Jensen (2002) and Rudebusch and Svensson (2002) apply 0.01 standard de-
viation shocks to demand and supply and observe macroeconomic perfor-
mance under alternative regimes. We build on these studies by including
an exchange rate shock. We do this to capture the vulnerability of African
economies to terms of trade shocks. For each country, we identify dominant
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shocks and proceed to nd a policy regimes that i) minimizes uctuations of
GDP and Ination around the steady state and ii) restores these macroeco-
nomic variables back to steady state in a relatively short period of time after
each of the three shocks.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Historical decomposition
The dominant shocks are obtained by analysing historical decomposition of
ination and output. Thus the historical decompositions presented in Figs.
11 and 12 explain the dominant shocks driving ination and output uc-
tuations, respectively, in the selected countries. The black line depicts the
deviation of the smoothed values of ination and output at the calibrated
parameter values. The colored bars correspond to the contribution of the re-
spective smoothed shocks to the deviation of ination and output from their
steady state. Initial values refer to the part of the deviations from steady
state that are not explained by the smoothed shocks but rather by the un-
known initial value of the state variables. The inuence of the starting values
usually dies out relatively quickly.
Ination decomposition The decompositions of ination for each of the
10 selected countries are presented in Fig. 11. The decomposition shows
that in Zambia, demand shocks are a dominant driver of ination uctua-
tions followed by foreign output shocks while in Uganda, the dominant driver
of ination uctuations are demand shocks followed by supply and exchange
rate shocks. Similarly, in Ghana, demand shocks dominate followed by sup-
ply shocks while in Egypt, ination uctuations are mostly driven by demand
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shocks followed by foreign output shocks. In Malawi, demand shocks are lead
drivers of ination uctuations followed by exchange rate, foreign output and
oil price shocks in that order. In Tanzania, we nd that demand and foreign
output shocks explain the bulk of ination uctuations. Similarly, in Kenya
it is the demand shocks which are lead drivers of ination uctuations but
are closely trailed by the supply shocks while in South Africa, demand and
exchange rate shocks are key drivers of ination uctuations. In Nigeria, it
is the demand shocks which contribute more signicantly to ination uc-
tuations followed by supply and crude oil price shocks. We also nd that
the demand shocks dominate as the main driver of ination uctuations in
Morocco followed by supply shocks.
Overall, the results show that in all the countries demand shocks explain
the bulk of ination uctuations. In most cases, they are followed by supply
and exchange rate shocks. Several channels in Africa can result in demand
factors driving ination dynamics. First is through the link between com-
modity prices and government spending. Commodity prices rose from 2006
but started reversing in 2008. The trend in commodity prices has since
then remained volatile. Fluctuations in global oil, tobacco, copper, gold and
tea prices directly translate into uctuations in import and export duties
resulting in signicant swings in consumer as well as government spending
patterns. In some countries like Nigeria scal spending heavily relies on fuel
proceeds. The uctuations in scal spending act as shocks which directly
a¤ect aggregate demand and ination.
Second is through the foreign aid channel. Aid inows to Africa contribute
signicantly to total government expenditure. For example until recently,
around 40 percent of the budget in Malawi was traditionally nanced by
donors. Volatility in aid therefore directly a¤ects governmentsresource en-
velopes and translates into uctuations in aggregate expenditure and ina-
tion. Furthermore uctuations in terms of trade arising from commodity
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price changes together with volatile aid have direct e¤ect on the exchange
rate behaviour in commodity and aid dependent countries. Due to high pass-
through of the exchange rate to ination, uctuations in aid and commodity
prices directly translate into ination uctuations. Thirdly, some countries
such as Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia have relatively higher base for
demand. Autonomous changes in demand therefore directly a¤ect ination
uctuations.
The signicance of supply shocks is equally not surprising considering the
dependence of African countries on agriculture. Weather-dependent agricul-
tural production implies that when there is surplus production due to good
weather ination will tend to improve while during lean periods ination
will tend to go up thereby increasing the volatility of ination. IMF (2011)
shows that the probability of supply shocks is higher in Africa which also
suggest that the contribution of supply shocks to ination uctuations will
likely be higher. In the majority of countries, such as Malawi which have
high value addition from agriculture ranging from 30 to 40 percent of GDP,
the response of ination to one standard deviation shock to domestic supply
therefore tends to be relatively higher. These ndings are consistent with
Nguyen et al. (2017) who show that demand and supply shocks account for
55 percent and 45 percent, respectively, of ination uctuations in Africa.
Output decomposition
Fig. 12, shows the historical decomposition of output for all the selected
countries. It can be observed that in Zambia output uctuations are mostly
driven by demand shocks followed by exchange rate shocks while in Uganda,
it is the demand shocks that explain the largest portion of output varia-
tion followed by the exchange rate and money demand shocks. Similarly, in
Ghana and Tanzania, demand, exchange rate and supply factors have his-
torically been major drivers of output uctuations. In Malawi and Nigeria,
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apart from demand, exchange rate and oil price shocks are also major factors
which explain output uctuations. In Egypt, the exchange rate and supply
shocks are key drivers of output uctuations. In Kenya, we identify demand
and monetary policy shocks as signicant contributors to output volatility.
In South Africa, demand shocks dominate followed by exchange rate shocks
while in Morocco demand shocks are a major determinant of output uctu-
ations.
Similar to ination, demand shocks are found to be key drivers of output
uctuations in Africa followed by exchange rate and supply shocks. De-
mand shocks may arise from donor inows which if spent by government,
signicantly contribute to aggregate demand uctuations. The other source
of demand uctuations are scal borrowings which persistently inject liq-
uidity in the economies. Furthermore, in countries like Nigeria, where oil
proceeds contribute signicantly to government revenue, the uctuations in
global prices directly result in uctuations in domestic aggregate demand
(see Addison and Ghoshray 2013 and Rasaki and Malikane 2014). In the
other countries, this e¤ect comes via the impact that commodity prices have
on import and export duties. Fluctuations in commodity prices a¤ect con-
sumers via changes in their export proceeds and import costs. They also
a¤ect governments spending patterns via changes in tax revenues. These
changes generate cutuations in aggregate demand.
In terms of exchange rate shocks, trade and nancial linkages have increased
substantially since the 1990s when African countries embarked on structural
adjustment programmes which included nancial sector liberalization and
political democratization. These features have somehow assisted to open
African countries to the rest of the world. Although the level of openness
remains low, it has assisted to boost trade and foreign direct investment while
also exposing African countries to commodity price and terms of trade shocks.
The openness therefore has increased the prominence of the exchange rate in
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inuencing output dynamics in African countries (see Raddatz 2008), making
the exchange rate a signicant driver of ination and output uctuations.
These results have several policy implications in African countries. First,
the dominance of demand shocks implies that demand management policies
are key in dealing with macroeconomic uctuations in Africa. The results
therefore support the current trend where the majority of African countries
are seeking support from international partners, such as the IMF, to up-
grade their monetary policy frameworks to ination targeting. According to
Frankel (2014), the IT is superior in handling aggregate demand shocks. The
growing role of demand in driving ination and output dynamics, therefore,
calls for a rather active role for monetary policy as an aggregate demand
management tool. Caution must however be exercised since the huge part of
aggregate demand uctuations may arise from scal behavior and agriculture
production rather than households and rms.
Secondly, dealing with demand shocks alone is not su¢ cient to stabilize
African economies because supply and exchange rate shocks closely trail de-
mand shocks in explaining macroeconomic uctuations. The e¤ectiveness
and sustainability of the demand management policies will depend on imple-
mentation of sound policies that mitigate the impact of supply and exchange
rate shocks. These ndings therefore bring to the fore the problem of choos-
ing a single suitable policy framework to deal with diverse shocks in African
context. The more diverse the shocks a¤ecting a particular economy, as is
the case with Malawi, the more complex the macroeconomic management
process because a single policy instrument tends to generate pay-o¤ trade
o¤s.
In line with the proposition by IMF (2015), these ndings dispel a long-
standing perception among policymakers in Africa that supply side factors,
particularly global commodity prices and domestic weather-related and some-
times political shocks are the main drivers of ination. However, our results
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suggests that the sources of aggregate demand uctuations must be carefully
considered in designing monetary policy. Tightening monetary policy is con-
sistent with dealing with inationary threats if sources of aggregate demand
pressure are consumption and investment which according to the conven-
tional transmission channels will decline when monetary policy is tightened.
However, in African countries, imbalances may also arise from government
expenditure, weather shocks and trade imbalances.
In such cases, instead of using monetary policy, a review of the scal policy
might restore external competitiveness. Again, diversication from weather-
dependent agricultural production is necessary to reduce macroeconomic uc-
tuations. Similarly, a review of the exchange rate policy might correct the
trade imbalance. This implies that it is not always when actual output is
above target that tightening monetary policy would be an e¤ective resort.
We, however, underscore the fact that the prevalence of supply shocks does
not necessarily invalidate the stabilization role of monetary policy in the
medium term. Rather it does imply a limited role for monetary policy.
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Figure 11: Historical decomposition of ination
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Figure 12: Historical decomposition of output
158
4.5.2 Impulse responses
The impulse response functions (IRFs) of ination and output to demand,
supply and exchange rate shocks under di¤erent monetary policy regimes are
presented in Figs. 13-18. Fig. 13 shows impulse responses of ination to a
supply shock. The IRFs are theoretically consistent in all countries. A supply
shock in form of a cost push generates a rise in ination under all regimes.
The amplitude of the shock however varies under di¤erent monetary policy
regimes. On aggregate, the majority of the economies revert to steady state
earlier under the hybrid policy regime compared to other regimes.
Fig. 14 presents the response of ination to a demand shock under various
monetary policy frameworks. Consistent with standard economic theory, in
5 countries, namely Zambia, Uganda, Egypt, Tanzania and South Africa, a
positive demand shock generates inationary pressures under all monetary
policy regimes. The industrial classication of these countries shows that the
agriculture sector is relatively small, suggesting that agricultural contribution
to output uctuations is also less. This implies that these countries have a
relatively large demand base. Due to this, output behaviour conforms to the
standard New Keynesian theory where aggregate demand is a sole proxy for
real marginal costs such that when it goes up ination also rises (see Gali and
Gertler 1999). In the other countries, a rise in output leads to lower ination.
This contradicts the standard New Keynesian theory. This nding, however,
reects the dominance of agriculture as well as the relatively large weight of
food in the consumer price index (near 50 percent of the CPI is from food in
these countries). Given this setup, an increase in food production positively
contributes to output. However, it also forces the price of food items down.
This generates downward pressure on overall ination (see Berg et al. 2006).
Fig. 15 shows impulse responses of ination to exchange rate shocks. In all
countries, exchange rate depreciation is found to be inationary. As shown
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by Senbeta (2011), Africas production and consumption patterns are largely
based on imports. Furthermore, Senhadji (1997) shows that Africa has in-
elastic demand for imports. When the exchange rate depreciates, the price
of imports goes up. Given inelastic demand for imports, the depreciation
in the exchange rate directly translates into high prices of imported goods.
This generates a positive link between the exchange rate and ination.
Fig.16, shows the impulse responses of output to a supply shock. Output
contracts in all countries following a negative supply shock. This result,
which is standard in economic theory, is also found by Alpanda et al. (2010).
A positive innovation in the price cost-push poses a policy trade-o¤ for the
authorities. Since a cost push raises real marginal costs, it translates into
a rise in ination. At the same time a rise in cost of inputs depresses pro-
duction thereby reducing output. In some countries, such as South Africa
and Morocco, the behavior of the impulse responses for the di¤erent frame-
works is such that the di¤erences are minimal and may not be discernible
graphically (see Tables 18 and 19).
Fig. 17 shows the impulse responses of output to a demand shock. These
IRFs are all theoretically consistent. A rise in aggregate demand raises out-
put. However, there are some marked di¤erences on how di¤erent monetary
policy regimes respond. Ination targeting stabilizes output relatively fast
compared to other regimes. Fig. 18 shows the response of output to a positive
shock to the exchange rate. It shows that depreciations are contractionary in
5 countries, namely Malawi, Zambia, Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania. This is
consistent with ndings by Bahmani-Oskoee and Gelan (2013 who show that
depreciations are mostly contractionary in Africa. This result can partly be
attributed to inelastic demand for imports (see Senhadji 1997). When the
exchange rate depreciates, imports and exports respond sluggishly. There-
fore, the trade balance worsens. Furthermore, since imports are a leakage
in the national income identity, it lowers aggregate demand. Exchange rate
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depreciation also raises ination which negatively a¤ects output.
4.5.3 Optimal monetary policy regimes
Tables 18 and 19 present the variances of output and ination under di¤er-
ent monetary policy frameworks when the economies are faced with demand
(dd), supply (ss) and exchange rate (xr) shocks. For tractability, the vari-
ances are rounded to two decimal places and scaled by (10n). Due to this,
some variances may look similar but are not necessarily the same. Table 19
lists dominant shocks to output and ination. It also lists the regimes that
generate least volatility in ination and output under each shock. From this
table, we select regimes which generate least macroeconomic volatility when
the economy is faced with the dominant shocks. These regimes are presented
in Table 20.
The results show that in Uganda, it is the hybrid regime which is superior in
handling the dominant demand shock. In Ghana, strict ination targeting is
superior in handling demand, supply and exchange rate shocks. In Zambia,
the hybrid policy regime supersedes all other regimes in handling the demand
shocks. In Egypt, we nd the hybrid regime to be optimal since it is capable
of handling a majority of shocks that drive ination and output uctuations.
In South Africa, strict ination targeting is superior in handling demand
shocks.
In Malawi, demand, supply and exchange rate shocks are optimally handled
using the hybrid policy regime. In Nigeria, the optimal framework to deal
with the dominant demand shocks is the exible ination targeting. In Tan-
zania, the hybrid framework is superior as it robust to 67 percent of the
shocks driving macroeconomic uctuations. The results also show that in
Kenya, it is strict ination targeting which is superior in handling the de-
mand shocks. In Morocco, we nd that strict ination targeting is an optimal
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framework to handle both, demand shocks that generate output uctuations
as well as supply shocks that generate ination uctuations.
Overall, our results suggest that in 5 countries, namely Zambia, Uganda,
Egypt, Tanzania and Malawi, the hybrid policy framework performs better
in handling macroeconomic uctuations. The superiority of the hybrid frame-
work in these countries reects the dual nature of shocks a¤ecting African
economies. Since the hybrid framework combines elements of both ination
targeting and nominal GDP, it is not surprising that we nd it to be able
to respond to a variety of shocks. Jensen (2002) however suggests that to
operationalise the hybrid regime, a relatively small weight must be put on
the ination target compared to the real GDP and NGDP targets in the loss
function. However, when this happens then authorities are sliding more to-
wards NGDP targeting regime. Put di¤erently, sliding more toward nominal
GDP targeting regime will generate nearly similar results with the hybrid
regime. This partly explains the small di¤erences in estimated variances
under the hybrid and NGDP targeting regime.
In 4 countries, name South Africa, Ghana, Kenya and Morocco, it is the strict
ination targeting regime that performs better. The response of ination to
current output is relatively high in these countries. In South Africa, it is the
lagged output that carries a relatively high value. Jensen (2002) shows that
under such circumstances, ination targeting will be inferior to nominal GDP
targeting because NGDP targeting induces inertia in policy making. When
ination is very sensitive to output gap measures, technological shocks play a
much more prominent role in ination determination. Changes in the output
gap become very powerful in stabilizing ination which in turn reduces the
importance of ination expectations as a stabilizing device. This suggests
that there exists some level of sensitivity of ination to aggregate demand
beyond which strict IT will be preferable to NGDP targeting. Jensen (2002)
suggests a value of 0.4. The majority of the parameters in these countries
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are way above this value (see Table 22).
The dominance of SIT also reects the fact that these countries have rela-
tively small share of food ination in the overall Consumer Price Index. This
together with a comparatively large demand base provides fertile ground for
the success of ination targeting. Due to these factors, strict ination target-
ing does not generate a policy trade o¤ which normally arises when output
is mostly driven by agriculture. The authoritiesreaction to ination is also
relatively stronger in these countries. This suggests that the actual weight
that authorities place on ination stabilization is comparatively high than
other countries (see Table 24). According to Frankel (2014) high weight on
ination makes SIT perform better than NGDPT. This study also identies
demand and exchange rate shocks as key drivers of macroeconomic uctua-
tions. The dominance of demand and exchange rate shocks create a favorable
ground for the success of IT regimes in these countries.
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Table 20: Optimal monetary policy regimes under dominant shocks
Dominant Shocks Optimal policy regime
Ination Output
Zambia DD, FO DD, XR Hybrid
Uganda DD, SS, XR DD, XR, MD Hybrid
Ghana DD, XR DD, XR SIT
Egypt DD, FO XR, SS Hybrid
South Africa DD, XR DD, XR SIT
Malawi DD, XR, FO DD, XR, Oil Hybrid
Nigeria DD, SS DD, XR, Oil FIT
Tanzania DD, FO DD, XR Hybrid
Kenya DD DD, MP SIT
Morocco. DD DD SIT
HY: Hybrid, SIT: Strict ination targeting, FI: Flexible ination,
SN: Strict nominal, FN: Flexible nominal GDP, FO: Foreign Output,
MD: Money demand, MP: Monetary policy
4.6 Conclusion
In this study, we use an open economy new-Keynesian model to examine
the relative performance of ination targeting and nominal GDP targeting
as alternative monetary policy frameworks for macroeconomic stabilization
in 10 selected African economies. Terms of trade and supply shocks confront
policymakers with di¢ cult choices in Africa. These shocks create a trade-o¤
between ination and output stabilization. African countries are particularly
vulnerable given the large share of food in consumption, the exposure of the
agricultural sector to weather-related shocks and the exposure to terms of
trade shocks. Identifying coherent monetary policy regimes robust to these
shocks is therefore of rst order importance. To address this question, we use
a New Keynesian model estimated using the Maximum Likelihood technique
with quarterly data mostly ranging from 1990 to 2014.
We nd several results. First, aggregate demand shocks are key in explaining
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ination and output uctuations in Africa. This nding is in line with Nguyen
et al. (2017) who shows that 55 percent of ination variation in some African
countries results from demand shocks. Our results also corroborate those of
IMF (2015) that supply features and weather related issues are not the main
drivers of macroeconomic uctuations in Africa. This result supports the
view that ination targeting which is superior in handling demand shocks
can be suitable for the majority of African countries. As argued by Frankel
(2014), the performance of ination targeting is superior when demand shocks
dominate. It is not surprising therefore that, some African countries, such as
Tanzania, Nigeria, Malawi and Zambia, are attempting to improve monetary
policy performance with the support from the International Monetary Fund
by moving to ination targeting frameworks (see IMF 2008).
However, our results also suggest caution as supply and terms of trade shocks
are the second and third largest drivers of macroeconomic uctuations in
Africa, respectively. This follows the dependence of African countries on
commodity exports and agriculture. It is therefore not surprising that in
5 countries, namely Zambia, Uganda, Egypt, Malawi and Tanzania, it is
the hybrid policy framework which is robust to macroeconomic uctuations.
The superiority of the hybrid framework in these countries reects the dual
nature of shocks a¤ecting African economies. Being a hybrid regime, the
demand shocks are taken care of but not completely at the expense of the
supply shocks since the hybrid framework combines elements of both ination
targeting and nominal GDP. This result stands in contrast to the current
direction of monetary policy that is sweeping across African countries where
a majority of them are adopting ination targeting.
In the other 4 countries, namely Ghana, Kenya, South Africa and Morocco,
it is the strict ination targeting framework that performs better. In these
countries the demand base is relatively large which is a favorable condition
for ination targeting. These results somehow render credence to the current
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policy practice in Ghana, South Africa and Uganda which are using ination
targeting frameworks. However, they suggest that monetary policy perfor-
mance can be enhanced in South Africa and Ghana if authorities implement
strict versions of the ination targeting regime. In Uganda, augmenting the
IT regime with NGDP targeting resulting into a hybrid policy regime is more
consistent with macroeconomic stabilization. Similarly, our nding are some-
what consistent with Kenya which is in transition to ination targeting. The
results however suggest that Kenya should implement a strict version of the
IT rather than the exible version.
On the other hand, in Zambia, Egypt, Tanzania and Malawi we nd the cur-
rent drive to migrate from monetary aggregate targeting to ination target-
ing to be inconsistent with macroeconomic stabilisation. Rather, our ndings
suggest that macroeconomic performance can be enhanced in these countries
by adopting hybrid monetary policy regimes which combine elements of both
ination targeting as well as nominal GDP targeting. In doing so, authori-
ties will be able to deal with multiple shocks that can neither be handled by
ination targeting nor nominal GDP targeting alone (see Jensen 2002).
Overall, the variation in the optimal monetary policy frameworks reects the
diversity in shocks a¤ecting African countries. The ndings therefore throw
caution against a blanket adoption of specic monetary policy regimes for all
the countries in Africa. These ndings suggest that there is room to enhance
the performance of monetary policy in Africa by adopting regimes which are
robust to prevailing shocks. However, the diversity in shocks also imply that
the choice of monetary policy frameworks is not a straight forward issue.
Identifying sources of macroeconomic volatility is thus critical for the choice
of robust monetary policy regimes. The larger the number of shocks a¤ecting
a particular economy, the more complex the macroeconomic management
process. This nding brings to the fore the problem of a one-size-ts-all
approach to choices in monetary policy frameworks in Africa.
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Lastly, the ndings suggest that controlling ination in Africa is not a de-
mand management issue alone. Authorities need to address supply side bot-
tlenecks to ensure sustainable agriculture/food production. Furthermore,
according to Engels Law, raising incomes will allow people to devote less
spending on food items. This will leave the bulk part of their income to be
a¤ected by monetary policy developments. This together with addressing
scal slippages can assist improving interest rate transmission which could
result in ination targeting regimes becoming more e¤ective in Africa.
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Figure 13: Impulse responses of ination to the supply shock
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Figure 14: Impulse responses of ination to the demand shock
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Figure 15: Impulse responses of ination to the exchange rate shock
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Figure 16: Impulse responses of output to the supply shock
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Figure 17: Impulse responses of output to the demand shock
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Figure 18: Impulse responses of output to the exchange rate shock
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5 Conclusion and policy options
The global direction in monetary policy conduct shows that the majority
of countries are adopting ination targeting with active use of interest rate
instruments. However, as observed by Berg et al. (2010), the practice in
African countries is somewhat di¤erent from the global trend. The di¤erence
arises due to several factors, such as underdeveloped nancial markets, high
frequency of terms of trade shocks and dominance of supply shocks, that
characterize African economies (see Nguyen et al. 2017). These factors
pose unique macroeconomic management challenges which include ine¢ cient
transmission of interest rate signals. Furthermore, these factors impede the
speedy adoption of IT and interest rate based regimes as they raise doubts as
to whether standard monetary policy as practiced in Advanced Economies
can be applied to Africa. At the same time, money demand is perceived to
be unstable leading to authoritiesdissatisfaction with the performance of
the monetary aggregate targeting regimes.
African authorities are thus caught up with the need to re-examine the reach
and limits of their monetary policy frameworks and instruments to address
these challenges. The re-examination also occurs on the backdrop of several
factors, such as global push towards IT and interest rate regimes and the
absence of clear monetary policy frameworks in Africa. Although achieving
macroeconomic stability through monetary policy largely relies on appropri-
ate conguration of monetary policy frameworks and instruments, literature
on the subject is little and mostly focused on Advanced Economies. Findings
from these studies are also divided making choices on the subject di¢ cult for
African countries.
In order to address these issues, this thesis investigates the relative perfor-
mance of alternative monetary policy frameworks and instruments in macro-
economic stabilization of 10 selected African economies. Specically, we ex-
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amine three issues. First, we compare the relative performance of the mone-
tary aggregate and the interest rate as policy instruments for macroeconomic
stabilization in the selected countries. Secondly, we examine the implications
of exchange rate smoothing using monetary policy rules on macroeconomic
stabilization in these countries. Lastly, we compare the relative performance
of ination targeting and nominal GDP targeting as alternative frameworks
for macroeconomic stabilization in the selected countries. In order to per-
form these comparisons, we derive and estimate a New Keynesian Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium model where money is non-separable from
consumption in the utility function. We mostly use quarterly data from
1990 to 2014 obtained from the International Financial Statistics of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund. The model is estimated using the maximum
likelihood technique.
We nd several results. First, In 5 of the 10 countries, namely Nigeria,
Malawi, Tanzania, Morocco and Zambia, it is the monetary aggregate instru-
ment which performs better in macroeconomic stabilization. These results
reects the fact that macroeconomic dynamics respond relatively more to
changes in the monetary aggregate than the interest rate in these countries.
In the other 5 countries, namely South Africa, Egypt, Ghana, Uganda and
Kenya, it is the interest rate instrument which performs better. Literature
suggests that interest rate instrument perform better when aggregate de-
mand is mostly driven by the core rather than food and other supply related
factors (Mishra et al. 2012). Furthermore, interest rate instruments perform
better under developed nancial markets. It is therefore not surprising that
in the latter group of countries where weight on food ination is relatively
small and nancial infrastructure developments is comparatively high, the
interest rate instrument is more successful in stabilizing the economies than
the monetary aggregate.
Our results further suggest an overall weak role of the interest rate in driving
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aggregate demand dynamics. This signals a weak interest rate transmission
process. Therefore, for authorities to use the interest rate as an e¤ective pol-
icy instrument, they need to adjust it with relatively large magnitudes. At
times such huge adjustments may be inconsistent with exchange rate, scal
and nancial stability objectives. Given this nding, e¤orts to modernize
monetary policy conduct must also include those that enhance interest rate
transmission mechanism, such as development of domestic nancial markets.
On the other hand, we nd la relatively large economic signicance of the
monetary aggregate. This suggests that a blanket abandonment of the mon-
etary aggregate as a policy instrument in Africa may be inconsistent with
macroeconomic stabilization goals.
Secondly, in 4 of the 10 countries, namely Ghana, Kenya, Malawi and Tanza-
nia, there is strong evidence for countries to engage in exchange rate smooth-
ing as doing so enhances macroeconomic performance. In these countries, the
pass-through of the exchange rate to ination is relatively high. The signi-
cance of the exchange rate therefore compels authorities to minimize the pass-
through by engaging in exchange rate smoothing. Despite facing declining
terms of trade, these countriescurrencies remained relatively stable in the
2000s suggesting that authorities smoothed the exchange rate uctuations.
This resulted in less pass-through to ination with marked improvements in
macroeconomic performance.
In the other 6 countries, namely Egypt, South Africa, Morocco, Nigeria,
Uganda and Zambia, engaging in exchange rate smoothing worsens macro-
economic performance. These results are consistent with IMF (2008), Taylor
(2001) and Calvo et al. (1995). In some countries, such as Nigeria and Mo-
rocco, which pursue near xed regimes, the exchange rate does not carry any
additional information from the domestic economy. Adjusting monetary pol-
icy to deal with uctuations therefore only makes interest rates more volatile.
The link between aggregate demand and interest rates implies that volatile
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interest rates will lead to volatile macroeconomic activity (Calvo 1995). In
other countries such as South Africa, which are relatively open economies,
monetary policy responds to external and domestic factors. Interest rate
developments elsewhere trigger monetary policy action due to the UIP con-
dition. At the same time monetary policy responds to domestic develop-
ments. This may result in overly frequent adjustments to monetary policy
which translates into volatile interest rates and hence volatile macroeconomic
performance.
We also nd evidence that macroeconomic performance is sensitive to the
level of aggressiveness towards exchange rate uctuations. Below certain
thresholds, the pass-through of the exchange rate remains high. In this case,
increasing the level of smoothing improves macroeconomic performance. Be-
yond certain thresholds, smoothing is tantamount to implementing a near
xed exchange rate regime which as shown by Baldini et al. (2015) raises
macroeconomic instability. Heavy exchange rate management can also re-
duce the exchange rates shock-absorbing role. In view of the vulnerability
of African economies to external shocks, it is important that African coun-
tries maintain exible exchange rate system to act as cushions during times
of shocks. However, as argued by IMF (2015), nding the right role for the
exchange rate is likely to be an unsettled, evolving, and ultimately country-
specic challenge. Authorities need to be able to identify episodes that re-
quire smoothing to avoid straying from mitigating disorderly conditions or
volatility to managing the exchange rate away from fundamentals. Exchange
rate smoothing should not ideally be a substitute for macroeconomic adjust-
ments.
Since exchange rate depreciations are contractionary in some countries, re-
acting to exchange rate movements due to ination concerns may stabilize
ination but jeopardize output. Given that many African countries rely on
very few, if not one, commodity for foreign exchange earnings, it is necessary
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that these countries pursue policies that promote industrial diversication
and pursue import substitution policies to mitigate external shocks. Devel-
oping deep and liquid foreign exchange rate markets together with coherent
foreign exchange intervention strategies is key in ensuring that the exchange
rate policy is consistent with other macroeconomic objectives.
Fourth, the results also show that demand shocks are dominant drivers of
macroeconomic uctuations in Africa. The dominance of demand shocks
implies that African countries can adopt the ination targeting framework
which according to Frankel (2014) is superior in handling aggregate demand
shocks. It is not surprising, therefore, that some African countries, such as
Tanzania, Nigeria, Malawi and Zambia, are attempting to improve monetary
policy performance with the support from the IMF by moving to ination
targeting regimes (see IMF 2008). However, these results also throw caution
as supply and exchange rate shocks closely trail demand shocks in driving
macroeconomic uctuations in Africa. This suggests that choosing a suitable
monetary policy framework is a complex process for authorities in African
economies.
Given this setup, in 5 countries, namely Zambia, Uganda, Egypt, Malawi
and Tanzania, it is the hybrid policy framework which is robust to macro-
economic uctuations arising from diverse shocks. In the other 4 countries,
namely Ghana, Kenya, South Africa and Morocco, it is strict ination tar-
geting framework that performs better. In Nigeria, it is the exible ination
targeting that yields lowest macroeconomic uctuations. The superiority of
the hybrid framework in the majority of the countries reects the dual nature
of shocks a¤ecting African economies since the hybrid framework combines
elements of both ination targeting and nominal GDP.
Our ndings suggest that there is room to improve the performance of mone-
tary policy in Africa by adopting suitable monetary policy regimes and instru-
ments as well as appropriate conguration of the policy instruments which
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are consistent with the dominant shocks. As argued by IMF (2015), in con-
sidering these improvements, it is essential that countries take into account
the specic conditions and challenges facing them. These ndings therefore
throw caution against a generalized adoption of some specic monetary policy
regimes or instruments across all the countries in Africa. Rather, the nd-
ings suggest that the process must be guided by periodic and country-specic
analyses to ascertain the relevance of particular policies. Policy-makers must
proceed at their own pace, taking into account local conditions.
This thesis contributes to the current state of knowledge and debate on mon-
etary policy frameworks and instruments in Africa. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is a rst study in African economies cast within the general equi-
librium rendition which makes a comparative analysis of the performance
of alternative monetary policy regimes and instruments, where instruments
are further adjusted to account for exchange rate smoothing. We however
opine that inclusion of debt, scal and nancial sector dynamics in our model
may enhance model dynamics and are therefore necessary avenues for further
research.
6 References
Adam, C., 2011. On the macroeconomic management of food price shocks
in Low Income Countries. Journal of African Economies 20 (1), 63-69.
Adam, C., Kessy, P., 2010. Assessing the stability and predictability of the
money multiplier in the EAC: The case of Tanzania.
Ades, A., Buscaglia, M., Masih, R., 2002. Ination targeting in Emerging
Market Countries. Too much exchange rate intervention?: A Test. Associa-
tion Argentina de Economica Politica Working paper 1658.
Alpanda, S., Kotzé, K., Woglom, G., 2010. The role of the exchange rate in a
New Keynesian DSGE model for the South African economy. South African
181
Journal of Economics 78 (2), 170191.
Alvarez, F., Lucas, R. E., Weber, W. E. (2001). Interest rates and ination.
The American Economic Review 91 (2), 219-225.
Anand, R., Prasad, E.S. and Zhang, B., 2015. What measure of ination
should a developing country central bank target?. Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 74,102-116.
Andrés, J., López-Salido, J. D., Nelson, E., 2009. Money and the natural
rate of interest: Structural estimates for the United States and the euro area.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33 (3), 758-776.
Andrle, M., Berg, M.A., Berkes, M.E., Portilo, M.R.A, Vlcek, M.J., Morales,
M.R.A., 2013. Money targeting in a mordern forecasting and policy analysis
system: an Application to Kenya. IMF Publications
Andrle, M., Berg, A., Morales, R.A., Portillo, R. and Vlcek, J., 2015. On
the Sources of Ination in Kenya: A Model-Based Approach. South African
Journal of Economics, 83(4), 475-505.
Aoki, K., 2001. Optimal monetary policy responses to relative-price changes.
Journal of monetary economics 48 (1), 55-80.
Araújo, L., Guimarães, B., 2015. A coordination approach to the essentiality
of money. Textos para discussão 381, Escola de Economia de São Paulo,
Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
Bahmani-Oskooee, M., Gelan, A., 2013. Are devaluations contractionary in
Africa? Global Economic Review 42 (1), 114.
Baldini A., Benes J., Berg A., Dao M., Portillo R., 2015. Monetary policy
in low income countries in the face of global crisis. Pacic Economic Review
20 149-192.
Ball, L., 1999. E¢ cient rules for monetary policy. International Finance 2
(1), 63-83.
Ball, L. 2000. Policy rules and external shocks. National Bureau of Economic
Research. WP 7910
Barnichon, R., Peiris, S. J., 2008. Sources of ination in sub-Saharan Africa.
182
Journal of African economies 17 (5), 729-746.
Batini, N., Harrison, R., Millard, S. P., (2003). Monetary policy rules for an
open economy. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 27 (11), 2059-
2094.
Batini, N., Jackson, B., Nickell, S., 2005. An Open-economy New Keynesian
Phillips Curve for the UK. Journal of Monetary Economics 52, 1061-1071.
Batini, N., Nelson, E., 2000. When the bubble bursts: monetary policy rules
and foreign exchange market behavior. Bank of England, London.
Batini, N., Yates, A. 2003. Hybrid ination and price-level targeting. Journal
of Money, Credit, and Banking 35(3), 283-300.
Belongia, M. T., Ireland, N. P., 2015. A Working solution to the question of
Nominal GDP targeting. Macroeconomic Dynamics.
Benchimol, J., FourÇans, A., 2012. Money and risk in a DSGE framework:
A Bayesian application to the Euro Zone. Journal of Macroeconomics 34,
95-111.
Berg, M. A., Unsal, D. F., Portillo, R., 2010. On the Optimal adherence
to money targets in a New-Keynesian Framework: An Application to Low-
Income Countries IMF Publication, No. 10-134.
Bernanke, B. S., Gertler, M., 2001. Should central banks respond to move-
ments in asset prices? American Economic Review 91 (2), 253257
Bhattacharya J., Signh R., 2008. Optimal choice of monetary policy instru-
ments in an economy with real and liquidity shocks. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control 32, 1273-1311.
Borio, C. E. V., Lowe, P. W., 2002. Asset prices, nancial and monetary
stability: Exploring the nexus. BIS Working Paper No. 114.
Brischetto, A., Voss, G., 1999. A structural vector autoregression model
of monetary policy in Australia. Economic Research Department, Reserve
Bank of Australia.
Bukhari, A. H., Khan, S. U., 2008. A small open economy DSGE model for
Pakistan. The Pakistan Development Review, 963-1008.
183
Calvo, G.A., 1983. Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework. Jour-
nal of monetary Economics, 12 (3), 383-398.
Calvo, G. A., Reinhart, C. M., Vegh, C. A. 1995. Targeting the real exchange
rate: theory and evidence. Journal of Development Economics 47 (1), 97-133.
Calvo, G. A., Reinhart, C., 2002. Fear of oating. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 117 (2), 379-408.
Calvo, G.A., 2001. Capital Markets and the Exchange Rate, with Special
Reference to the Dollarization Debate in Latin America. Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking 33, 312.
Calvo, G.A., 2001. Capital markets and the exchange rate, with special
reference to the dollarization debate in Latin America. Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking 33, 312-334
Canova, F., Menz, T., 2011. Does money matter in shaping domestic busi-
ness cycles? An international investigation. Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking 43 (4), 577-607.
Canzoneri, M., Henderson, D., 1989. Optimal choice of monetary policy in-
struments in a simple two country game dynamic policy games in economics,
547-564.
Canzoneri, M., Cumby, R., Diba, B., LÓPEZ-SALIDO, D., 2008. Mone-
tary Aggregates and Liquidity in a Neo-Wicksellian Framework. Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking 40 (8), 1667-1698.
Castelnouvo, E., 2012. Estimating the evolution of moneys role in the U.S
monetary business cycle. Journal of Money Credit and Banking 44 (1), 23-52
Chari, V. V., Kehoe, P. J., McGrattan, E. R., 2000. Sticky price models of the
business cycle: Can the contract multiplier solve the persistence problem?.
Econometrica 68 (5), 1151-1179.
Chen, X., Kirsanova, T., Leith, C., 2014. An Empirical Assessment of Op-
timal Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area. Available at SSRN
2561078.
Coenen, G., Wieland, V., 2002. Ination dynamics and international link-
184
ages: A model of the United States, the Euro area and Japan.
Coenen, G., Wieland, V., 2003. The zero-interest-rate bound and the role
of the exchange rate for monetary policy in Japan. Journal of Monetary
Economics 50 (5), 1071-1101.
Krugman, P. and Taylor, L., 1978. Contractionary e¤ects of devaluation.
journal of International Economics 8(3), 445-456.
Davoodi, H., Dixit, S, Pinter, G., 2013. Monetary transmission in the East
African Community: An empirical investigation. IMF Working paper 13/39.
Dennis, R. 2001. Monetary policy and exchange rates in small open economies.
FRBSF Economic Letter.
De Paoli, B., 2009. Monetary policy under alternative asset market struc-
tures: The case of a small open economy. Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking 41 (7), 1301-1330.
Del Negro, M., Schorfheide, F., 2003. Take your model bowling: forecasting
with general equilibrium models. Economic Review-Federal Reserve Bank
Atlanta 88 (4), 3550.
Devereux, M., Lane, P., Xu, J., 2006. Exchange rate and monetary policy in
Emerging Market Economies. The Economic Journal 116 (511), 478-506.
Dornbusch, R., Fischer, F., 1992. La inación moderada. Economía Mexi-
cana NUEVA ÉPOCA 1, 5-70.
Durevall, D., Sjö, B. 2012. The Dynamics of Ination in Ethiopia and Kenya.
African Development Bank Group.
Edwards, S. and Ahamed, L., 1986. Introduction to Economic Adjustment
and Exchange Rates in Developing Countries. In Economic Adjustment and
Exchange Rates in Developing Countries (pp. 1-16). University of Chicago
Press.
Eichengreen, B., 2006. Can emerging markets oat? Should they target in-
ation. Monetary Integration and Dollarization, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar
S, 149-175.
Evans, George W., Honkapohja, S., 2003. Friedmans money supply rule
185
vs. optimal interest rate policy.Scottish Journal of Political Economy 50 (5),
550-566.
Fan, L., Yu, Y. and Zhang, C., 2011. An empirical evaluation of Chinas
monetary policies. Journal of Macroeconomics, 33(2), 358-371.
Favara, G., Giordani, P., 2009. Reconsidering the role of money for output,
prices and interest rates. Journal of Monetary Economics 56(3), 419-430.
Frankel, J., Smit, B. and Sturzenegger, F., 2008. Fiscal and monetary policy
in a commodity-based economy. Economics of Transition, 16(4), pp.679-713.
Frankel, J., 2014. Nominal GDP Targeting for Middle-Income Countries.
Central Bank Review 14 (3), 1.
Friedman, M. 1963. Post war trends in monetary theory and policy. Center
of Economic Research.
Frisch, H., Staudinger, S., 2003. Ination targeting versus nominal income
targeting. Journal of Economics 78 (2), 113-137.
Fuhrer, J. C., Rudebusch, G. D., 2004. Estimating the Euler equation for
output. Journal of Monetary Economics 51 (6), 1133-1153.
Fujiwara, I., 2007. Is there a direct e¤ect of money?: Moneys role in an
estimated monetary business cycle model of the Japanese economy. Japan
and the World Economy 19 (3), 329-337.
Furlani, L. G. C., Portugal, M. S., Laurini, M. P., 2010. Exchange rate move-
ments and monetary policy in Brazil: Econometric and simulation evidence.
Economic Modelling 27 (1), 284-295.
Gal¬, J., Gertler, M. and Lopez-Salido, J.D., 2001. European ination dy-
namics. European economic review 45(7), pp.1237-1270.
Gali, J., & Gertler, M., 1999. Ination dynamics: A structural econometric
analysis. Journal of monetary Economics 44 (2), 195-222.
Gali, J., 2008. Monetary policy, ination and the business cycle: An in-
troduction to the New Keynesian framework. Princeton University Press,
Oxford.
Gali, J., Gertler, M., Lopez-Salido, J. D., 2001. European ination dynamics.
186
Euoropean Economic Review 45 (7), 1237-1270.
Garcia, C. J., Restrepo, J. E., Roger, S., 2011. How much should ination
targeters care about the exchange rate?. Journal of International Money and
Finance 30 (7), 1590-1617.
Garín, J., Lester, R., Sims, E., 2015. On the Desirability of Nominal GDP
Targeting (No. w21420). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Ghosh, A.R., Ostry, J.D., Chamon, M., 2015. Two targets, two instruments:
Monetary and exchange rate policies in emerging market economies. Journal
of International Money and Finance 60, 172-196.
Goodhart, C., Hofmann, B., 2005. The IS curve and the transmission of
monetary policy: is there a puzzle?. Applied Economics 37 (1), 29-36.
Gordon, R., 1979. Monetary policy and the 1979 shock, NBER Working
Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Gupta, R., Jooste, C., 2014. Is the South African Reserve Bank inuenced
by exchange rates when setting interest rates? Banks and Bank Systems.
Hansen, L. P., Sargent, T. J., 2007. Recursive robust estimation and control
without commitment. Journal of Economic Theory, 136 (1), 1-27.
Heintz, J., Ndikumana, L., 2011. Is there a case for formal ination targeting
in sub-Saharan Africa?. Journal of African Economies 20 (2), 67-103.
Ho, C., McCauley, R.N., 2003. Living with exible exchange rates: Issues
and recent experience in Ination Targeting Emerging Market Economies.
BIS Working Paper No. 130.
Houssa, R., Otrok, C., Puslenghea, R., 2010. A model for monetary policy
analysis for Sub-Saharan Africa. Open Economies Review 21 (1), 127-145.
Hufner, F., 2004. Foreign exchange intervention as a monetary policy instru-
ment: Evidence for Ination Targeting Countries. Physica-Verlag.
IMF, 2008. Monetary and exchange rate policies in sub-Saharan Africa,
Chapter II. In World Economic and Financial Surveys, Regional Economic
Outlook, Sub-Saharan Africa 2741.
IMF, 2011. Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa, IMF publi-
187
cations.
IMF, 2014. Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions. IMF Publications
IMF, 2016. Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions. IMF Publications
IMF, 2014. Improving monetary policy framework in SSA countries. In IMF
Regional Economic Outlook, 43-61.
IMF, 2015. Evolving monetary policy frameworks in Low-income and other
Developing countries. IMF publications.
Ireland, P. N.,2004. A method for taking models to the data. Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control 28 (6), 1205-1226.
Ireland, P., 2004a. Moneys role in the monetary business cycle. Journal of
Money Credit and Banking 36, 969-983.
Ireland, P., 2004b. Technology shocks in the New Keynesian models. The
Review of Economics and Statistics 86 (4), 923-936.
Jensen, H., 2002. Targeting nominal income growth or ination?. The Amer-
ican Economic Review 92 (4), 928-956.
Jonsson, G., 2001. Ination, money demand, and purchasing power parity
in South Africa. IMF Sta¤ papers 48(2), 243-265.
Kamps, C., Pierdzioch, C. 2002. Monetary policy rules and oil price shocks.
Kasekende L, Brownbridge M., 2011. Post-crisis Monetary Policy Frame-
works in sub-Saharan Africa. African Development Review 23(2),190-201.
Kim, J., Henderson, D. W., 2005. Ination targeting and nominal-income
growth targeting: When and why are they suboptimal? Journal of Monetary
Economics 52 (8), 1463-1495.
King, M. 1997. Changes in UK monetary policy: Rules and discretion in
practice. Journal of Monetary Economics 39(1), 81-97.
Klau, M., Mohanty, M. S., 2004. Monetary policy rules in emerging market
economies: issues and evidence.
Knell, M., Stix, H., 2005. The income elasticity of money demand: A meta-
188
analysis of empirical results. Journal of Economic Surveys 19(3), 513-533.
Kose, M.A., Riezman, R. (2001). trade shocks and macroeconomic uctua-
tions in Africa. Journal of development economics, 65(1), 55-80.
Krugman, P. and Taylor, L., 1978. Contractionary e¤ects of devaluation.
journal of International Economics 8(3), pp.445-456.
Leitemo, K., Söderström, U., 2005. Simple monetary policy rules and ex-
change rate uncertainty. Journal of International Money and Finance 24 (3),
481-507.
Liu, L., Zhang, W., 2010. A New Keynesian model for analyzing monetary
policy in Mainland China. Journal of Asian Economics 21 (6), 540-551.
Loening, J. L., Durevall, D., Birru, Y. A., 2009. Ination dynamics and food
prices in an agricultural economy: The case of Ethiopia. World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper Series.
Lubik, T. A., Schorfheide, F., 2007. Do central banks respond to exchange
rate movements? A structural investigation. Journal of Monetary Economics
54 (4), 1069-1087.
Malikane, C., 2014. A new Keynesian triangle Phillips curve. Economic
Modelling 43, 247-255.
Mehrotra, A. and Sánchez-Fung, J.R., 2010. Chinas monetary policy and
the exchange rate. Comparative Economic Studies 52 (4), 497-514.
Meltzer, A. H. (2001). The transmission process. In The Monetary Trans-
mission Process (12-130). Palgrave Macmillan UK.
McCallum, B. T. 1988. Robustness properties of a rule for monetary policy.
In Carnegie-Rochester conference series on public policy 29, 173-203.
McCallum, B. T., 1995. Two fallacies concerning central bank independence
(No. w5075). National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 5075.
McCallum, B. T., Nelson, E., 1997. An optimizing IS-LM specication for
monetary policy and business cycle analysis. National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper 5875.
McCallum, B., 2000. Alternative monetary policy rules: A comparison with
189
historical settings for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan,
Economic Quarterly, pages 49-79
McCallum, B., Nelson, E., 2000. Monetary policy for an open economy:
An alternative framework with optimizing agents and sticky prices. Oxford
Review of Economic Policy 16 (4), 74-91.
McCandless, G., 2008. The abcs of rbcs. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London:
Harvard.
Mishkin, F. S., 1999. International experiences with di¤erent monetary pol-
icy regimes. Journal of monetary economics 43 (3), 579-605.
Mishkin, F.S., Savastano, M.A., 2001. Monetary policy strategies for Latin
America. Journal of Development Economics. 66 (2), 415444.
Mishra, P., Montiel, P. J., Spilimbergo, A. (2012). Monetary transmission in
low-income countries: e¤ectiveness and policy implications. IMF Economic
Review, 60 (2), 270-302.
Mitra, K., 2003. Desirability of nominal GDP targeting under adaptive learn-
ing. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 35 (2), 197-220.
Monacelli, T., 2004. Into the Mussa puzzle: monetary policy regimes and
the real exchange rate in a small open economy. Journal of International
Economics 62 (1), 191-217.
Moura, M. L., de Carvalho, A., 2010. What can Taylor rules say about
monetary policy in Latin America?. Journal of Macroeconomics 32 (1), 392-
404.
Muhanji, S., Malikane, C., Ojah, K., 2013. Price and liquidity puzzles of
a monetary shock: Evidence from indebted African economies. Economic
Modelling 33, 620-630.
Muhanji, S., Ojah, K., 2011. External shocks and persistence of external debt
in open vulnerable economies: The Case of Africa. Economic Modelling 28,
1615-1628.
Nell, K. S., 2004. The structuralist theory of imported ination: an applica-
tion to South Africa. Applied Economics 36 (13), 1431-1444.
190
Nelson, E. and Nikolov, K., 2002. Monetary Policy and Stagation in the
UK.
Nelson, E. (2003). The future of monetary aggregates in monetary policy
analysis. Journal of Monetary Economics 50 (5), 1029-1059.
Nguyen AD, Dridi J, Unsal FD, Williams OH., 2017. On the drivers of
ination in Sub-Saharan Africa. International Economics.
Nordstrom, A., Roger, M. S., Stone, M. M. R., Shimizu, S., Kisinbay, T.,
Restrepo, J., 2009. The role of the exchange rate in ination targeting
economies, International Monetary Fund Working Paper 267
OConnell, S., 2011. Towards a rule based approach to monetary policy
evaluation in Sub-saharan Africa. Journal of African Economies 20, 36-66.
Orphanides, A., Porter, R. D., Reifschneider, D., Tetlow, R., Finan, F., 2000.
Errors in the Measurement of the Output Gap and the Design of Monetary
Policy. Journal of Economics and Business, 52 (1), 117-141.
Orphanides, A., Van Norden, S., 2002. The unreliability of output-gap esti-
mates in real time. Review of economics and statistics 84 (4), 569-583.
Pavasuthipaisit, R., 2010. Should Ination targeting central banks respond
to exchange rate movements?. Journal of International Money and Finance
29 (3), 460-485.
Peiris, S., Saxegaard, M., 2010. An estimated DSGE model for monetary
policy analysis in Low-Income Countries. IMF working Paper WP/07/282.
Petrella, I., Santoro, E., 2012. Ination dynamics and real marginal cost:
new evidence from US manufacturing industries. J. Econ. Dyn. Control. 36,
779794.
Pfeifer, J., (2014). A guide to specifying observation equations for the esti-
mation of DSGE models. Research Issue, 1-150.
Poole, W., 1970. Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a simple
stochastic macro-model. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 197-216.
Prescott, E.C., 1986. Theory ahead of business-cycle measurement. In
Carnegie-Rochester conference series on public policy 25 11-44).
191
Rasaki, M., Malikane, C., 2015. Macroeconomic shocks and uctuations in
African economies. Journal of Economic Systems 39 (4), 675-696.
Razamahefa, I.F., 2012. Exchange rate pass-through in sub-Saharan African
economies and its determinants.
Rotemberg, J., Woodford, M. 1998. An optimization-based econometric
framework for the evaluation of monetary policy: Expanded version, NBER
Technical Working Papers 0233.
Rogo¤, K. 1985. The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate
monetary target. The quarterly journal of economics 100 (4), 1169-1189.
Rotemberg, J., Woodford, M., 1997. An optimization-based econometric
framework for the evaluation of monetary policy, in: National Bureau of
Economic Research 12, 297361.
Rudd, J., Whelan, K., 2005. New tests of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve.
Journal of Monetary Economics 52 (6), 11671181.
Rudd, J. and Whelan, K., 2007. Modeling ination dynamics: A critical
review of recent research. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 39, 55-170.
Ruge-Murcia, F., 2007. Methods to estimate dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium models. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31 (8),
2599-2636
Sanchez, M., 2008. The link between interest rates and exchange rates:
do contractionary depreciations make a di¤erence? Journal of International
Economics 22 (1), 4361.
Sargent, T., Wallace, N., 1975. Rational expectations, the Optimal monetary
instrument, and the optimal money supply rule. Journal of Political Economy
83 (2), 241-54.
Sbordone, et.al., 2010. Policy analysis using DSGEModels: An Introduction.
Economic Policy Review 16 (2).
Schmitt-Grohé, S. and Uribe, M., 2004. Solving dynamic general equilibrium
models using a second-order approximation to the policy function. Journal
of economic dynamics and control 28(4), 755-775.
192
Sidaoui, J. 2003. Implications of scal issues for central banks: Mexicos
experience. BIS Papers, Bank for International Settlements 20, 180-197.
Sekkat, K., Varoudaks, A., 2000. Exchange rate management and manufac-
tured exports in Sub-saharan Africa. Journal of Developments Economics 61
(1), 237-253.
Senbeta, S. R., 2011. A small open economy new Keynesian DSGE model
for a foreign exchange constrained economy. Available at SSRN 1812743.
Senhadji, s., (1997), Time series of structural demand equations-A cross
country analysis. IMF working paper 97/132. International Monetary Fund,
Washington.
Sheedy, K. D., 2014. Debt and Incomplete Financial Markets: A Case for
Nominal GDP Targeting. CEPR Discussion Paper 9843.
Sichei, M., Kamau, A., 2010. Demand for Broad Money in Kenya: unpub-
lished. Nairobi: Central Bank of Kenya.
Sims, C. A., Zha, T. (2006). Does monetary policy generate recessions?.
Macroeconomic Dynamics 10 (2), 231-272.
Smets, F., Wouters, R., 2003. An estimated dynamic stochastic General
Equilibrium Model of the Euro Area. Journal of the European Economic
Association 1 (5), 1123-1175.
Sumner, S., 2012. How nominal GDP targeting could have prevented the
crash of 2008. Boom and burst banking: the causes and cures of the great
recession
Sumner, S., 2015. Nominal GDP futures targeting. Journal of Financial
Stability, 17, 65-75.
Svensson, L. E., 1999. Ination targeting as a monetary policy rule. Journal
of monetary economics 43 (3), 607-654.
Svensson, L. E., 1999. Monetary policy issues for the Eurosystem. In
Carnegie-Rochester conference series on public policy 51, 79-136.
Svensson, L. E., 2000. Open-economy ination targeting. Journal of inter-
national economics 50 (1), 155-183.
193
Svensson, L., 2002. Ination targeting: Should it be modeled as an instru-
ment rule or a targeting rule? European Economic Review 46 (4-5), 771-780.
Svirydzenka, K. (2016). Introducing a new broad-based index of nancial
development.
Taylor, J. 1999. The robustness and e¢ ciency of monetary policy rules as
guidelines for interest rate setting by the European central bank. Journal of
Monetary Economics 43, 655-679.
Taylor, J. B., 2001. The role of the exchange rate in monetary-policy rules.
American Economic Review 91 (2), 263-267.
Taylor, J., 1979. Estimation and control of a macroeconomic model with
rational expectations. Econometrica, Econometric Society 47 (5), 1267-86.
Taylor, J., 1993. Discretion versus policy rules in practice. Carnegie Rochester
conferences on Public Policy 39 (1), 195-214.
Taylor, J.B., 2000. Using monetary policy rules in EmergingMarket Economies,
in: 75th Anniversary Conference, Stabilization and Monetary Policy: The
International Experience. Bank of Mexico.
Timbergen, J. 1952. On the theory of economic policy.
Thomas, A.H., 2012. Exchange Rate and Foreign Interest Rate Linkages for
Sub-Saharan Africa Floaters, IMF Working Paper 12/208
Thornton, J., 2008. Money, Output And Ination In African Economies.
South African Journal of Economics, 76 (3), 356-366.
Walsh, C. E., 2001. The output gap and optimal monetary policy. Unpub-
lished manuscript, UC Santa Cruz.
Wollmershäuser, T., 2006. Should central banks react to exchange rate move-
ments? An analysis of the robustness of simple policy rules under exchange
rate uncertainty. Journal of Macroeconomics 28 (3), 493-519.
World Development Indicators (2011), World bank
Woodford, M., 2000. Monetary policy in a world without money. Interna-
tional Finance 3 (2), 229-60.
Woodford, M., 2003. Optimal interest rate smoothing. The Review of Eco-
194
nomic Studies 70 (4), 861-886
Woodford, M., 2008. How important is money in the conduct of monetary
policy? Journal of Money Credit and Banking 40 (8), 1561-98.
Woodford, M., 2014. Monetary Policy Targets After the Crisis. IN Ak-
erlof, GA, Blanchard, O., Romer, D. and Stiglitz, J.(eds.), What have we
Learned,55-62.
Zanetti, F. (2012). Banking and the role of money in the business cycle.
Journal of Macroeconomics 34 (1), 87-94.
Zhang, W., 2009. Chinas monetary policy: Quantity versus price rules.
Journal of Macroeconomics 31(3), 473-84.
7 Appendix to Chapters 3 and 4: Model deriva-
tions and parameter estimates
A.1 Households
Maximize utility:
Ut= Et
1P
j=0
j

1
1 
h 
Cdt   hCdt 1
1 
+
 
Cmt   hCmt 1
1 i Mt
Pt

  N1+'t
1+'

; (A.01)
Subject to a HH Budget Constraint:
Mt
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
+
ZtB
f
t
Pt
=
WtNt
Pt
+
Mt 1
Pt
+
(1 + rt 1)Bt 1
Pt
+
Zt(1 + r
f
t 1)B
f
t 1
Pt
 Cdt QtCmt ;
((A.02))
where j2 (0; 1) = discount factor,  > 0 = elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution, 0    1 = elasticity of money demand, h = habit formation, Nt =
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labour, ' = Frisch labour supply elasticity, Mt = money, Bt = bonds, B
f
t = for-
eign bonds, Wt = wages, Zt = nominal exchange rate, Qt = real exchange rate,
Pt = domestic price level, P
f
t = foreign price level, rt = domestic interest rate,
rft = foreign bonds, C
d
t=consumption of domestic goods, C
m
t = consumption of
foreign goods.
The rst order conditions are:
 
Cdt   hCdt 1
  Mt
Pt

= t; (A.03)
 
Cmt   hCmt 1
  Mt
Pt

= Qtt; (A.04)
Ett+1

1 + rt
1 + t+1

= t; (A.05)
Ett+1
 
1 + rft
1 + t+1
!
Zt+1
Zt

= t; (A.06)

1  

Mt
Pt
 1
Xt = t   Et

t+1

1
1 + t+1

;(A.07)
N't
t
=
Wt
Pt
: (A.08)
where t is the Lagrangian multiplier and
Xt =
h 
Cdt   hCdt 1
1 
+
 
Cmt   hCmt 1
1 i
.
The Taylor approximation of eq.(A.03) to eq.(A.07) around the steady state
yields the following:
c^dt =
1
1 + h
Etc^
d
t+1 +
h
1 + h
c^dt 1  
(1  h)
(1 + h)
(r^t   Et^t+1)
+
(1  h)
(1 + h)
(m^t   Etm^t+1); (A.09)
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and
c^mt =
1
1 + h
Etc^
m
t+1 +
h
1 + h
c^mt 1  
(1  h)
(1 + h)
(r^t   Et^t+1)
+
(1  h)
(1 + h)
(m^t   Etm^t+1)  (1  h)
(1 + h)
(q^t   Etq^t+1): (A.10)
A.2 Macro-balance
The Macro-balance is based on McCallum (2000) as follows:
y^t =  cc^
d
t + xx^t   mc^mt ; (A.11)
where x^t = exports,  c =
c^d0
y^0
; x =
x^0
y^0
; and m =
c^m0
y^t
represent steady state
ratios of relevant variables to income, q = elasticity of exports with respect
to exchange rate , f = elasticity of exports with respect to foreign income.
The export function is:
x^t = q q^t + f y^
f
t : (A.12)
Substituting eq.(A.10) and eq.(A.12) into eq.(A.11) and using the fact that
 cy^t = c^
d
t ; xy^t = x^t;and my^t = c^
m
t yields the following expression:
y^t = 1Ety^t+1 + 2y^t 1   3(r^t   Et^t+1) + 4 (m^t   Etm^t+1)
+5 (q^t   Etq^t+1) + 6Etq^t+1 + 7q^t + 8q^t 1 + 9Ety^ft+1
 10y^ft   11y^ft 1 + "yt; (A.13)
where
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1 =
1
(1 + h)
; 2 =
h
(1 + h)
; 3 =
(1  h)
(1 + h)
; 4 =
(1  h)
(1 + h)
;
5 =
(1  h)
(1 + h)
; 6 =
xq

; 7 =
xq

; 8 =
xq

,
9 =
fx

; 10 =
xf

; 11 =
xf

;  =  c c   mm:
A.3 Exchange rate determination
Combining Taylor approximation around steady state of eq.(A.05) and eq.(A.06)
yields:
Etz^t+1 = r^t   r^ft : (A.14)
The real version of Eq. (A.14) can be given as:
Etq^t+1 =  
h
(r^t   ^t+1)  (r^ft   ^ft+1)
i
+ "qt: (A.15)
As in Wollmershäuser (2006) and Svensson (2000), the term "qt is included to
typically capture deviations from parity and is referred to as foreign exchange
risk premium.
A.4 Money demand
We combine steady state forms of eq.(A.07) and eq.(A.05) and use the econ-
omy wide resource balance in eq.(A.11) to derive the following money market
equilibrium conditions:
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m^t = 	1y^t +	2y^t 1  	3(r^t   Et^t+1) 	4Et^t+1 +	5q^t +	6q^t 1  	7y^f
+	8y^
f
t 1 + "mdt; (A.16)
r^t = 1y^t + 2y^t 1   3m^t   4^t+1 + 5q^t + 6q^t 1 + 7y^ft
 8y^ft 1 + "rdt; (A.17)
where
	1 =
(x   m)(1  )(xx   mm)
2(1  )(1  h) ; 	2 =
h(1  )(x   m)(xx   mm)
2 (1  ) (1  h) ;
	4 =
1
2(1  ) ; 	5 =
q(1  )(x   m)x
2 (1  ) (1  h) ; 	6 =
q(1  )(x   m)xh
2 (1  ) (1  h) ;
	7 =
f (1  )(x   m)x
2 (1  ) (1  h) ; 	8 =
fh(1  )(x   m)x
2 (1  ) (1  h) ; 1 =
	1
	3
,
2 =
	2
	3
, 3 =
1
	3
, 4 =
1 + 	4
	3
, 5 =
	5
	3
, 6 =
	6
	3
, 7 =
	7
	3
,
8 =
	8
	3
; 	3 =
1
2(1  ) :
The terms "rdt and "mdt are money demand shocks.
A.5 Firms
Following Batini et al. (2005) and Malikane (2014) , we assume that rms
exhibit non-linear input demand. The non-labour input demand therefore
takes the following form: Xjt = Y
j
t . Xjt are non-labour inputs; j is the
199
elasticity of input j in the production process. Firms are assumed to seek
prot maximization but operate in a monopolistically competitive environ-
ment and face staggered price setting as in Calvo (1983). The production
function is Cobb-Douglas in nature and is specied as follows:
Yt = AtN

t
"
mY
j=1
Y
jj
t
#
: (A.18)
At is an AR (1) technological process. Parameter  = labour share in in-
come, j =elasticity of output with respect to input j. The reduced form for
eq.(A.18) is given by:
Yt = AtN

t ; (A.19)
Where  = 
1 	 ; 	 =
mP
j=1
jj , At = A
1
1 	
t : The rmss real total costs can
be expressed as the sum of real wage and non-labour factor costs as follows:
TCt =
WtY
1

t
Pt A
1

+
mX
j=1
PjtY
j
t
Pt
; (A.20)
Combining eq.(A.08) and eq.(A.19) yields the following real wage expression:
Wt
Pt
=

Yt
At
 '
 1
t
: (A.21)
Combining eq.(A.20) and eq.(A.21), and letting pit denote real price of non-
labour input yields the following real marginal cost expression:
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1
Y
2
t
A
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t
1
t
+
mX
j=1
jpjtY
i 1
t ; (A.22)
where 1 =
'+1

; 2 =
1 +'

and 3 =
+(1 	)(1+')
(1 	) : The Taylor approxima-
tion of eq.(A.22) yields:
rm^ct = 1y^t   2a^t   3^t +
mX
j=1
4p^jt; (A.23)
Where
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#
Next, we combine the steady state form of eq.(A.04) and eqs.(A.11) and
(A.12) and substitute the result in eq.(A.23) to get the following expression:
rm^ct = 1y^t +

3 + m
1  h

Ety^t+1  

3 + hm
1  h

y^t 1   3q^t
+
3qxm
1  h Etq^t+1  
3qhxm
1  h q^t 1   3m^t
+
3fxm
1  h Ety^
f
t+1  
3fhxm
1  h y^
f
t 1 + 4p^jt   2a^t:(A.24)
Substituting eq.(A.24) into the baseline hybrid new-Keynesian Phillips curve
201
proposed by Gali and Gertler (1999) yields the following hybrid Phillips
curve:
^t = fEt^t+1 + b^t 1 + 1y^t + 2Ety^t+1 + 3y^t 1 + 4q^t
+5Etq^t+1   6q^t 1 + 7m^t + 8Ety^ft+1   9y^ft 1
+ 10p^jt + "t; (A.24)
where
1 = c1; 2 =

c
3m(mm    c c)
1  h ; 3 =

c
h(mm    c c)
1  h ;
3 =

c
h)( 2m    2c)
1  h ; 4 = c3; 5 =

c
3xmq
1  h ;
6 =

c
3xmq
1  h ; 7 = c3; 8 =

c
3fxm
1  h ;
9 =

c
3fxm
1  h , 10 = c4; c = (1  )(1  )(1  !);
 =
1  
1 + (  1) f + ! [1   (1  )]g
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Table 26: Parameters of the exogenous variables-AR(1) coe¢ cients
Equation Parameter Description Value
Foreign output 
yf
AR(1) 0.95
Foreign interest rate 
rf
AR(1) 0.96
Foreign ination 
ff
AR(1) 0.89
Crude oil prices o AR(1) 0.96
Table 27: Correlation between policy instruments, ination and output
Zambia Uganda Tanzania S. Africa Nigeria
m r m r m r m r m r
y 0.31 -0.32 0.01 -0.07 0.02 -0.12 0.57 -0.42 0.62 0.10
 -0.30 -0.03 -0.41 0.51 -0.01 0.23 -0.30 0.46 -65 -0.16
Morocco Malawi Kenya Ghana Egypt
y 0.01 -0.01 -0.16 -0.36 0.06 -0.22 0.23 -0.28 0.13 0.27
 -0.15 0.07 -0.29 0.73 -0.69 0.36 -0.34 0.60 -0.47 0.34
Correlations by monetary policy regimes
IT Other MAT CP
m r m r m r m r
y 0.27 -0.25 0.33 -0.14 -0.003 -0.07 0.01 -0.01
 -0.35 0.52 -0.55 0.06 -0.26 0.43 -0.15 0.07
m=money supply, r=Nominal interest rate, =Ination, CP=Conventional peg
MAT=Monetary Targeting, Other=other regimes, IT=Ination Targeting, y=output gap,
208
Variables in deviation from steady state
Figure 19: Trend in variables used in the model
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